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ABSTRACT 
Communist Miscellany: The Paperwork of Revolution 
Jian Ming Chris Chang 
 
 
“Communist Miscellany” is a history of file-keeping and bureaucratic paperwork 
in Maoist China, examined through the institution of individual dossiers on Chinese 
subjects known as dang’an. Drawing upon an original sourcebase of deaccessioned 
archival dossiers, the project explores how the party-state bureaucracy fashioned an 
archive of Maoist society through scrupulous routines of investigative, clerical, and 
material labor. 
In Maoist China, one of the primary responsibilities of local bureaucratic units 
was to compile detailed individualized dossiers on party members, cadres, workers and 
students under their jurisdiction. The dossier constituted a master record of a subject's 
social identity, probing issues of class status, personal background, family relationships, 
political activities and attitudes. Broadly instituted in the 1950s on the basis of the 
Soviet model, the stated purpose of the dossier system was to inform staffing decisions 
for personnel management in the planned economy. However, in the Mao era, the 
dossier was widely deployed as a surveillance instrument, producing a living archive of 
“political and historical problems” among the people. For ordinary citizens, materials 
gathered through the dossier were the basis of crucial class labels and the grounds for 
political advancement. The paper-bound practices of the dossier informed the generic 
presentation of identity and evidence while supplying material for everyday political 
acts. 
This study of the dossier system engages current debates on bureaucratic culture, 
social surveillance, and archive in the PRC. A project of immense ambition, the dossier 
system straddled the imperatives of permanent revolution and socialist state-building 
to transcribe a record of Chinese society in the Maoist image. The continuous expansion 
of the dossier system over the Mao era gave rise to elaborate routines of file-keeping 
and paperwork as well as unexpected consequences of the bureaucratic will to 
knowledge. The bureaucratic tendency toward overaccumulation and excess in the 
production of dossier materials exposes the political and epistemic insecurities that 
drove social surveillance. The practical demands of the dossier system strained the 
ability of local bureaucrats to keep pace with requests for intelligence, shaping an 
approach to file-keeping that conceived its own distinctive forms of knowledge and 
incapacity. 
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Introduction 
The Maoist Dossier: 
Archive and Ephemera 
At the height of the Cultural Revolution, a division of the rebel-aligned Zhejiang 
Workers’ Congress published a biting takedown of party revisionists. Packaged as a 
parody of the dossier system, the single-issue booklet was titled, Beat the Down Dogs.1 Its 
cover featured the familiar Cultural Revolution iconography of a proletarian hero 
impaling the revisionist leadership on a railway spike as Chairman Mao’s face hovered 
over the scene like a red sun. Inside, Beat the Down Dogs printed the “dossiers” of twelve 
revisionist leaders—Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Tao Zhu, among others. To 
any Chinese reader in the 1960s, the format of the contents would have been instantly 
recognizable as emulating the genre of personnel files, but the dossiers were unlike any 
others. 
For instance, the “dossier” of Liu Shaoqi placed a pockmarked, forlorn caricature 
of the late Premier alongside the standard fields that formed the header portion of cadre 
background forms: 
1 Beat the Down Dogs 痛打落水狗 (Zhejiang Workers Congress 浙江省工代会斗批改组,
1968). 
2 
“Name: Liu Shaoqi 
Birth Name: Pervert Liu | Aliases: China’s Khruschev, the Black Commander 
Year of Birth: 1899 | Origin: Hunan, Ning County, Huaminglou Township 
Class Origin: Landlord 
Political Activity: Renegade, bandit, and traitor, and leader of all of the above 
The file proceeded to offer variations on the conventional sections on the dossier, 
including “Family and Family’s Political Situation,” “So-called Publications” and 
“Criminal History.” These sections detailed, among other misdeeds, Liu’s romantic 
liaisons (naming four women he had “abandoned”), his cover-up of treasonous 
activities during the revolution (using the “plot of bitter flesh”), and a selection of his 
counter-revolutionary remarks (“In this world, there is neither absolute love, nor 
absolute hate”).2 
Other Chinese leaders came in for similar treatment. Luo Ruiqing, the once-
powerful head of the Central Bureau of Public Security, was classified as a 
2 The “Plot of Bitter Flesh” is known as one of the ’36 Stratagems’ a compilation of classical 
military stratagems with a long written and oral history. The “Bitter Flesh” refers to a 
strategic sacrifice for greater gain. 
Fig. 1 Beat the Down Dogs
3 
‘capitulationist,’ ‘fake proletarian,’ and ‘big spy.’ Tan Zhenlin suffered the most 
grotesque portrait, supplemented by a field describing his “Vulgar Philosophy”: “Good 
food, clothes, housing, and entertainment; add some science and physical education 
and that’s socialism!” Tao Zhu’s file, emulating the conventional use of appendices in 
dossiers, even reprinted a Nationalist Party “Evaluation Letter” as evidence of an 
enemy conspiracy. 
Fig. 2 Tan, Luo, and Yang Shangkun’s ‘dossiers’ from Beat the Down Dogs (1968)
Little of Beat the Down Dogs would qualify as subtle, but the booklet’s dark
humor resonated deeper and closer to home. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, the 
dossier system had grown into a near-universal institution of classified files on Chinese 
citizens maintained by their bureaucratic superiors. Access to a dossier—the ability to 
read, edit, categorize and archive—was a privilege of entrenched power. Most likely, 
any person reading Beat the Down Dogs resided on the other side of the dossier system,
and would have experienced its probing routines firsthand as a subject of registration, 
investigation, and evaluation. Chinese citizens never saw the contents of their own file. 
Seeing the dossier of a senior leader was all but politically inconceivable. Placing party 
4 
leaders in that compromised position—as the subject of a file—might have been read as 
a subversive commentary on the socialist political order, but at least everyone could 
appreciate the irony. The radicals behind Beat the Down Dogs, in their critique of
entrenched bureaucratic power, had appropriated one of its preeminent artifacts. 
This dissertation traces a unique object and institution—the dossier—through 
Maoist China. It is a history of file-keeping and preserved knowledge, the neuroses of 
bureaucracy, paper-bound routines, and the lives subjected to archive. It follows the 
path of recent scholarly approaches in reading the dossier “along the archival grain,” 
exploring continuities in material, political, bureaucratic, and epistemic approaches to 
doing things with files.3 I extend this critical focus in engaging the dossier as an archive 
of everyday politics, revealing the mundane, material sources of bureaucratic authority, 
and the unintended consequences of the will to social knowledge.  
3 Along the Archival Grain is the name of Ann Stoler’s influential book, which I draw upon
in this introduction and generally throughout this text. Ann Stoler, Along the Archival 
Grain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
Fig. 3 An early cadre dossier (compiled 1949-50) 
5 
Despite its constant presence in life under Maoism, the dossier is an 
understudied and misunderstood topic of historical research.4 The proximate origins of 
the dossier are found in the institution of CCP personnel records in the revolutionary 
capital of Yan’an, launched as an eclectic set of practices in the 1940s to enable internal 
surveillance of the party rank-and-file. Following liberation, an emergent system of 
internal personnel dossiers was routinized and successively extended to broader groups 
of cadres, professionals, workers, and students. Drawing inspiration from the 
individual file systems employed in the Soviet Union, the formal aim of the new PRC 
dossier system was to advise the allocation of labor and expertise in a centrally planned 
economy. As socialist construction extended state control to all fields of Chinese society, 
personnel administration became increasingly commensurate with socialist governance, 
and the personnel archive expanded to encompass broad segments of the Chinese 
population. 
Political surveillance was tightly entwined with the routines of the dossier. In the 
Mao era, the personnel records served a secondary purpose as an instrument for 
monitoring social threats, collectively forming a ‘living’ archive of “political historical 
problems” among the population. One of the primary responsibilities of work unit 
administrators, working in conjunction with the local Public Security Bureau, was to 
prepare detailed personal histories, evaluations, and investigative reports on persons 
under their jurisdiction. For cadres and citizens alike, information recorded in their 
4 What I refer to as the personnel ‘dossier’ is commensurate with the Chinese renshi dang’an
人事档案, or colloquially geren dang’an 个人档案. English translations occasionally give
‘personnel file’ or ‘personal file’ as alternatives, which have unintentionally produced a 
fair degree of confusion in the Anglophone literature. 
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dossier provided the material grounds for political opportunity or discipline. A 
standard set of documents were kept in the dossier file as a permanent record of an 
individual’s social identity, supporting paper routines to bureaucratically mark 
professional ability, class status, political history, and personal relationships. The paper 
routines of the dossier consumed the bureaucratic occupation and organized the lives of 
Chinese subjects through subtle, unexpected, and profound measures. 
Subjects of Surveillance 
The Chinese dossier system engages a broader history of socialist states and their 
operation of central filing systems. The archetype of the Maoist dossier—a 
comprehensive record stemming from routine personnel investigation—was 
omnipresent in the file collections of socialist nations across Eastern Europe and Asia in 
the 20th century. The Maoist dossier, like its analogous institutions in Eastern Europe, 
was initially modeled upon the Soviet Union’s permanent records on Bolshevik party 
members and nomenklatura distinctions.5 In the PRC, the uneven translation of the 
Soviet personnel archive produced a system of files bearing formal and terminological 
similarities to its Soviet predecessor, but differing in important dimensions of 
methodology, depth, and scope. 
From the distant remove of the present, any consideration of these socialist 
dossier systems seems to instantly invite strained comparisons with the Orwellian 
surveillance state, or other dystopian futures of information control. But considered 
                                               
5 Lit., ‘the list of names,’ referring to the personnel and the process through which key 
positions throughout the state bureaucracy were centrally staffed. For the differences in 
the CCP version, John Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System : A 
Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984. (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1989). 
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within its own historical specificity, the history of the socialist dossier is in dialogue 
with an established academic literature on surveillance and social control. The 
scholarship in this area continues to be deeply informed by Michel Foucault’s 
theoretical arguments on the structure of disciplinary institutions and their production 
of political subjects.  
Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s panopticon is a useful point of entry to the 
surveillance functions of the dossier system. Based of course upon Jeremy Bentham’s 
18th century reformist vision of the ideal prison, the panopticon as presented by 
Foucault presents an architectural analogy for how modern disciplinary institutions 
produce docile subjects through hierarchies of observation. The central feature of the 
panopticon is the construction of lines of sight that enables the jailer to observe all, even 
as the inmates are only able to see that they are under observation. The constant threat 
of surveillance removes the need for physical repression, as the awareness of the jailer’s 
gaze trains the inmates to police themselves. 
Foucault undoubtedly would have appreciated the panoptic ambitions of the 
dossier system, which in many respects, attempted to create by means of archive what 
the panopticon envisioned through architecture. If the power of the panopticon is 
grounded in the metaphor of vision, the dossier system operates through a analogous 
system of reading and legibility.6 Dossiers are transcripts of social persons, and the 
ability to read is the ability to interpret, to critique, to evaluate, and to file away. The 
efficacy of the dossier is not premised on the basis of what is actually transcribed, but 
the subject’s anxiety of what might be written, and that someone is reading. The self-
                                               
6 James C. Scott develops a similar metaphor of legibility out of the Foucauldian paradigm. 
James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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submitted forms of the dossier invite countless acts of self-identification and voluntary 
disclosure which created the basis for bureaucratic examination. Confessional genres, 
combined with the file’s total inaccessibility to its subject, co-opt the subject into the 
process of their own surveillance. Even in the absence of individual wrongdoing, the 
repetitive, trivial tasks of self-reporting train the surveilled to regulate their behavior 
according to the prescriptive norms of the observer. 
For the dossier system, these overlapping practices of surveillance, 
documentation, evaluation, and archive were involved in the formation of particular 
subjects, congruent with the process that Ian Hacking so eloquently terms ‘making up 
people.’7 Hacking’s work builds directly upon the Foucauldian observation that modern 
disciplinary institutions seek to produce the very subjects that they control, and that 
they do so through the discursive formation of the categories that condition social 
experience. The dossier system presents a literal form of Hacking’s nominalism in 
action. One of the primary outputs of the dossier was to distinguish and record 
sociopolitical labels pertaining to persons, such as ‘middle peasant,’ ‘cadre,’ ‘landlord,’ 
‘student’ and so on. All of these appellations carried meaningful social consequences 
including educational and employment opportunities, income, housing, even eligibility 
for marriage. The archival production of categories further extended to the making of 
the ‘people’ / ‘enemy’ dyad, which Michael Dutton presents as the foundational 
distinction of Maoist politics.8 The taxonomic contortions of the dossier reveal the 
                                               
7 See ‘Making Up People’ in Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 
8 Michael Dutton identifies the friend/enemy dyad in Mao’s ideology as analogous to the 
Schmittian concept of the political. Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
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intrinsic circularity at the core of disciplinary surveillance: to police social threats, 
disciplinary institutions must produce the categories of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ and make 
files to fill them. 
Panoptic surveillance appears to paint a bleak portrait, but in direct response to 
the Foucauldian account, recent histories of socialism have emphasized the gaps that 
regimes of surveillance create.9 These works draw attention to the inefficiencies of 
disciplinary routines, their internal and external contradictions, and their susceptibility 
to the weapons of the weak.10 If there is a corrective trend to these findings, it seems to 
affirm that panoptic surveillance often disappoints its own claims to total social 
knowledge.11 
A common approach in the ‘new revisionist’ historiography of the Soviet Union 
inverts the disciplinary regime by examining how the Soviet Union’s cultivation of 
Stalinist subjectivity also rendered it vulnerable to manipulation from below. Stephen 
                                               
9 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in 
Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jochen Hellbeck, 
“Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939),” Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas (1996); Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: 
A Study of Practices (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999); Katherine 
Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: 
Central University Press, 2014). 
10 Beyond the literature on socialism, we also find similar perspectives in Timothy Mitchell, 
“The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” The American 
Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991); Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang. Li, Rightful Resistance 
in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); James Scott, Weapons of the 
Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); 
Michael Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed : Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2017). 
11 Though this is not quite what Antoinette Burton was referring to, her critique of the 
panoptic view of the archive is relevant here. See her epilogue in Antoinette Burton, 
Dwelling in the Archive (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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Kotkin’s account of “speaking Bolshevik,” the practice of strategic code-switching by 
Soviet citizens to align themselves with prevailing Soviet ideology, is widely cited 
beyond the literature on the Soviet Union as an example of how sites of discipline can 
become a mechanism for agency and resistance against irresistible authority.12 In Tear 
Off the Masks!, Sheila Fitzpatrick equates the dossier to a highly edited textual persona, 
or “file self,” and draws upon the epistolary genres of writing—such as appeals, 
accusations, confessions, and denunciations—that make up its contents.13 Fitzpatrick 
argues that the Soviet Union—like the PRC—was unusually dependent upon epistolary 
channels for social intelligence, which allowed Soviet subjects to negotiate their political 
status through ‘identity projects.’ She deploys the example of imposture to show how 
the bureaucratic determination of political identity was exposed to leverage and even 
exploitation as subjects produced themselves before the authorities. 
Seconding Fitzpatrick, I am skeptical that the dossier grants us access to 
recovering the historical subject, but I view that as a call to move beyond questions of 
subject formation to instead interrogate the dossier’s politics of production. The notion 
that panoptic surveillance is not as totalizing as it appears is an important insight for 
thinking about the history of the Maoist dossier. This invites exploration of the 
                                               
12 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, 22. 
13 Fitzpatrick argues that the “file-self” contains neither the authentic voice of the historical 
subject, nor a pure literary fabrication. Whereas Kotkin has been critiqued for presenting 
an account of “resistance” as feigned compliance (which may rest on the assumed 
autonomy of an underlying humanistic subject), Fitzpatrick rejects the notion that the 
dossier allows for distinctions about true belief. Instead, she critiques the sorting of these 
discursive acts into “cynical versus sincere performances” as a creating a “false 
dichotomy,” reminding us that the texts of the dossier are always politically mediated. 
For an insightful analysis of the subjectivity debate, see Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious 
Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies,” Kritika: explorations in Russian and Eurasian history 1 
(2000). 
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institutional development of the dossier as a diachronic process, and the dynamic 
tension between party-state bureaucracy and socialist revolution.  
The limits of disciplinary surveillance resonate in the context of the PRC where 
the dossier system continuously expanded after 1949 to encompass all recognizable 
institutions of urban society and much of the countryside through factories, schools, 
collective farms, enterprises, and government offices. Yet the mode of individuating 
surveillance required by the dossier was an unreliable means for reducing the social 
complexity of Chinese society to broad uniformities. The implementation of the dossier 
system by the responsible local authorities was prone to exposing the inadequacies in 
the sociopolitical labels themselves. Rather than settle hierarchies, I would argue the 
dossier opened up a new site of everyday politics.14 The connections and gaps in the 
disciplinary, discursive, and performative effects of the dossier reveal the contested 
ground upon which the structure of a socialist society was formed. 
 
Means and Ends of Bureaucracy 
As an institution laden with notions of bureaucratic order, the dossier system 
was politically controversial throughout the Mao era, and bears a complex legacy 
within the communist revolutionary project. One well-established thematic strand in 
                                               
14 My approach here is in alignment with the current movement in the China field toward 
‘new social history,’ an amorphous heading that includes Chinese and Western 
practitioners, whose common interest may be defined as using new empirical 
methodologies (such as grassroots sources) to investigate everyday structures of Maoist 
society and politics. Rather than attempt to list those exhaustively here, I would draw 
attention to the Brown and Johnson edited volume, Maoism at the Grassroots, showcases 
the breadth of the field. Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson, eds. Maoism At the 
Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015). 
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the historiography of the PRC underscores Mao Zedong’s deep distrust of the party-
state bureaucracy, which Mao inveighed against as a reactionary establishment and an 
inveterate, if necessary evil along the path to a purer socialist democracy. Since the 
founding of the People’s Republic, mass campaigns authorized by the Maoist theories 
of ‘permanent revolution’ had targeted not only the elusive class enemy, but 
bureaucratic authority itself. The campaigns upheld the notion that for revolution to 
endure, the popular passions that gave rise to Chinese communism would need to 
undergo continuous renewal, and keep the forces of bureaucratic authority at bay. In a 
1967 piece, Mao enumerated the failings of the bureaucratic caste: 
They are conceited, complacent, and they aimlessly discuss politics. They 
do not grasp their work, they are subjective and one-sided; they are 
careless; they do not listen to people; they are truculent and arbitrary; they 
force orders; they do not care about reality; they maintain blind control. 
This is authoritarian bureaucracy. 
They are very busy from morning until evening, they labour the whole year 
long; they do not examine people and they do not investigate matters; they 
do not study policies; they do not rely upon the masses; they do not 
prepare their statements; they do not plan their work. This is brainless, 
misdirected bureaucracy. In other words, it is routinism. 
The dossier system embodies the awkward paradox of Mao’s permanent 
revolution. The dossier system was first established in Yan’an as an institution of 
internal files to monitor threats arising from the bureaucracy. Files on rank-and-file 
party members and state cadres were the original dossiers that all subsequent iterations 
were based upon. At every stage of the institution’s existence, “cadre dossiers” were its 
primary concern, and by extension party-state bureaucrats were the most exhaustively 
documented persons in Maoist China. 
Yet despite an institutional raison d'être that entailed reigning in the threat of 
bureaucratism, the dossier system was wholly embedded in the structure of the 
bureaucracy itself. The production and review of cadre dossiers was carried out by 
hierarchically ordered personnel sections extending down to the work unit. 
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Management of party dossiers was the purview of the Organization Department, which 
as the CCP’s human resources arm, was itself a vast bureaucracy of bureaucracies. The 
dossier system could only fulfill the tasks identified by permanent revolution through 
the bureaucratic means at its disposal—new investigative protocols, additional 
paperwork, and added layers of review and approval.15 
In the chapters that follow, I show that revolutionary ideology was a central 
priority in the construction of CCP file systems. Maoist mass campaigns that explicitly 
sought to reign in the bureaucracy—including cadre screening, rectification, Sufan and 
the Cultural Revolution—generated enormous quantities of files, accounting for some 
of the most prolific phases of file-making in the history of the party-state. To the 
disappointment of the Maoist vision, the institutions empowered with perpetuating 
socialist revolution instead developed their own norms, biases, categories and artifacts. 
As the dossier system expanded to become a state-wide institution, it entrenched a vast, 
self-insulated bureaucratic infrastructure of files and paperwork. Revolution stalled 
before an expanding catalog of resumes, registration forms, progress reports, self-
evaluations, appeals, and certifications.16 Permanent revolution came to a disjuncture 
between revolutionary means and ends. 
                                               
15 It should be noted that Mao’s own commitment to his anti-bureaucratic rhetoric has been 
called into question. Martin Whyte wrote convincingly that Mao’s later ideological 
thinking inclined more Stalinism than Maoism as traditionally defined. Whyte believes 
that Mao’s ultimate preference was not for less, but greater bureaucratic control over 
society through supply allocation and the abolition of the money economy, as suggested 
in the Stalinist visions for the development of the USSR. Whyte distinguishes between 
two forms of bureaucratism, explained in a note below. Martin Whyte, “Who Hates 
Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle,” Center for Research on Social Organization Working Paper 
Series 337 (1986), 13. 
16 The problem of the bureaucracy is a perennial theme of Chinese history. We might 
reference a classic work in Chinese historiography, Philip Kuhn’s Soulstealers. One iconic 
image from that account of the 18th century sorcery scare finds a brooding Qianlong 
Emperor in his palace, raging at the officials that he believes are misleading him about the 
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I would point out the parallels between Mao’s hostility to the stifling routines of 
‘bureaucratism’ and the warnings of one of the foremost Western theorists of 
bureaucracy, Max Weber.17 Taking Mao’s polemics seriously, as I attempt to here, 
shows that Mao and Weber shared similar misapprehensions regarding the perils of 
bureaucratization—namely, that it would turn bureaucratic agents into powerful, yet 
unfeeling automata executing scripted routines.18 Mao’s anti-bureaucratism 
complements the Weberian premonition that increasing rationalization in all spheres of 
                                               
nature and extent of the disturbance in the provinces. Meanwhile, Qianlong’s requests for 
more specific information creates a continuous flow of formal updates in the mode of 
exquisitely prepared palace memorials assuring him everything below is in order. This 
only infuriates Qianlong further—with bold rescripts from his unique vermillion brush, 
he spreads comments and invective over the memorials, but his calligraphic tantrums 
only prove that the means of the bureaucracy are more lasting and obstinate than his. 
Philip Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990). 
17 Take for instance Weber’s statement: “We must remember the fact, which we have 
encountered several times and which we will have to discuss repeatedly, that 
“democracy” as such is opposed to the “rule” of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps 
because of its unavoidable and yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization. Under 
certain conditions, democracy creates palpable breaks in the bureaucratic pattern and 
impediments to the bureaucratic organization.” Max Weber and Stephen Kalberg, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism With Other Writings on the Rise of the West 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), 425. 
18 Martin Whyte, who has written at length on problems of the Chinese bureaucracy, has 
argued that Weber and others generally tend to speak of bureaucratization in two 
different aspects. In the first aspect, bureaucratization is seen to indicate a “process by 
which more and more of social life comes to be governed by large, hierarchical, non-
kinship based organizations…and subject to hierarchical allocation and coordination.” 
Whyte terms this bureaucratization of “structure.” The second aspect is what Whyte calls 
the “bureaucratization of function,” and concerns the processes of rationalization and 
formalism that I have use Mao and Weber to highlight here. Mao seems to have been 
most concerned with the second aspect. Whyte, “Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese 
Puzzle,” 6. 
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life would lead to the tyranny of formal laws, technical procedures, and professional 
norms, subordinating all social ends to an “iron cage” of teleological efficiency.19  
The trajectory I ascribe to the Maoist dossier unsettles the Weberian paradigm of 
rationalization. Despite the dossier system’s increasingly routinized, formal mode of 
operation, bureaucratization was hardly a linear path toward rational efficiency. 
Particularly in the context of the PRC, bureaucratization was an uneven process 
involving compromises between scale, centralization, and the material practicalities of 
paper files and bureaucratic labor. Not only did the party-state bureaucracy struggle to 
manage the expectations of permanent revolution, but the paper-bound means at its 
disposal were also generative of waste, delusion, accidents, and incapacity. 
For all of their anxieties about the advance of bureaucratic formalism, neither 
Weber or Mao reflected deeply about how bureaucratic work was performed on a day-
to-day basis. But one of Weber’s rare, isolated comments on the topic is revealing: 
The management of the modern office is based upon written documents 
(the ‘files’), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and upon a 
staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials 
working in an agency, along with the respective apparatus of material 
implements and the files, makes up a bureau.20 
The offhand integration of objects and bodies in close quarters calls to mind 
Latour’s conception of the bureaucratic office as an “object institution,” a hybrid 
                                               
19 ‘Iron cage’ is Talcott Parsons’ well-known translation of stahlhartes Gehäuse, which has 
been challenged by others. The Baehr and Wells translation uses “shell as hard as steel.” 
Max Weber, Peter Baehr, and Gordon Wells, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: And Other Writings (Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics) (Penguin Classics, 
2002). 
20 Weber and Kalberg, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism With Other Writings on 
the Rise of the West, 417. 
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collective of people and artifacts, whose shifting relation to one another mobilizes the 
effects we variously recognize as ‘the state’ or ‘the law.’21 Latour’s “deflationary” 
approach to knowledge production breaks with the strategy of defining conceptual 
constructs through the mental states of participants in favor of examining the mundane, 
everyday practices that make them up—the desk tools of clerical work, the movement 
of paper and materials, the rhythm of the office workday.22 
Latour’s media-ethnography is an invitation to consider the dossier as a made 
object, and specifically how its means of production reflected and informed the 
professional culture of the party-state bureaucracy. In the People’s Republic, a 
personnel dossier was at its most basic, a paper file containing a set of documents 
related to one person, running from a few dozen up to hundreds of pages. The basic 
semiotic structure of the dossier was the written word, by which I mean that 
information in the files was primarily preserved through written questions and 
answers, narrative testimony, comments and signatures, all in the form of text.23 The 
production and social uses of the dossier were deeply conditioned by its technology: the 
medium of paper and the manual practice of writing things out by hand. 
 At a minimum, a dossier needed two documents: 1) a Personal Background 
Form or Registration Form, filled out by the subject on an official template; and 2) a 
recent Evaluation Form, consisting of a self-evaluation, followed by comments and 
                                               
21 Michael Hull also points out the Latourian sensibility in Weber’s description. Matthew 
Hull, “Documents and Bureaucracy,” Annual Review of Anthropology 41 (2012), 256. 
22 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil D’Etat (Cambridge: Polity, 
2009). 
23 Rather than graphic artifacts, material evidence, or photographs, which begin to enter 
some dossiers after 1980. 
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approvals by work unit leadership. After 1950, an Autobiography and Investigation 
Report (prepared by the PSB) became mandatory as well, but the preparation of these 
documents was closely associated with formal political examinations and sometimes 
omitted, or rather, procrastinated if the subject’s politics were uncontroversial. Beyond 
these mandatory items, the Organization Department denoted a limited number of 
optional documents that could also go into the dossier, with the implication that 
documents outside this scope should be excluded. In practice however, administrators 
erred on the side of accumulation, and a diverse array of unsanctioned materials related 
to the subject found their way into individual dossiers. 
It was a persistent feature of dossiers across the Mao era that the inventory of 
documents in a file differed from person to person, and case to case. Form templates for 
cadre dossiers were not standardized nationwide until 1980, meaning that during the 
Mao era, the task of designing, producing, and distributing official templates was 
delegated to each locality. Local diversity in the form of forms ensured the 
fragmentation of file-keeping standards across state agencies and work units, but also 
effected subtle interventions in the adjudication of individual cases. Depending on 
circumstances of the form—lined or unlined fields, the size of a blank space assigned to 
a response, the durability of the paper used, the results of cadre examination and 
review could vary. 
Preparing a dossier involved weeks of exacting bureaucratic and clerical work. 
While instructions, archival jackets, and formatted templates might be printed, the 
substantive labor of filling in form fields, verifying testimony, transcribing evidence, 
and making duplicates, was ordinarily completed manually. By my estimate, over 90% 
of dossiers from the Mao era contain only information put in by hand, whereas typed 
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dossier materials in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were close to the norm.24 
Given the speed of Chinese typists, typing the documents out would not necessarily 
have been more expedient, but their handwritten format serves to reiterate that each 
dossier was essentially a unique, custom-made product.25 The quality of the 
documentation and penmanship also varied. Formal submissions by the subject were 
required to be written in black or blue ink, upright and legible, on lined paper 
corresponding to their political identity (‘black elements’ were not to use red-lined 
paper). Investigative reports by leadership or PSB investigators were often hastily 
copied onto unformatted loose leaf sheets, and tested the margins of legibility. 
At every stage of file-making, archival decisions were informed by practical 
considerations. Administrators faced decisions on whether or not to file uncorroborated 
materials, how far to send personnel to obtain supplemental records, whether to 
summarize a piece of evidence or reproduce it. These decisions were frequently 
informed by mundane constraints such as the availability of storage space, the 
expediency of the method, and the cost and availability of paper supplies. With its 
labor-intensity and thrift, the work of file-making resembled a handicraft enterprise. 
Most work units with more than one hundred people employed at least one archival 
specialist with skills in different methods of binding, mounting and preserving paper, 
and making homemade glue.  
                                               
24 This puts the PRC system at divergence with file-keeping in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, where typed materials in dossiers were closer to the norm. 
25 Mullaney finds reports of maximum typewriting speeds of approximately 3000-3300 
characters per hour in the 1950s PRC. Thomas Mullaney, The Chinese Typewriter: A History 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018), 286-298. 
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While there is a strong temptation to read the dossier purely for information, 
reflecting on the materiality of the dosser—its durable, portable, and tangible 
qualities—underlines its instrumentality to the practice of bureaucracy. The ubiquitous 
bureaucratic term for the contents of a dossier file—cailiao 材料, or ‘materials’—refers to 
information as a physical thing. Writing on the subject of the Romanian Securitate file, 
Katherine Verdery has insightfully connected the materiality of dossiers to their 
performative function, noting “the materiality of the file guarantees the reality/identity 
of the person produced through it.”26 Her observation echoes Lisa Gitelman’s interest in 
the document as an epistemic object which is defined by its dual capacity for “knowing 
and showing.”27  
I would point out three basic bureaucratic maneuvers that the material form, or 
the cailiao, of the dossier enabled, which are irreducible to the information they convey. 
First, the dossier validates and signals the fulfillment of bureaucratic tasks; it allows 
officials to show to their superiors that an investigation was carried out, appropriate 
measures were taken, and everyone at the lower levels did what they were supposed to. 
Second, the dossier creates a horizon of future use; because it can be reused, amended, 
duplicated, or moved, it allows bureaucrats to add on or change their minds. Third, the 
dossier is a generator of secrets; dossiers in the aggregate create hierarchies of secrecy 
and access that mark gradations of political power. 
Clearly, these are not the only functions that dossiers perform. My enumeration 
of these effects is only based upon my impressions of the Maoist institution, perhaps 
                                               
26  Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of the Romanian Secret Police, 64 
27 Lisa Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents (Duke University 
Press: Durham, 2014), 2-5. 
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reflecting my biases as a researcher. I would not deny that my reading of the dossier’s 
performative effects entails an underlying suspicion of the charisma of files, based in no 
small part on their material persuasiveness.28 Approaching the dossier as an epistemic 
object reframes the assumption that files were mere appendages or tools of the 
bureaucracy. Rather, the material form of the file is precisely what made basic routines 
of the bureaucracy possible. 
Archival Fantasies 
The dossier system desired to inventory Chinese subjects, abstracting from 
bodies and individual difference to make paper artifacts. Those artifacts could be fit to 
broad conformities, evaluated, sorted, and filed away. Its operative principle was that of 
a “substitution set,” working from the notion that the files in the archive, and the 
distinctions they produced, bore a meaningful equivalence to the social objects they 
named in the world. 29 We might recognize in the outlines of this transubstantiation of 
subjects into objects any number of institutionalized knowledge projects.30 But in its 
                                               
28 Ben Kafka calls bureaucratic records the “charismatic megafauna” of studies, whereas 
Latour calls them “the most despised of ethnographic objects.” I am in no position to 
adjudicate, but the underlying sentiments are not as dissimilar as they appear. 
29 My use of the ‘substitution set’ comes from Sekula, who develops the notion in part based 
upon a reading of Oliver Wendell Holmes: “In structural terms, the archive is both an 
abstract paradigmatic entity and a concrete institution. In both senses, the archive is a vast 
substitution set, providing for a relation of general equivalence between images. This 
image of the archive as an encyclopedic repository of exchangeable images was 
articulated most profoundly in the late 1850s by the American physician and essayist 
Oliver Wendell Holmes when he compared photographs to paper currency.” Allan 
Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” October 39 (1986), 17. 
30 We might invoke for comparison the documentalist Suzanne Briet’s account of the zoo. 
Briet has a famously broad concept of a document—an object used as ‘evidence in 
support of a fact’—which she illustrates with the example of the zoo. In the wild, an 
antelope would be just that, but once captured and brought to the zoo, it becomes for 
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pursuit of social comprehensiveness, the dossier system was an archive of pure 
technocratic fantasy of governance by the file.  
Ann Stoler, one of the most astute scholars on the subject of archive, underscores 
how archive works to assuage the “epistemic uncertainties” of power. Her work reads 
the operation of the archive as a means of treating the fractures and insecurities in 
imperial knowledge. Stoler might well have been writing of the dossier system in 
stating that the colonial archive nurtured “the imperial conceit that all was in order, 
because papers classified people, because directives were properly acknowledged, and 
colonial civil servants were schooled to assure that records were prepared, circulated, 
securely stored, and sometimes rendered to ash.”31 We do not need to look far to detect 
the self-therapeutic function of the archive in the dossier. I build upon Stoler’s approach 
in interrogating the knowledge practices of the dossier as symptoms of neurosis; where 
I differ is in my resistance to the notion that archival operations always reveal stable 
epistemologies, which limits how much we can read into the categories of the archive. 
Today, the discipline of history has distanced itself from those quaint times when 
archive could naively be called upon as the repository of historical truth. But since the 
1990s, the surge of humanistic interest in the archive has recast its theoretical role as 
something yet more basic and totalizing—an institutional paradigm for the production 
and inscription of discourse. If not a ‘library of libraries,’ the archive establishes the 
categories of historical knowing as the ‘frame of knowledge production itself.’32 I find 
                                               
Briet a form of evidence, thus a document. Briet, “What is a 'Document'?" Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science 48, no. 9 (Sept 1997): 804-809. 
31 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 1. 
32 Tagg has an excellent summary of recent approaches to the theoretical archive. Various 
positions identified in Tagg, Foucault and Derrida, would point to archive as an allegory 
for the historical text’s own “mode of operation,” the discursive “first law of what can be 
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that notion of the archive unsatisfying. It liberates us from the archival fetish only to 
reveal a deeper, more totalizing construct at work.33 
The problem with the ideal typing of the total archive is that it vastly overstates 
the convenience of the archival work, in addition to taking for granted the internal 
conceptual coherence that archives possess. To the extent that the Maoist dossier system 
reflects the operations of the archive, its history reiterates the underlying fragility of 
archival order. It also shows the inherent difficulty of maintaining fine conceptual 
distinctions in the face of irreducible social complexity, particularly those based upon 
the technology of bulky files, decaying paper, and the manual labor of modern scribes. 
Dossier work was productive of social categories, but gaps, errors, and inefficiencies in 
knowing were tethered to its productive process. 
In the PRC, the strain of maintaining pretenses to archival order grew directly 
out of the impetus to archive everyone. Quite contrary to Mao Zedong’s allegations of 
routinism, dossier work in personnel examinations was generally carried out with an 
attention to detail and an ethic of ‘seeking truth from facts.’ But as the administrative 
ambitions of the socialist state extended examinations from cadres to increasingly wider 
circles of Chinese citizens, it took on an archival project that was oceanic in scope, and 
yet underwhelming in its routine findings of typicality. Despite their labor-intensive 
                                               
said,” or that which “produces as much as it records the event.” These positions are 
respectively elaborated in John Tagg, “The Archiving Machine; or, the Camera and the 
Filing Cabinet,” Grey Room 47 (2012), 34; Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 129; Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever : A Freudian Impression 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 17. 
33 Antoinette Burton’s provocative epilogue tackles some of these themes with much greater 
depth and precision. I see myself as engaging with Burton’s challenge to imagine the 
official archive as something other than a “panoptic institution.” Burton, Dwelling in the 
Archive. 
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assembly, dossiers found themselves with a surplus of social facts relative to the needs 
of administration. Bureaucratic administrators became accidental ethnographers of 
people’s politics, living habits, social relationships, and other mundane details of 
everyday life under Maoism.34 In retracing the steps of the dossier system, one is struck 
by how much bureaucratic manpower—the sheer quantity of manually crafted 
paperwork—was expended for the thick description of ordinary people and behaviors. 
It is as though the will to panoptic surveillance, in the interest of rendering Chinese 
society legible, sentenced bureaucratic functionaries to a lifetime of making files, 
writing reports, and filling forms. 
Allan Sekula described in an influential essay how Bertillion’s 19th century 
criminal identification system utilized the photographic archive to produce a 
“bureaucratic-clerical-statistical system of ‘intelligence.’” Yet he asserts that the “central 
artifact” in this archival system was not the camera, but the filing cabinet.35 I find this to 
be an important insight into archival epistemologies and the anxieties they reveal. 
Whether in the criminal archive or the socialist dossier, the filing cabinet is where the 
productive distinction between ordinary persons and threats to society is at its clearest; 
it is there that the latter group is figuratively captured, sorted, and put away. The filing 
of people was a technique of social management that doubled as a metaphor for an 
imaginary state of control. 
The dossier system served as a ‘filing cabinet’ for the political anxieties of 
Maoism, which conditioned the prolific collection and preservation of dossier materials. 
                                               
34 Katherine Verdery’s concept of the Securitate files as an ethnographic database seems 
very apt here. Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of the Romanian Secret 
Police, 39 
35 Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” 16-17. 
  24 
Mass campaigns, and elite suspicions of enemies among the masses more generally 
were the driving force in the creation of dossiers, but as the party-state became 
increasingly proficient in its productive tasks, it arrived at what Sekula calls the 
“fundamental problem” of the archive: volume.36 Volume and over-accumulation 
afflicted all contemporaneous archival enterprises, but hoarding was a particular 
problem for the Maoist dossier system because of political pressures to redundancy and 
a corresponding aversion to destroying material.37 An archive that aspired to and 
largely succeeded in collecting comprehensive documentation proved highly difficult to 
mine for information, except in the local work units where it was least needed.38 In the 
aggregate, the dossier system amounted to a vast, decentralized, ethnographic database 
dispersed across millions of archival sites. This was big data in the heyday of carbon 
copy—paper overload exhausted the capacity of the upper levels to read and process all 
the material being constantly produced. 
                                               
36 Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” 28-29. 
37 One, micromanagement and routine review of personnel examination at the lower levels 
fostered a culture of ‘showing’ work; examinations tended to produce more materials 
than necessary to support findings, but once filed in the dossier, it was rare for material to 
be removed or destroyed, as that would require a tedious series of approvals. Second, 
archival accumulation was exacerbated by the imperatives of Maoist political campaigns, 
which periodically demanded that lower bureaucrats ‘reexamine’ completed cases, along 
with new quantities of documentation and evidence.  
38 Infrastructural incapacity and the state’s efforts to address it are also a primary theme of 
Arunabh Ghosh’s research on the development of statistical sciences in the PRC. I view 
my work as complementary to Ghosh’s findings on the fetishization of complete 
enumeration in socialist statistics, or namely, how the ideological emphases of socialist 
approaches to statistics entailed a preference for techniques such as exhaustive counting 
and large-scale sampling. Arunabh Ghosh, “Making it Count : Statistics and State-Society 
Relations in the Early People’s Republic of China, 1949-1959,” diss., Columbia University, 
2014). 
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The superabundance of the dossier as a source of knowledge, while partly an 
artifact of the dossier system itself, illuminates an underlying “archival hubris” that is 
common to all forms of archive.39 Not only are archival projects susceptible to 
overextension, but it is precisely the unintended consequences of the drive to 
comprehensiveness which undermines their conceits of order. The partial myopia of the 
dossier system reflects how archival routines that inscribe social knowledge are also 
generative of incapacity. Another way of stating this observation is the knowledge 
practices of the archive entail their own processes of self-disfigurement. 
To note that archives perpetually work toward and to the disappointment of 
their grand ambitions, does not close off the archival fantasy of governance by the file. 
The dossier system, like archive in other forms, has endured in part because it projects a 
facade of rule by knowledge, which is itself an expression of power. In the Mao era, the 
fetishization of the dossier served an important performative function in maintaining 
the party-state’s pretensions to knowledge and authority. Dossiers, like all forms of 
archive, work not only through what they know, but also the erudition that we ascribe 
to them. If any agreement exists between the practice of the Maoist dossier system and 
our contemporary approach to the theoretical archive, it is in a common willingness to 
indulge the archive in its productive fallacies, which hold the boundless promise of 
historical thought. 
                                               
39 I am borrowing the turn of phrase from Greetham, though this is not precisely how he 
uses it. David Greetham, “Who’s in, Who’s Out: The Cultural Poetics of Archival 
Exclusion,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 32, no. 1 (1999), 18. 
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Socialist Legacies 
In the present study, I locate the proximate origins of the PRC dossier system in 
Yan’an. As with all accounts of origin, this presentation is inherently argumentative and 
overlooks alternative entry points in the long history of personnel file-keeping in 
imperial China. Within the small body of historiographical literature on the dossier 
system in the PRC, most treatments take precisely the opposite approach by 
emphasizing the deep historical continuities between the modern institution and a 
venerable dynastic legacy. Two authoritative neibu (internal) histories by party 
researchers Deng Shaoxing and Wang Faxiong each present the PRC personnel file 
system as the teleological endpoint of a long-gestating process of bureaucratic 
development. Deng begins his study with the observation: “China is an ancient 
civilization; its personnel system commenced very early and developed 
comprehensively…Personnel files and personnel file management can be traced back 
thousands of years.”40 
Both Deng and Wang make a case for thinking about dossiers in the longue 
durée, but their official histories conspicuously omit any mention of the Soviet Union.41 
We may speculate as to whether those omissions reflect post-socialist revisionism in 
                                               
40 In a similar vein, Wang remarks “It is clear that the modern personnel file developed 
upon a foundation from antiquity; our nation’s personnel files are the product of 
unbroken path of development.” Shaoxing 邓绍兴 Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案
学 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe 中国青年出版社, 1990), 1; 王法雄 Wang 
Faxiong, An Outline of Personnel Files Management 人事档案管理概论 (Wuhan: Hubei 
renmin chubanshe 湖北人民出版社, 1984), 14. 
41 Deng Shaoxing’s 1990 handbook, which devotes a chapter to each of the Tang, Song, 
Ming and Qing dynasties, and two more to the Republic, avoids any mention of a 
historical connection to the Soviet Union. Wang Faxiong’s 1984 study opens with 
quotations from Marx and Lenin to characterize personnel files as a branch of “socialist 
science,” but ends there.  
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PRC historiography, but nonetheless the marginalization of the Bolshevik influence 
ignores how the PRC system of personnel surveillance was substantially modeled after 
filing systems established in the Soviet Union under Stalinism.42 Recognizing how the 
Maoist dossier adapted key features of Soviet file systems situates the PRC institution 
within a broader context of filing and surveillance in the socialist world.43 
The derivative relationship between the Soviet dossier and its Chinese 
counterpart is most clearly reflected in the typology and inventory of materials that 
came to comprise the PRC personnel file. Beginning in Yan’an, the Chinese Communists 
embraced the use of form templates as the basic instruments for collecting information 
on personnel. CCP templates utilized fixed elements and a visual layout imitative of 
their respective Soviet counterparts. The nomenclature of the various forms—including 
‘cadre registration forms’ (登记表), ‘personal history forms’ (简历表), ‘party 
applications’ (入党志愿书)—converged upon the Soviet scheme. Departing from the 
narrative basis of Qing personnel records, the new forms were batch produced as blank 
forms in contrast to the handmade, epistolary format of Qing documents. 
                                               
42 More recently, some scholars have in fact acknowledged the Soviet Union as a source for 
the PRC dossier system, but precise relationship and mechanism by which methods of the 
dossier migrated from the Soviet Union to the PRC is poorly understood. In the present 
study, the Bolshevik influence in the establishment of the PRC dossier system is among 
the various forms of Soviet technical assistance received by the PRC during the 1950s 
decade of socialist construction, which included not only machine equipment, industrial 
designs, and scientific advice, but also institutional templates for governance and party 
organization. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
43  Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of the Romanian Secret Police; Paul 
Betts, Within Walls Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Fig. 4 Leonid Brezhnev Military Registration Card (1942)44 
The mimetic features of the CCP personnel archive were evident from a 1941 
requirement to have all cadres submit a political autobiography. This essay-form 
political autobiography had been a longstanding requirement in the Bolshevik Party for 
the administrative assessment of an individual’s political sincerity and ideological 
thought.45 In the context of the dossier, Autobiographies in the Soviet Union manifested 
as politically performative stories of coming to ideological consciousness, such as this 
self-presentation by Mikhail Suslov: 
I was born in 1902 in the village of Shakhovskoe in the former Khvalynskii 
uezd of the Saratov guverniia. My father and mother were poor peasants;
they ran a small peasant farm and didn’t even have their own horse. Until 
1920 I lived in the village of Shakhovskoe and helped my mother on the 
farm, and sometimes in winter I worked in the village Soviet and on the 
44 Source: Wikimedia Commons (accessed 6/26/17) 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ru/a/ac/BrezhnevLIListKadr1942.jpg
45 Jochen Hellbeck, “Working, Struggling, Becoming: Stalin-Era Autobiographical Texts,” 
Russian Review 60, no. 3 (2001), 342-43.
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Committee of Poor Peasants as the assistant secretary (my father was the 
chairman of the committee). In 1919 I began in earnest to be interested in 
Bolshevist political pamphlets and politics.46 
Adopted in Yan’an by the CCP, the dossier-specific version of the 
Autobiography existed alongside established genres of writing about the self. But in 
contrast to cognate practices of ‘self-criticism’ 检讨, ‘submission’ 交代, or ‘confession’ 坦
白, the Autobiography was not a punitive exercise. Instead, the practice of 
Autobiography was viewed as a component of socialist ideological training and 
Marxism-Leninism as an objective methodology. As in the Soviet case, the collection of 
Autobiographies prioritized cadres of rank, and was presented as a privilege that 
followed power and prestige.47 
Elsewhere, CCP personnel dossiers consciously reproduced elements of Soviet 
intelligence files through new routines of covert investigation and record-keeping. The 
Soviet Union under Stalinism had made it a priority to keep files on friends as well as 
                                               
46 Compare Suslov’s Autobiography against that of A.A. Zhdanov: 
“I was born on the 14th of February 1896 in the family of Master of Divinity, Inspector of 
Public Schools A. A. Zhdanov in the city of Mariupol' in Ekaterinoslav guberniia. My 
childhood was spent under the influence of the revolutionary ideas of my father (he did 
not belong to the party but maintained friendship with socialists and followers of 
Tolstoy), who provided the main impetus for the creation of my revolutionary world 
view. Because my father was drawn principally to the Social Democrats, the main 
direction of his educational work was Marxist. As soon as I began to live a conscious life, 
and for me it began in 1904-1905, I became a sympathizer with the Social Democrats and 
followed all the details of their work during 1906-1912, using the sources that I had 
(bourgeois press, pamphlets published during the first revolution of 1905-1906). 
Diane Koenker and Ronald Bachman. Revelations From the Russian Archives (Washington: 
Library of Congress, 1997), 334-336. 
47 In China, the Autobiography requirement was first implemented in the Central Party 
School and other cadre training institutions after 1941. But because of the actual labor 
involved in writing Autobiographies, the requirement was not enforced on a wide scale 
until the mid-1950s. But thereafter, the Autobiography became one of the mandatory 
components of the cadre dossier. 
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enemies. Before the CCP established its own system of internal files, its members were 
themselves subjects of a Comintern surveillance project carried out in secret over more 
than a decade. It would not have been controversial to claim that at least until 1937, the 
Comintern possessed a more complete personnel archive of the Chinese communist 
organization than the CCP itself. Archival research by Alexander Pantsov offers a 
glimpse into the still-classified Comintern dossiers.48 According to Pantsov, dossiers on 
Chinese Communists numbered 3,328 in total, compiled on visiting students, Chinese 
Comintern ‘activists,’ and the CCP leadership in China. Mao Zedong’s Comintern 
dossier runs an impressive fifteen volumes, and holds an array of investigative reports, 
personal correspondence, as well as accusations against him up until the year of this 
death.49 One of the earliest documents in Mao’s dossier originates from “Terebin” (A. 
Ya. Orlov), a Soviet physician dispatched to Yan’an in 1942 to provide medical care to 
Chinese leaders. On Mao, Terebin reported back the following: 
Mao Zedong 
- Chairman of the government of the People's Republic of China 
- Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party  
A cultured and educated person (mostly self-educated). Knows no foreign 
languages. Knows China thoroughly, his people, especially the peasantry, 
its conditions of life, the psychology of the Chinese peasant. Knows the 
army very well, the possibilities of war in China, guerrilla as well as regular 
units. Knows very well and loves ancient Chinese literature. He is himself 
an historian, poet, and writer (recently he has not been writing). Possesses a 
good Marxist background which he acquired through self-education; he 
correctly and skillfully adapts Marxism to Chinese reality. He is one of the 
founders of the Chinese Communist Party, its ideologist and leader. 
                                               
48 As Pantsov notes, these files were briefly opened in the Russian Federation during the 
Yeltsin era thaw, but are now once against largely off-limits. Alexander Pantsov, “Stalin 
Watches Mao: Documents From the Top Secret Soviet Archives,” 當代中國研究 (Modern 
China Studies) 22, no. 1 (2015). 
49 Pantsov, “Stalin Watches Mao: Documents From the Top Secret Soviet Archives,” 15. 
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He works a lot. His working day begins around 3 or 4pm. After he's tired, 
he eats, reads telegrams, and receives his close colleagues. If he gets tired 
earlier, then around 5 or 6 p.m. he takes a short walk. In the evening, as a 
rule, he has meetings and sessions that last well past midnight. He speaks a 
lot at small meetings. Generally at such meetings there are neither time-
limits nor strict procedures. He works a lot. He keeps reading the press, 
newspapers, “Cankao xiaoxi” (Reference Materials Bulletin) that is like our 
TASS for a narrow circle of persons, especially for our leading articles, 
decisions, and reports of responsible persons. He writes his own articles 
and revises them often, and often makes corrections in already finished 
articles. 
Terebin’s report continued with details of Mao’s eating habits, nocturnal work 
schedule, and penchant for dancing. Related filings in Mao’s Comintern dossier focus 
more closely on the Chairman’s health and hygiene; one such report is the source of the 
famous claim that Mao never brushed his teeth, but only gargled with green tea. This 
information provided a rare, unvarnished portrait of the CCP leader, however 
questionable in its value to intelligence. 
Considering the subject and the political stakes, the fact that the report mainly 
consists of Mao’s daily routine would appear incongruous. Yet both the Soviet and 
Chinese archives are filled with reports precisely of this type. File surveillance worked 
by gathering quotidian details of the subject’s background, daily habits, character, and 
personal relationships to triangulate ‘real’ identities. The overproduction of fine detail 
was not reserved for socialist elites—this genre of tedious reportage appears in dossiers 
associated with all categories of persons. Mao’s Comintern file illustrates a central 
feature of dossiers—the bulk of the material in individualized files held of small details 
and ephemera. Dossier files in the Soviet Union, the PRC and Eastern Europe shared a 
tendency to collect a superfluous information. The abiding banality of the dossier shows 
that the political objectives that guided these unintentional ethnographies were often 
lost in the thick description of everyday life. 
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Chapter Outline and Sources 
The four chapters that follow are ordered in a rough chronological fashion, but 
also progress outward from ‘center’ to ‘local’ in examining the dossier system’s 
bureaucratic sites of production. Chapter One locates the formative origins of the 
dossier system in approaches to examining new party members in the wartime crucible 
of 1940s Yan’an. Connecting organization work and internal surveillance, I argue that 
the crucial impetus for new routines of file-keeping were elite anxieties about the 
possibility of enemy subversion. Following liberation, institutional continuity 
bequeathed the political emphases of wartime file-keeping to the nascent PRC. 
Chapter Two explores the development of the archival sciences in the PRC and 
the corresponding ‘archival turn’ in personnel management. With the formalization of 
state archival institutions in the early 1950s, the party-state appropriated archival 
techniques for use in socialist human resources, re-orienting dossier work around 
routines of record-keeping and material preservation. As the personnel file system 
evolved toward archivization, governance by the dossier encountered the perennial 
problems of archival management—fragmentation, inconsistency, and overload—tasks 
of party members and problematic subjects alike. 
Chapter Three analyzes the elements of the dossier by focusing on the file of one 
elementary school teacher. The dossier system perpetually prioritized political 
surveillance of party-state workforce. But with the continuous expansion of the state 
sector through 1950s socialist construction, an increasing number of Chinese citizens 
gained ‘cadre status,’ subjecting them to the exhaustive background investigation that 
was once reserved for the political elite. As the case of this schoolteacher shows, each 
dossier required significant inputs of manual and creative labor by both subject and 
administrators, culminating in a painstakingly produced ethnographic database. 
  33 
Chapter Four examines how dossier files informed the investigation and 
discipline of minor personnel misconduct using two separate cases of adultery from the 
approximate period of the Cultural Revolution. By that period, the dossier system was 
embedded in the basic socialist institution of the work unit, devolving responsibilities 
of investigation, examination, and discipline to local administrators. In these two cases 
of alleged affairs, the bureaucratic emphasis on the evidential appendices bound for the 
dossier reflects how the demands of documentation had become the effective ends of 
the investigative process.  
In a brief afterword, I reflect on the post-archival itineraries of the dossiers that I 
encountered in my fieldwork, related through my experience of the research process. A 
few words on that methodology here. A version of the dossier system continues to exist 
in the PRC today, and all dossiers both past and current are still considered property of 
the state. Dossiers fall under PRC archival law and are hence protected “state secrets.” 
For historians, the tightening array of access restrictions that apply to Mao era sources 
in official archives are even more prohibitive when it comes to personnel dossiers. 
Researchers requesting personnel dossiers from the archival stacks are generally 
rebuffed on the ironic pretext of “safeguarding individual privacy.” 
In light of recent conditions, my fieldwork for this project was based upon 
traditional archival research, complemented with the careful acquisition of what are 
informally referred to in the China field as “grassroots sources.” Literally known as 
“garbage sources” 垃圾资料 until Jeremy Brown rebranded them in a 2015 Dissertation 
Reviews post, these materials constitute files, dossiers and other government papers that 
were discarded from Chinese archives after the 1980s. Instead of being destroyed, they 
resurfaced in secondhand book and paper markets, and subsequently entered the hands 
of researchers and private collectors. In pursuing this vein of materials, I have followed 
the path of scholars such as Brown, Cao Shuji, Yang Kuisong, Michael Schoenhals, and 
Aminda Smith, whose collective body of work has demonstrated the productive 
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potential of these sources in illuminating a range of historical issues from the neglected 
vantage of grassroots Maoist society.50 
The sourcebase for my project contains approximately forty complete dossiers 
and comparable number of partial files that I acquired in the field. The dossiers 
encompass a diverse range of subjects and institutional contexts, from party cadres 
employed in state agencies to clerks of a rural supply cooperative. Most of the dossiers 
trace geographically from the cities and towns of the North China Plain in Hebei, 
Shanxi and Henan, and the temporal span of 1945 to 1978. Even within my small 
collection—a drop in the ocean of the dossier system—there is a tremendous degree of 
variation in the individual dossiers, from party to non-party members, urban to rural 
work units, and different historical periods. All of these files have benefited my 
incremental understanding of the complex history of the Maoist dossier system, but for 
the purposes of exposition and coherence, I have opted to highlight five examples out of 
the larger set of files which I use as case studies. Some of the files that I did not cite are 
shown as images in an appendix, which is but a small token of their uniqueness. It is to 
my regret that I could not find room for all of these sources in my current study, a 
feeling that only affirms my own susceptibility to the archival impulse. 
                                               
50 The list of scholars who have made productive use of grassroots sources is extensive and 
growing, but in addition to their scholarly contributions, but the persons named here 
provided significant help and encouragement as I carried out my fieldwork. Brown and 
Johnson, Maoism At the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism; 杨奎松 
Yang Kuisong, A Record of “Marginal People” “边缘人”纪事 (广州: Guangdong chubanshe 
广东出版社, 2016); Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Aminda Smith, Thought Reform and China’s 
Dangerous Classes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012). 
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Chapter 1 
The Organization of a Discipline: 
The Yan’an Origins of Dossier Work 
 
There exists a singular account in the official biography of An Ziwen that explains how 
the first party dossiers survived the Chinese Civil War.51 That narrative is set in the 
winter of 1946 as Nationalist forces were advancing on Yan’an, wartime capital of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to his biographers, An Ziwen had only just 
taken up a new post as a deputy director of the Central Organization Department 
(COD) when he was tasked by with ‘consolidating’ the contents of approximately 
20,000 personnel files on CCP cadres. These dossiers were the product of almost a 
decade of intensifying cadre screening and investigation, spanning the end of Long 
March through the Yan’an Rectification Campaign. As the first and only set of records 
on the rank-and file, they were to be protected at all costs.52  
An Ziwen and his associates selected the most ‘valuable’ materials to be 
extracted to safe territory, destroying the rest. As the Nationalist armies closed in, the 
                                               
51 An Ziwen was to become the longest tenured head of the Central Organization 
Department, serving from 1956-66. 
52 This account is described in the Biography of An Ziwen, 《安子文传略》 reprinted in 
Lawrence Sullivan, “The Biography of an Ziwen and the History of the Ccp Organization 
Department,” Chinese Law & Government 21, no. 4 (1988), 30-32. 
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staid bureaucrats of the Organization Department were issued guns, kerosene, and 
explosives—with explicit instructions to give their lives if necessary to defend the files. 
The cadres set out, eluding the enemy and ferrying across the Yellow River. With the 
“timely assistance of the people,” they eventually found safety in a small township 
called Sanjiao 三交镇 in Shanxi Province, where the files were hidden away. With 
victory over the Nationalist forces in 1949, the entire cache of files was brought to 
Beijing where they became the seed for what would become the PRC personnel archive. 
If the foregoing account is the most heroic portrayal of dossier management on 
record, it is also one of the very few. Whether attributable to official discretion or the 
banality of the work itself, the personnel file system is all but absent from the officially 
sanctioned histories that rehearse the exploits of Communist liberation.53 Since its 
inception, the tight-laced institution has been regarded as the highest expression of 
bureaucratic rule, yet mundane in the way that the most essential of systems tend to 
become.  
But for an object whose workings are synonymous with administrative tedium, 
the dossier has always been a source of intense anxiety. An Ziwen’s evacuation of the 
20,000 from Yan’an reaffirms the theme of insecurity that runs through the history of 
the dossier system. Once dossiers exist, they become seemingly indispensable political 
resources. Yet in even in the right hands, dossiers can be treacherous things—stubborn, 
                                               
53 Until the publication of Deng Shaoxing’s 1990 study, few if any works of party history 
acknowledged the role and the development of the personnel archive in Yan’an. While 
other accounts mention the evacuation of Yan’an—such as the memoirs of Marshal Ye 
Jianying—dossier files are seldom mentioned. An Ziwen’s biography is exceptional in 
devoting significant attention to the Yan’an dossiers. It is understandable that An’s 
biographers would seek to highlight his contributions to communist liberation after he 
became a target of the Cultural Revolution. See Pamela Lubell, The Chinese Communist 
Party and the Cultural Revolution : The Case of the Sixty-One Renegades (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002). 
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artificial, and corruptible. For them to be useful, they not only have to be researched 
and compiled, but more importantly, protected and maintained. Their politics of 
production trigger a string of open-ended questions: who writes the dossier, and for 
whom? What is the source of its authority? What labor does it perform? 
In the present chapter, I illustrate how the development of the dossier system in 
the CCP base areas was imbricated in the ideological, institutional, and epistemic 
anxieties of Yan’an. Early approaches to dossier work arose out of a recognition of 
existential threats to the Communist movement, including military encirclement, enemy 
subversion, and internal sedition. It was amidst these exceptional circumstances that 
party leaders adopted paper schemes of personnel registration, investigation, and 
assessment to audit its rank-and-file members, and rewrite the distinction between 
friend and enemy. The exigencies of the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942-44) 
precipitated an expansion of file-keeping techniques with intensified rigor and greater 
standardization. The records produced by these initiatives became the first permanent 
dossiers on the CCP rank-and-file—the same set of records that An Ziwen was tasked 
with evacuating in 1946. 
The conventional periodization of the Yan’an era sees two distinct phases of 
organizational change: first, a phase of party expansion (1936-42), generally 
characterized by greater ideological tolerance, inclusiveness, and paternalistic 
leadership; and second, a phase of party rectification (1942-47), defined by the political 
struggle and its lasting impact on party governance.54 While that periodization is 
                                               
54 My discussion of the rectification campaign in this chapter is indebted to Gao Hua’s 
definitive treatment of the campaign. 高华 Gao Hua, How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins 
and Development of the Yan’an Rectification Movement 红太阳是怎样升起的：延安整风运动
的来龙去脉 (Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe 中文大学出版社, 2000). 
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generally useful, there has been an attempt in some recent Chinese scholarship to read 
this temporal and ideological divide into the history of the dossier system.55 On that 
point, the literature on the dossier system contrasts the roles played by Chen Yun, the 
Director of the Central Organization Department (COD) in the earlier period, and Kang 
Sheng, the head of internal security (CDSA) during the rectification. Luo Yanming 
argues that during the Yan’an expansion, Chen Yun was the architect of an incipient 
approach to personnel examination and record-keeping as a liberal organizational 
endeavor. In Luo’s view, Kang Sheng took advantage of the rectification campaign in 
1942 to wrest control of the dossiers and weaponize them for intra-party struggle. In 
this analysis, the two phases of organizational expansion and campaign terror produce 
the dichotomy of the so-called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ faces of the dossier.56 
Against this narrative, I argue in this chapter that the uses of the dossier as an 
instrument of political surveillance and discipline were present from their origins and 
otherwise inextricable from the project of party construction. I seek to show that the 
surveillance functions of the dossier were in fact the impetus for the systemization of 
the personnel archive, which addressed perennial concerns regarding ‘unknown 
elements’ and possible subversives hidden among the ranks. Put another way, there 
was no stable approach to CCP ‘human resources’ that did not employ records for the 
                                               
55 For Luo’s argument, see 罗燕明 Luo Yanming, “Further Discussion of Chen Yun and the 
Cadre Examination System in Yan’an 再谈陈云与延安时期干部审查制度罗燕明,” 
Zhong’guo Yan’an Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao 中国延安干部学院学报 4, no. 1 (2011); 罗燕明 
Luo Yanming, “Chen Yun, Kang Sheng and Yanan Cadre Screening 陈云、康生与延安干
部审查,” Dangshi Bo’lan 党史博览 8 (2010). 
56 Biographical works on Chen Yun and Kang Sheng have reinforced this dichotomy based 
on the respective roles of the two figures in the Cultural Revolution. These portraits tend 
to be highly laudatory of the former and equally critical of the latter. 
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investigation, assessment, and documentation of the political purity of the party 
membership. Rather, the COD’s managerial approach to personnel was closely aligned 
with the CDSA’s policing of the intimate enemy throughout the Yan’an period. The 
convergence of the two approaches was manifest in the constituent practices of cadre 
dossiers, which proved equally accommodating to the needs of suasion and terror. 
The sections below revisit the historical foundations of the dossier system 
through an extended itinerary. Bureaucratic culture in Yan’an was eclectic and drew 
from multiple sources, from Marxism in translation to the remote Chinese past. To 
varying degrees, the CCP drew upon these references in adapting the dossier to the 
conditions of Yan’an, which placed material records at the center of an emergent 
approach to party control. This chapter contains three main parts. I begin with an 
overview of the organizational and demographic shifts that accompanied the Party’s 
relocation to Yan’an, along with a brief consideration of how those changes informed a 
fraught calculus of ideological ‘virtue’ in assessing the party’s newest members. I then 
trace the COD’s rollout of cadre screening amid growing concerns of enemy infiltration 
in 1940, implemented through increasingly strict regimens of registration, verification, 
and evaluation. Finally, I end with a close analysis of an original 1944 Cadre Evaluation 
Form, which illustrates the Party’s evolution and material approach to questions of 
virtue through a unique case study. 
 
Rebuilding the Party Ranks 
In 1935, the CCP eluded eradication by the slimmest of margins. Driven out of its 
rural stronghold in Jiangxi by Nationalist armies, the main communist force embarked 
on the Long March to the last revolutionary base area in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border 
region, where only 7,000 of the original 100,000 marchers reached refuge. In the interim, 
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all other communist base areas collapsed, and the CCP numbers had plummeted to 
merely 40,000 at-large members.57 The following year, the brokering of the United Front 
with the Nationalists granted the Communists a temporary reprieve. In the ensuing 
Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), the brunt of the Japanese offensive fell upon the 
Nationalist-controlled power centers in eastern and central China, while the shelter 
offered by Yan’an enabled the CCP to turn its attention to the task of rebuilding its 
battered organization.58 
The move to rebuild the Party bureaucracy began almost immediately after the 
CCP relocated their headquarters to the foothills of Shaanxi. However, expansion 
efforts gained an influential advocate in October 1937 when a plane from Moscow 
carrying Chen Yun, Kang Sheng and Wang Ming touched down in a Yan’an airfield.59 
                                               
57 Gao Hua gives this figure in 高华 Gao Hua, “1940: Cadre Screening in Yan’an 1940年延安
审干,” Yanhuang Chunqiu 炎黄春秋 3 (2012), 21. A similar figure is given by James 
Harrison in The Long March to Power, qtd. in Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History. 
58 Ten years of civil war had decimated the CCP rank-and-file. Thousands of the Party’s 
most dedicated, experienced operatives had been lost to the battlefield, the Nationalist 
security services, and defection. The historiography on the early Yan’an period depicts a 
fluid, confused political hierarchy. Gaps in personnel policy led to an improvised 
approach to management and training that was somewhat wryly known as the “guerrilla 
work style.” The literature on the Yan’an period is expansive, but generally focuses on the 
Rectification. Peter Seybolt, “Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, 
Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942-1943,” Modern China 12, no. 1 (1986), 44.  
For a work based on firsthand Western accounts that offers a glimpse of 1930s Yan’an with 
attention to its egalitarian political structure, see T.A. Bisson, Yenan in June 1937: Talks 
With the Communist Leaders (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of 
California, 1973). 
59 Each of the three men would play a major role in the revolutionary conflicts to come. Of 
the three, Wang Ming was the highest-ranking, an astute student of Marxism-Leninism 
and the Soviet Union’s preferred candidate to lead the Chinese Communist Party. Chen 
Yun and Kang Sheng originally accompanied Wang Ming’s as members of his 
‘entourage.’ They were expected by the Comintern to support and assist Wang Ming in 
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An example of the Soviet Union’s cautious support of their Chinese allies, the three men 
had received formal political training during their time abroad, but were expected to 
help bend the CCP toward the Comintern line in their new political roles. Among the 
three figures, Chen Yun was technically the lowest-ranking member, but being a 
reliable Maoist ally, he was appointed almost immediately upon his return to the 
important post of Director of the Central Organization Department.60  
The Central Organization Department (COD) was officially responsible for 
handling cadre evaluations, appointments, and discipline for all central level party 
organs. In reality, it was both less and more influential than this description implied. On 
the one hand, the most important central-level appointments were de facto managed by 
the Politburo and thus decided well in advance of COD decisions. But on the other, the 
COD’s central policy decisions set standards for Party organs and controlled career 
lines through the system of nomenklatura.61 The COD was a bureaucracy of 
bureaucracies, managing the Party’s human resources. Like the Soviet Orgburo upon 
which the Chinese agency was modeled, the COD exercised oversight over personnel 
                                               
guiding the CCP toward the Comintern line, but in fact they quickly surpassed him in 
stature. Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 36. 
60 Given the stature of the office, Chen Yun was a relatively unexpected choice to head the 
COD. Bachman speculates that Chen was a compromise candidate of Mao Zedong and 
his Comintern-backed rival, Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu). Previously, Chen Yun had 
supported Mao at the Zunyi conference, but had also served as a deputy to Wang Ming in 
white area operations in Shanghai. On account of his Soviet training, he was regarded as 
qualified, but also unlikely to abuse the position of COD director to develop an 
independent base of support. David Bachman, Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System 
(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Chinese 
Studies, 1985), 13. 
61 For a full overview of the Chinese nomenklatura system, and its key differences from the 
Soviet process, see John Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System : A 
Documentary Study of Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984. 
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matters through its local organs, and acted as a gatekeeper to political advancement. 
For this reason, the Director of the COD was always a senior cadre of high standing—
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Zhang Wentian had all been among Chen 
Yun’s predecessors. 62 Though the COD never exceeded 200 full-time staff in the period 
between 1937 and 1945, the office was responsible for commissioning up to 91,000 
officers in a year to positions spread across the base areas.63 
The massive effort to recruit and train administrative cadres required large scale 
changes to the composition of the party base, highlighting the demographic cleavages 
within the CCP’s organizational ranks.64 For the Party of 1937, senior CCP leaders with 
few exceptions hailed from educated, urban middle-class backgrounds, or ‘petty 
bourgeois’ in the socialist jargon. Meanwhile, however, the party base was largely 
                                               
62 The COD may have been pushed to the periphery of political decision-making during the 
Jiangxi Soviet. Before Chen Yun’s arrival in Yan’an, the COD had issued few directives 
since 1929, and churned through five different directors in the span of two years. Chen 
Yun assumed leadership over a staff of 12 permanent officers working out of a small 
siheyuan courtyard-style building in Yan’an. Soon after taking over, the site was bombed 
by Japanese warplanes, burying the office and surrounding hillside in an avalanche of 
debris. But with a new mandate of party expansion from Mao, the COD would rise from 
these inauspicious beginnings to become the driving force of party expansion. ZGZYLS 
《中共中央组织部史志资料》特辑(92): p. 65. 
63 Sullivan, “The Biography of an Ziwen and the History of the Ccp Organization 
Department,” 7. 
64 Julia Strauss has argued that prior to Yan’an, there was no common terminology to refer 
to a bureaucrat as distinct from a party member or military officer. It was only in the 
latter 1930s that the Chinese term ganbu 干部, solidified the concept of the ‘cadre’ as a 
bureaucratic functionary. There was no standard system of ranks and titles for the small 
number of civil positions; bureaucrats were instead given military ranks, or colloquially 
differentiated by their canteen privileges. Julia Strauss, “Weiiguan (”lettered Official”), 
Gongwuyuan (”public Servant”), and Ganbu (”cadre”): The Politics of Labelling State 
Administrators in Republican China,” Language and Politics in Modern China (1995). 
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drawn from peasants, hired laborers, and people on the rural margins—many of whom 
had been swept up by passing communist forces.65  
Despite his own working class background and deep experience in labor politics, 
Chen Yun emerged as one of the most outspoken advocates of recruiting intellectuals 
into the Party.66 From the perspective of the new head of the COD, the Party’s 
intractable issues of organization were in fact problems of personnel. Poor 
communication, non-existent records, and fractured lines of authority indicated the 
need to raise the “quality” 本质 of the party base. Chen Yun pointed out demand for 
expertise in propaganda, translation, logistics, and economics, among other skills.67 
These criteria suggested appealing to new members with strong professional and 
                                               
65 Among the party base, literacy rates are thought to have been relatively low. Not 
everyone could speak standard spoken Chinese. Until liberation, fighting units were 
commonly subdivided along linguistic lines, with small detachments organized by 
dialect, and large meetings requiring multiple translators. Party members with the ability 
to read and write or speak several dialects were treated as valuable personnel. Ezra 
Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The “Regularisation” of Cadres,” The 
China Quarterly (1967), 40. 
66 Born in 1905 to a poor peasant family near Shanghai, Chen had the distinction of being 
one of the few high-ranking CCP leaders to come from a proletarian household. He had 
no formal education after primary school. At the age of 12 he became an apprentice with 
the Shanghai Commercial Press, later earning a promotion to the distribution department 
as a traveling salesperson. Around 1925, Chen Yun became an active labor organizer and 
joined the Communist Party, achieving prominence for his role in steering the press 
workers union through the May 30th Movement. Chen remained in the white areas with 
the underground leadership following the 1927 anti-Communist purge. Along with Zhou 
Enlai, Kang Sheng, and two others, he led the Special Service Department (the short-lived 
intelligence arm of the underground Party) until Shanghai was evacuated in 1932 under 
pressure from the Nationalist secret police. Bachman, Chen Yun and the Chinese Political 
System, 2. 
67  Personnel shortages meant that irregular and non-specialist staff were often called upon 
to aid in administrative tasks. Vogel notes that within the wartime capital, students 
helped to produce official propaganda, civilians reported on the economy, and residents 
cleaned the streets. Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The “Regularisation” 
of Cadres,” 38. 
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educational backgrounds, who could then be ideologically molded into red experts. 
Chen was reported to have said, “Whoever captures the intellectuals, captures all under 
heaven.”68 Under its new director, the COD began to place a greater emphasis on 
young, urban, and educated recruits in ‘storm recruitment’ drives around the country. 
 
”On Cadre Policy” 
In his first publication as COD director in 1938, Chen Yun articulated his broader 
vision for personnel management in a widely circulated essay, “On Cadre Policy.”69 
“On Cadre Policy” is a unique text—distributed widely through official propaganda 
channels, it was both a white paper for the Organization Department and its local 
bureaus, as well as one of the first attempts by a party leader to articulate a CCP 
approach to human resources. In this essay, Chen explained principles of Leninist party 
organization in an idiom overlaid with traditions of scholar-officialdom, articulating a 
moderate, inclusive vision of ‘political virtue’ that emphasized individual cultivation.70 
                                               
68 Gao Hua, “1940: Cadre Screening in Yan’an 1940年延安审干,” 21. 
69 中共中央文献编辑委员会 Documents Editorial Committee of the Party Center, ed. The 
Works of Chen Yun 陈云文献 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1995), 109-22. 
70 Besides its exposition of cadre policy, it contained a detailed practical and ethical guide to 
management for mid-level cadre bureaucrats. For example, on the conduct of meetings, 
Chen Yun counseled that an opportunity for staff to provide suggestions and criticism 
should always be indicated on the meeting agenda. Meanwhile criticism by superiors of 
their subordinates should always be geared toward rectifying specific errors, rather than 
self-aggrandizing attacks based on abstract political “principles.” He cited the latter 
tendency to harp on “principle”— such as invoking charged categories of “left 
opportunism” or the “spirit of revolutionary sacrifice”—as a destructive habit that 
threatened the unity of the party. For this reason, he attributed problems of low morale 
and dereliction of duty among the lower ranks to mismanagement by senior cadres, who 
lacked the patience and the imagination to cultivate talented men. 
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“On Cadre Policy” carried two main points: first, Chen claimed the crux of 
organization work existed in the challenge of properly selecting and cultivating talent (
用人之道); second, he argued that leadership was aligned with knowledge, and to lead 
people to revolution, one had to “evaluate them holistically.” These two overarching 
ideas are neatly expressed by a well-known maxim of Confucian-Mencian statecraft: 
“select the worthy and promote the capable; evaluate the person and employ them 
well” 选贤任能; 知人善任.71 Chen put his own gloss on this distinctly Confucian 
foundation by coining a “Twelve-Character Rhymed Instruction” on cadre policy: 
了解人，气量大；用得好，爱护人 
Understand the person, 
Be lenient and magnanimous; 
Employ them well, 
Love and cherish men 
Longstanding Chinese political tradition plotted the two measures of an official 
along axes of ‘才’ ability versus ‘德’ virtue. The first and third triplets of the instruction, 
“了解人 / 用得好,” addressed ability, or professional competence. “Understand the 
person / employ them well” (了解人 / 用得好) was essentially a reformulation of ‘知人
善任,’ but implicitly both Chen’s phrase and its inspiration carried the connotation of 
“employ a person for their best abilities so they may flourish.” In his explanation, the 
COD director asserted that the first duty of a superior was to evaluate his subordinates 
as individuals—their backgrounds, motivations, personal attachments, ‘strengths and 
                                               
71 This familiar phrase first appears in the History of the Early Tang Dynasty 《旧唐书·食货志
上》, but has become a common trope. 
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weaknesses.’ Of these factors, ‘strengths and weaknesses’ were the most important to 
ascertain, but could only be derived from a “holistic evaluation” of the person.72 
The second and fourth triplets of the instruction, “be lenient and magnanimous / 
love and cherish men” 气量大 / 爱护人, pointed to the issue of ‘德‘ or virtue.73 
Particularly in a time when the “land is great and men are few,” the Party could not 
afford to harbor apprehensions about those who had already proved themselves 
through revolutionary service. Therefore in the case of “intellectuals and the literate,” it 
was stipulated that so long as the individuals in question had positively and 
enthusiastically joined the revolutionary cause, they should “be fully absorbed into the 
party ranks without further misgivings.” 
                                               
72 Applying this principle to management and organization work, Chen critiqued the 
formal tendency in cadre examinations to reduce an individual to a list of social or 
political identifiers. Instead, he argued that all persons should be evaluated “holistically” 
according to their underlying nature and qualities. By pressing this holistic approach to 
understanding, Chen appeared to tap into a classical trope of martial leadership in which 
capable leaders discerned innate potential in subordinates and employed them in 
situations that unlocked their talent. All aspects of an individual’s personal and interior 
life were considered germane to applying their talents effectively. See Documents 
Editorial Committee of the Party Center, The Works of Chen Yun 陈云文献, 112. 
73 The exact term ‘de’ 德 appears in Yan’an documents sporadically; it is primarily a 
holdover of a late imperial concept reused by some CCP leaders. This connection has 
been pointed out in  A holistic approach to evaluating the cadre left open the question of 
how to appropriately assess a cadre’s sincerity and ideological consciousness in relation 
to their ability. Throughout the 1930s, and 40s, the official line on ’the right amount of 
virtue’ fluctuated from campaign to campaign, shaping career lines and spilling over into 
larger political struggles. Since the CCP shifted its focus to party construction at Yan’an, 
the elite consensus had moved toward greater ideological tolerance in order to recruit the 
broadest possible base of talent. In a 1936 COD memo, central organs were instructed not 
to “nitpick” a party member’s level of ideological consciousness, nor “get hung up on 
their class identity.”73 Vogel, “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The 
“Regularisation” of Cadres”; Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist 
China. 
73 ZGZYLS “中央组织部关于党的组织上几个 问题给陕甘宁省委的信 (1936)” 28(28) p. 252 
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In the initial phase of his tenure as COD director, Chen Yun publicly endorsed 
this broad-tent vision for the Party.74 But “On Cadre Policy” waded beyond 
considerations of expediency into a deeper ideological morass on the source of political 
virtue. At the core of this debate was the problem of whether some cadres, by virtue of 
their class backgrounds, possessed an intrinsically good or bad ‘nature.’ In other words, 
was ideological purity ‘纯洁性’ based upon nature or nurture? The question was not 
simply whether a high level of talent could override low virtue, but rather the more 
vexing problem of whether virtue was in fact learnable. In one camp were those who 
believed that ideological purity was irrevocably determined by class origin and political 
background; on the opposing side were those who regarded ideological character as 
malleable, such that it could be progressively improved through conscientious study 
and self-reform.75 
The central of conceit of “On Cadre Policy” could have well been interpreted as 
an allusion to the progressivist position. Chen’s choice to compose a “Twelve-Character 
Rhymed Instruction” composed of four three-character triplets, would have been 
immediately recognizable to his readers as imitating the structure of the Three Character 
Classic, a Song dynasty rhymed litany of condensed Confucian-Mencian teachings. 
From the late imperial times through the Republican Era, the Three Character Classic 
                                               
74  In Chen’s line of thinking, taking a rigid stance on the virtue of party members would 
deprive the organization of those cadres with the greatest knowledge of the enemy, or in 
his colloquial description, “those with longer beards.” Chen noted that in unpredictable 
times, political identification had shifted frequently and without regard to moral 
appearances, noting that he himself had supported the warlord Wu Peifu. “On Cadre 
Policy” Documents Editorial Committee of the Party Center, The Works of Chen Yun 陈云
文献, 109-12.  
75 A variation of this debate would emerged decades later as the controversy over ‘bloodline 
theory’ in the Cultural Revolution. See Andrew Walder, Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing 
Red Guard Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 139. 
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remained a favored text for teaching schoolchildren literacy and traditional values. Its 
first twelve characters are also its most well-known, containing a pithy distillation of the 
Confucian-Mencian ethos: 
人之初，性本善; 性相近，习相远. 
At birth, human nature is good;  
Their natures being similar, their learning makes them different.76 
In the Confucian-Mencian tradition, cultivation, study, and self-rectification 
underlie a progressivist ethic of human nature. Chen Yun affirmed the notion of 
education as the source of moral cultivation, but transposed its positive valence onto 
socialist ideological consciousness. Socialist education—vis-a-vis cultivation—was 
presented as a potential path to overcoming problematic political origins and effecting 
individual self-transformation. This reframing of a familiar moral construct seemed to 
define virtue not in terms of ‘purity,’ but rather process, open to iterative accumulation 
and refinement. 
The moderate, inclusive political values espoused in “On Cadre Policy” have 
been highlighted by Luo Yanming and others to argue that Chen Yun’s vision of 
personnel management was fundamentally a liberal one.77 It is certainly true that 
Chen’s messaging was designed to appeal to the urban, educated intellectuals of non-
proletarian origins. However, “On Cadre Policy” was also a piece of strategic branding, 
distributed a broad readership to motivate expansion. Its lack of binding, actionable 
                                               
76 Translation is mine. The more literal Herbert Giles translation reads: “Men at their birth / 
are naturally good / their natures are much the same / their habits become widely 
different” in San Tzu Ching (1910). 
77 Luo Yanming, “Chen Yun, Kang Sheng and Yanan Cadre Screening 陈云、康生与延安干
部审查.” 
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instructions should give us pause when attempting to read the text as a definitive 
statement of policy. In Yan’an, the ‘liberalism’ of Chen Yun’s cadre policy needs to be 
situated within the context of the COD’s central role in internal surveillance. As party 
expansion later turned to ideological consolidation, the hard limits of the COD’s 
tolerance for political ambiguity crystallized into expanded routines for screening and 
disciplining persons of dubious virtue. 
 
The Newcomers 
In the early years of Yan’an, the Organization Department’s campaign of 
outreach was extremely successful, and central to the Party’s success in bureaucratic 
reconstruction. During the period from 1937-1940 which the Chinese historian Gao Hua 
terms the Party’s ‘renewal,’ the CCP completed a remarkable organizational revival in 
qualitative and quantitative terms.78 After the party ranks had been reduced to only 
40,000 at large members in 1935, membership between 1937 and 1940 swelled to 
600,000.79 By the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the organization counted over 
one million party in their ranks. These gains accompanied a resurgence in the strength 
of the People’s Liberation Army, and territorial expansion to new rural base areas 
behind Japanese lines. Thousands of the new recruits came from urban areas outside of 
                                               
78 Gao Hua, How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins and Development of the Yan’an Rectification 
Movement 红太阳是怎样升起的：延安整风运动的来龙去脉. 
79 ZGZYLS《中共中央组织部史志资料》特辑(92): p. 67. Also “CCP Central Committee’s 
Directive on Opposition to Capitulationism and Splittism to Avoid a National Crisis 
(1940)” in Warren Kuo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party (Taipei: Institute 
of International Relations, 1968), 357. 
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the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region in accordance with the recruitment strategy 
advocated by Chen Yun and other organizational elites.  
New personnel joined the Party in Yan’an through several channels. First and 
foremost was active recruitment in the white or occupied territories. The tenuous 
rapprochement of the United Front granted the CCP legal recognition as a legitimate 
party, meaning that after years of suppression by Nationalist security services, the CCP 
in 1937 resumed open operations.80 Legally permitted to engage in recruitment for the 
first time in a decade, the party launched ‘storm recruitment drives’ in the major 
population centers across China.81 Secondly, droves of leftist volunteers braved a long 
journey through multiple enemy blockade to join the Communists in the wartime 
capital. A large portion of the new arrivals were university students from the war-
affected provinces, but others included urban professionals, labor leaders, writers and 
artists.82 
Lastly, the United Front secured the release of hundreds of imprisoned CCP 
members from Nationalist prisons. Many of the political prisoners had been arrested 
                                               
80 Of the nearly 24,000 communists arrested or executed since 1927, a disproportionate 
number were specialists in Shanghai and Wuhan with training in organization, logistics, 
intelligence, and technology. Over 3000 political prisoners were held in Nationalist 
controlled prisons as of 1936, according to the Nationalist Minister of Justice Wang 
Yongbin. Lubell, The Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution : The Case of the 
Sixty-One Renegades, 44. 
81 Extensions of the Communist Youth League Organizations such as the Chinese National 
Liberation Vanguard, were also established at universities to capitalize upon patriotic 
student sentiments Lubell, The Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution : The 
Case of the Sixty-One Renegades, 48. 
82 The cadres who joined the Party between 1937 and 1945 (excepting ‘returned CCP 
members’) were officially designated as ‘War of Resistance cadres.’ They held less 
prestige than the ‘Old cadres,’ which included the Long Marchers. Vogel, “From 
Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The “Regularisation” of Cadres,” 42. 
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after 1927 while conducting underground operations in the white areas; even after years 
in prison, they accounted for some of the most politically capable operatives in the 
Party. As a condition for release, the Nationalist authorities required each prisoner to 
write a renunciation of the CCP—creating a cloud of suspicion over the released for the 
rest of their careers—but did not otherwise prevent the released individual from 
rejoining the Communist forces. Among the most well-known of the ‘returned cadres’ 
were the ’61 renegades’ of Caolanzi prison, which included future high-ranking officers 
such as Bo Yibo, Liu Lantao, Yang Xianzhen and the aforementioned An Ziwen, among 
many others.83 
Given the pace of organizational change, the arrivals inevitably placed the CCP’s 
ad hoc personnel management scheme under strain. It was estimated that 90 percent of 
the new cohorts were of petty bourgeois origin, and an equivalent proportion 
unexposed to communist organization.84 As the Party absorbed recruits, it became 
implausible to scale what had been a highly personalized and recommendation-based 
network to the expanded party structure. Even as the Party continued to staff 
bureaucratic posts, the influx of newcomers triggered elite misgivings about the 
political identities of its newest members. Whether an information gap was the cause or 
symptom of deepening political anxieties, one complicating factor was that leadership 
had no written records on its personnel to work with. Despite the rhetorical emphasis 
                                               
83 Pamela Lubell’s monograph focuses on the story of the ’61 Renegades’ and their 
subsequent careers—she covers the predicament of the “returned cadres” in greater 
detail. 
84 Harrison qtd. in Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 107. 
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placed upon ‘evaluating the person’ in the official literature, the Party possessed 
scarcely any documentation to shed light on the identities of its members.85  
The lack of personnel records was attributable to the CCP’s recent status as an 
underground party.86 The possibility of losing internal files to capture or leaks made 
any form of documentation a significant security risk. During the CCP’s underground 
years, it had suffered more than one major intelligence breach in which its membership 
records had been exposed. In 1931, Gu Shunzhang, the Soviet-trained head of the CCP 
security services, was captured by the Nationalist secret police. Gu defected to the 
Nationalists and turned over hundreds of internal records, leading to a massive 
roundup of the underground party in Wuhan and Shanghai. In 1934, in the hopes of 
avoiding a similar disaster, the PLA destroyed all of its personnel records cables on the 
eve of the Long March.87 In all, some 50 pounds of documents—including dossiers and 
secret cables—were burned to prevent capture.88 Even so, these measures did not 
prevent the Nationalist general Chen Cheng from recovering a large tranche of files 
                                               
85 The sole method of verifying new arrivals was the ‘letter of introduction’ 介绍信. In its 
most common form, the letter of introduction (occasionally also referred to during this 
time as a ‘letter of recommendation’ was a sealed voucher from one trusted party organ 
to another asserting that the individual carrying the letter was known and fit for service. 
Such letters functioned as a convenient token of trust, but were far from a comprehensive 
or secure store of knowledge to draw upon. Systematic records were given to be a luxury 
during a period when personnel—along with paper, ink, and printing equipment—were 
generally in short supply. ZGZYLS “中央组织部关于写证明文件的通知 (1940)” 28(117): p. 
35. 
86 Michael Oksenberg, “Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy,” The 
China Quarterly 57 (1974), 32. 
87 Luo Yanming, “Further Discussion of Chen Yun and the Cadre Examination System in 
Yan’an 再谈陈云与延安时期干部审查制度罗燕明,” 113-14. 
88 David Chambers, “The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography,” 
Studies in Intelligence (2012), 32. 
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from the abandoned Jiangxi Soviet.89 Among CCP veterans, these incidents led to a 
lasting mistrust of writing names on paper. 
Despite continued risks, by the late 1930s, administrative oversight of a growing 
workforce all but demanded the reinstitution of central filing. The Organization 
Department tentatively reestablished party-wide cadre registration for new and old 
cadres. In what amounted to a wholesale inventory of its personnel, the Organization 
Department had all party offices issue and collect paperwork accounting for the 
personnel in their units. The renewed effort at cadre registration relied heavily upon 
registration forms drafted by local base area committees. These forms capture the 
questions that Party leadership harbored toward the rank-and-file, reflecting the 
priorities and fault lines of the organization at a crucial moment of transition. 
 
The Right Amount of Virtue: The Registration Form of the Sichuan Party Committee 
One classic registration form from this transitional period was a 46-item template 
first created by the Provisional Party Committee of Sichuan Province.90 The Sichuan 
form was distinguished by its length and thoroughness. Its 46 question fields resulted in 
registration form that was essentially an extended questionnaire. Ostensibly, the 
purpose of cadre registration was to have essential biographical records of all staff such 
that it could be easily retrieved by work unit leaders and superior levels. However, the 
                                               
89  Considered an intelligence windfall in its time, those papers are now known as the Chen 
Cheng collection of the Hoover Institute and represent one of the richest collections of 
sources on the Jiangxi Soviet outside China. 
90 AC “中共四川临时省委关于整顿组织的通告九件(1927)” 
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Sichuan cadre registration form sought a far greater degree of detail than what a 
reasonable administrator would have needed to assign a new cadre a job. Regardless of 
whether it accurately reflected the COD’s ‘holistic’ approach to personnel management, 
the Sichuan form was unique in its desire for comprehensiveness.91 
The registration form was designed to be manually completed by the subjects of 
registration, and followed-up with interviews. Overall, the questionnaire sought a 
balance between gauging professional ability of immediate benefit to the Party, versus 
an understanding of class origins and political background. Roughly one-fourth of the 
46 queries could be considered an audit of professional ‘strengths and weaknesses,’ 
including: 
 
20. Do you understand any foreign languages? (specifically: can you read 
documents, compose documents, or perform translation?) 
21. Do you possess any unique skills? (such as: music, martial arts, 
drawing, shooting, dancing, typing, fortune-telling, oratory, illusions) 
22. Do you possess special competencies? (such as: propaganda work, 
organization work, writing, or machinery?) 
23. What types of ideological books or papers have you read? 
24. Have you written any published works? 
34. What are your personal vices? 
As indicated by the parenthetical notes, no skill or trait was too esoteric to 
submit the Party. While the list of desired competencies included several office skills, 
none of the examples given were offered frivolously—for instance, Gu Shunzhang, the 
                                               
91 In his authoritative survey, Deng Shaoxing claimed that the Sichuan Cadre Registration 
Form “established a stable foundation for subsequent cadre registration forms and cadre 
background forms.” This is a difficult assertion to evaluate, but in comparing the Sichuan 
form to other historical examples, what is most striking is its length and thoroughness, 
which makes it markedly different from contemporaneous Soviet examples, as well as 
CCP registration forms that appear afterward. Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 
172. 
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former CCP spy chief-turned defector, was an illusionist by reputation (幻术师); Deng 
Xiaoping was a skilled metal fitter. The range of seemingly acceptable ways to 
contribute to the Communist cause intersected with the idea of leveraging unique skills 
from “On Cadre Policy,” or employing persons to realize their potential. 
Under the guise of knowing a person to the fullest, the questionnaire contained a 
few items that were deceptively open-ended. One series of questions took the format: 
“What is your opinion on…?”, and asked the subject for their general thoughts on “the 
Nationalists,” “the Communist Youth,” and “the Communist Party.” Below, a similar 
setup was given for workplace issues: “How do you feel about your current work?” 
Followed by: “What do you think about your current boss?” One of the last items, No. 
42, read simply: “What are your ultimate ambitions?” Whatever information a cadre 
chose to supply, there was no correct answer, but there lay a minefield of incorrect 
responses. The paternal solicitude implicit in the questions solicited affect, while 
maintaining a conceit of leadership as helping subordinates to realize their better selves. 
With its last series, the Registration Form shifted its focus to the sensitive topic of 
political history. Comprising what was likely to be the most scrutinized portion of the 
questionnaire, these questions reveal the CCP’s calculus of sincerity and suspicion: 
 
25. What political organizations have you ever been party to? (truthfully 
recount their name, composition, organizational mission, dates of activity, 
and current administrator if active) 
27. Have you ever been a member of the Nationalist Party? (truthfully 
recount what your role was during the time you were a member) 
29. When did you join the Communist Party (truthfully recount the name of 
the person who introduced you to the Party, their position at the time, and 
their current administrative position) 
30. What political movements have you previously participated in? (e.g., 5-
4, 2-7, 5-25, 3-18, 3-31, other) 
32. Have you ever been imprisoned or detained by the enemy? 
This set of questions evinced the growing fear among the Party elite regarding 
the possibility of enemy infiltration. The main issue at stake—conspiracy—was probed 
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by a series of polar yes-no questions. The shift to an inquisitorial mode of questioning 
reflected the deepening suspicion among party administrators that the new and 
returning cadres were not ideologically true. The political background of urban 
intellectuals, and cadres that had previously worked or been captured in the white 
areas, were referred to as ’complex’ 复杂.92  
The Organization Department’s position on the new cadres was considerably 
more harsh than its public stance suggested. While having emphasized talent over 
purity in “On Cadre Policy,” Chen Yun’s other statements on the white area and 
returning cadres heavily favored increased security measures. This caution was evident 
from the handling of an issue marked as Question No. 32 on the Sichuan Form, “Have 
you ever been imprisoned or detained by the enemy?” This query dealt directly with 
the returned cadres. Despite being some of the Party’s longest-tenured operatives, their 
capture and release stoked permanent suspicions that the returned cadres had 
collaborated with the enemy, or had been turned into double-agents.  
In his 1936 paper on anti-subversion, Chen Yun wrote that enemy subversives 
were likely to “pass themselves off” as returned cadres by “appearing with blood 
dripping from their faces and cries of having been tortured” in order to gain re-
admittance to the party ranks.93 He recommended that cadres from the white areas be 
subjected to ‘the most rigorous process of reinvestigation’ until fully proven to be 
reliable. 
                                               
92 The problematic virtue of the ‘returned cadres’ is a point of emphasis in Ch. 2 of Lubell, 
The Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution : The Case of the Sixty-One 
Renegades.  
93 “革命运动的发展和防止奸细的破坏 (1936)“ in Documents Editorial Committee of the 
Party Center, The Works of Chen Yun 陈云文献, 102. 
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Questionnaires that probed political background were viewed as a necessary first 
step toward unmasking true ideological identities. This bureaucratic ‘will to 
knowledge’ revealed a reverse aspect of ‘holistic evaluation,’ a political project of 
surveillance to counterbalance the humane endeavor alluded to in “On Cadre Policy.” 
Instead, to understand the cadres was to have knowledge of their past, their faults, their 
liabilities. The Central Committee used the raw expression “remove the pants to cut off 
the tail” 脱裤子割尾巴 as an explicit depiction of what cadre investigation ought to look 
like. The tail—symbolizing an individual’s unwholesome past—was to be publicly 
exposed and severed.94 
Fears of infiltration were rooted in real danger and possibility, but they persisted 
in part because party administrators lacked the means for ‘rigorous investigation’ that 
was necessary to monitor threats from within. On the Sichuan Form, the repeated 
command to “truthfully recount” 诚述 facts of the matter was an indication of the 
Party’s limitations. The instruction to respondents was both a command and a warning, 
and yet somewhat futile given that the authorities had few sources of reliable 
information other than the subjects themselves.  
The unsolved questions of the Sichuan Form illuminated the concerns that would 
drive the development of personnel files. As a 1940 COD memo warned: “to clearly 
evaluate a cadre or party member, it is not enough to rely on interviews, 
nor...assessment of their everyday work or study—understanding comes from knowing 
all aspects of their personal history and past experience.” It was not sufficient to cultivate 
                                               
94 See Yang Shangkun’s address to the Central Research Institute (later the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences) qtd. in Qing Dai et al., Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies”: 
Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944 (Armonk, New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 142. 
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virtue; virtue was to be researched and policed.95 
 
Braving the Archive: The Case for Cadre Screening 
Beginning in 1939-40, the Organization Department launched an intensive 
program of background investigation and file-making under the heading of ‘cadre 
screening.’ Cadre screening was a direct extension of previous efforts in organization 
and registration begun in the base areas. The initiative built upon the experience of 
cadre registration in identifying new and returning cadres as a security liability.96 
However by 1939, party leadership believed that the security problem had metastasized 
into a general crisis. In the “Decision on the Consolidation of the Party” from August 
25, 1939, the CCP Politburo issued a bracing reassessment of the party’s situation: 
Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, especially since the correct 
decision taken by central leadership to expand the party membership, the 
Chinese Communist Party has greatly developed itself by absorbing 
numerous good elements into the Party and firming up the basis of a 
national mass Bolshevik Party. But because of the very fact that the Party 
has been expanded too rapidly within too short a period…without careful 
screening of the individual candidates, chances arose for the adversaries, 
speculators, and subversive agents to sneak into the party. Consequently 
the party organization has been damaged… National and class enemies are 
given opportunities to subvert our party. This is a mistake. These 
                                               
95 ZGZYLS “中央关于审查干部问题的指示(1940)” 28(117): p. 36-38. 
96 Specifically, Luo Ruiqing identified three main methods of Nationalist infiltration: 1) 
embedding high-level intelligence agents to be long-term ‘moles;’ 2) staging of the “honey 
trap;” 3) turning captured or surrendered operatives. Kuo, Analytical History of the Chinese 
Communist Party, 469. 
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phenomena are indicative of the serious weakness of the party…and the 
growing danger of domestic split and capitulation to the Japanese.97 
A sense of alarm was not limited to a single department or faction within the 
Party. In a speech to a newly minted class of security officers in early 1941, the normally 
staid Liu Shaoqi asserted that since launching subversive operations over a decade ago, 
Nationalist operatives had been able to “endure suffering and hardship to embed 
themselves in the ranks, and conduct themselves in speech and action to win the trust 
of leadership.” He warned that unless the Party was able to neutralize the infiltrators 
entirely, they risked “swallowing the Monkey King,” who would wreak havoc inside 
the Party until the organization faced a “choice between cutting out the stomach or sure 
death.”98 
Cadre screening thus marked an important reorientation in the Party’s 
organizational priorities from sourcing talent in order to combat external enemies—the 
Nationalists and imperialists—to policing threats posed by the enemy within. As 
socialist human resources pivoted from “discovering the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual cadres” to the task of “rooting out heterodox elements,” organization work 
merged with traditional counter-intelligence operations.99 New forms of documentation 
and record-keeping were required to provide intelligence on suspected threats. 
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Counter-subversion gave rise to institutional structures within the Party apparatus 
devoted to monitoring the political purity of the rank-and-file. 
These interrelated practices of intelligence work and the personnel organization 
were distinctly informed by a Soviet genealogy of practice.100 In Yan’an, the two high-
level figures most directly engaged in cadre screening were Chen Yun and Kang Sheng, 
who both spent significant time in Moscow during the 1930s at an elite Comintern 
training academy. Kang Sheng, who in Yan’an would lead the new internal security 
service called the Central Department of Social Affairs, previously trained in Moscow 
under NKVD head Nikolai Yezhov.101 During his time in Moscow, Kang’s high standing 
with his Bolshevik hosts had earned him an appointment as the head of the 
International Lenin School’s Chinese division, where Chen Yun studied security work 
during his two-year stay from roughly 1935-37.102 Foreshadowing events in Yan’an, 
Kang even worked with the NKVD to conduct a purge of ’Trotskyite counter-
revolutionaries’ among the visiting Chinese students in 1936. 
Security and organization work had been a point of curricular emphasis at the 
International Lenin School (MLSh), a Comintern-managed leadership academy for the 
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training of global communist leaders.103 Fully funded and directly operated by the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern, the school enjoyed considerable support from 
the Party Central, and occasionally hosted Bolshevik dignitaries, such as Josef Stalin, 
Grigorii Zinoviev, and Bela Kun, as visiting speakers. Classes were primarily taught by 
Soviet academics or senior cadres in either Russian or English. The Chinese division 
was a small standalone program within MLSh, training a select group of students in the 
praxis of world revolution.104 Though each cohort of CCP students numbered only in 
the teens, several important Chinese leaders were students or lecturers at MLSh, 
including Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chiang Ching-Kuo, Zhang Guotao, and others. 
In an ironic turn, Chinese visitors to Moscow gained a firsthand understanding 
of the Soviet surveillance archive by becoming its subjects. Every student at a 
Comintern academy was subject to a strict system of surveillance and record-keeping 
modeled after the dossier system that the Bolsheviks used for monitoring their own 
personnel. It was general knowledge among the Chinese that their Soviet keepers 
maintained comprehensive files on them, but only the Soviets were permitted access to 
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their contents.105 The student dossiers constituted only a fraction of the larger 
Comintern archive on the CCP as a whole, which included multi-volume files on top 
leaders. 
At the three international Comintern academies active from the 1921 through 
1938—The University of the Toilers in the East, Sun Yat-sen University, and the 
International Lenin School—all visiting students were subjected to a ‘screening’ upon 
arrival. Among other things, this required the student to fill out a registration form with 
all essential biographical information, complete a political autobiography, and turn over 
any papers they were carrying to the authorities to be mined for intelligence. All 
students where photographed and issued identity cards to carry with them at all times. 
Soviet handlers reserved the right to conduct follow-up investigations and utilize the 
findings as they pleased.106 
As recalled by former students, the experience of being processed by the 
Comintern personnel archive left a strong impression on the Chinese students. Yueh 
Sheng, one of the ’28 Bolsheviks’ enrolled at Sun Yat-sen University from 1926-32, 
recalled one particular day when the GPU subjected all the Chinese students to detailed 
physical measurements, including: “our height; the dimensions of our heads; the size, 
dimensions, and relative positions of our eyes, noses, and ears; the length of our necks; 
and the delineation of our hairlines…and any identifying physical marks.” These 
measurements were then put on file in the students’ dossiers along with other personal 
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information.107 The Chinese students had no choice but to comply with the procedures 
in spite their discomfiting implications. 
Upon rejoining the Party in Yan’an in 1937, Chen Yun and Kang Sheng became 
conduits for the introduction of Bolshevik-style personnel records into the CCP’s 
bureaucratic workflow. Chen Yun and Kang Sheng were among a small group of high-
ranking cadres who experienced the Bolshevik surveillance archive as both subjects and 
administrators, and could appreciate its varied applications. It was not lost on Chen 
Yun that the Bolshevik approach to the dossier prioritized its intelligence value. The 
type of background information collected in individualized files appeared crucial to the 
task of counter-subversion as perceived by the CCP at home. 
Chen had previously acknowledged the double-edged utility of the archive in his 
writings on intelligence. In the same 1936 essay (Moscow) in which he warned of 
traitorous returning cadres, he explained how bad actors in the employ of the enemy 
might exploit information in cadre registration forms: 
(Enemy) intelligence agents are greatly interested in the registration of 
revolutionary organizations, which allows them to collect a great deal of 
previously unknown information. They will utilize the authority of 
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superior levels to issue many investigative and statistical forms, registering 
the membership of organizations everywhere. After completing this 
registration, they may immediately arrest these revolutionaries, but in 
many other situations they invite the security forces to the places where the 
forms are kept to inspect them.108 
Chen’s earlier distrust of the registration form was informed by his service in the 
underground Party, whose work had been betrayed by documents in several security 
breaches in the 1930s. But in hindsight, what is most notable about Chen’s admonition 
is that it forecast precisely how the Organization Department would deploy registration 
forms in Yan’an to investigate potential subversives among its own personnel. In the 
1940s when the CCP had stabilized its strategic position, it turned to registration as an 
integral practice for screening the purity of its membership. 
The CCP’s transition from registrant to registrar was indicative of a broader 
reversal of its historic relationship to the archive. Prior to the Yan’an, when the Party 
was a target of Nationalist, Japanese, and even Socialist surveillance, there existed a 
consensus among the underground leadership that the archive was a dangerous 
liability. However, the unfolding crisis of enemy infiltration impressed the potency of a 
central filing system for purposes of internal surveillance. In a war of intelligence, 
trusted and recorded information on personnel became the most precious of political 
resources. The CCP came to terms with the archive by harnessing the methodology of 
file-making that had previously been utilized against them. 
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As information providers, the Organization Department and the Department of 
Social Affairs were placed on the front lines of the counter-subversion effort. The two 
departments assumed joint responsibility for identifying and eliminating ‘heterodox 
elements’ 异己分子 within the ranks through the emergency initiative of cadre 
screening. In the process of party-wide screening, comprehensive records on the rank-
and-file were compiled for the first time.  
The Organization Department coordinated the entire process for the Party as a 
whole, but cadre screening mobilized all levels of the party apparatus to work toward 
the elimination of enemy agents. General recruiting was suspended for the duration of 
the screening effort. The agenda for party-wide purification was deliberately top-down: 
the highest echelons of the Party underwent examination first; once cadres at higher 
levels had been cleared, they would proceed to screen the cadres at the levels 
immediately below them, and so on down the bureaucratic ladder. Cadre 
administrators charged with screening were to be of the highest loyalty and reliability, 
and ordered to “obey party principles without letting emotion get in the way of work.” 
Meanwhile, subordinates were to be reminded that as “cadre screening benefited both 
the Party and the cadres themselves,” all cadres ought to “be pleased to undergo 
screening.109 
Reflecting elite priorities, the screening initiative mobilized an extraordinary 
amount of manpower. Lin Boqu, Chairman of the Party Committee of the Northwest 
Border Region Party, announced in 1939 that his government had formed 700 anti-
subversion committees, comprising 100,000 total members. Even allowing some 
headway for bureaucratic embellishment, Lin’s reported figure accounts for over 15% of 
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the entire Party membership at the time. At the height of cadre screening in 1943, 
official targets called for 10 to 20 percent of all cadres to be employed toward “counter-
espionage work of investigation, research, detection, interrogation and examination.”110 
In Yan’an alone, as many as 8000 cadres were organized to screen just 40,000 Party and 
military personnel.111 The distribution of counter-subversive tasks among the local Party 
organs reflected the CCP’s mass-line approach to security work as a whole. The 
elimination of hidden subversives was not the responsibility of a single specialized task 
group—instead, security was presented as a basic duty of administrators and 
necessarily integrated into all levels of the bureaucracy.112 
 
The Material of Surveillance: Verification and Evidence 
In August of 1940, Chen Yun issued an internal memorandum with detailed 
instructions for cadre screening based upon the experience of the past year. (Fig 1.1)113 
The memorandum was circulated by way of secret radiogram and outlined the 
questions and procedures that were to be undertaken in individual cases of cadre 
screening. Even as the new instructions made a perfunctory mention of ‘evaluating the 
cadres to utilize their abilities,’ the literary allusions to Confucian-Mencian cultivation 
had been noticeably stripped away. In lieu of “ability,” the 1940 memorandum instead 
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emphasized that “different cadres bring different problems.”114 Chen asserted that only 
by thoroughly understanding those problems, was it possible to gauge “sincerity,” and 
“distinguish the real cadres from the freeloaders and the renegades.” 
 
Fig. 1.1 Chen Yun’s draft “COD Summary of Initial Experience in Cadre Screening 
(1940)” 
In broad terms, cadre screening sought to distinguish the political background of 
all Party members by means of a three-part sequence of procedures: registration, 
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investigation (or verification), and assessment. Each of the three phases entailed its own 
specific form of paperwork, created on the basis of guidelines issued by the 
Organization Department. Registration forms were used to flag specific categories of 
problems that merited additional scrutiny from administrators. Evidence pertaining to 
these issues was then to be collected and verified by the Department of Social Affairs. 
Lastly, the processed cadres were assessed and divided into two broad groups, 
“cleared” and “problematic.”115 Cleared cadres received a professional and political 
evaluation from a supervisor, while the cadres with problematic backgrounds were 
placed on a separate disciplinary track. 
Cadre registration forms were the original basis for personnel records, but Party 
administrators quickly learned their limitations as a medium. New routines of 
personnel management were often piloted at centrally-run party academies, such as the 
Central Party School (located in Yan’an 1937-47, also known as the Marx-Lenin 
Institute). When a pilot screening program was implemented there in 1940, all of the 291 
cadets who were new Party members—that is, cadres who joined after the war with 
Japan—were required to submit registration and personal history forms.116 Out of this 
subgroup, only 103, or just over a third, were subsequently determined to have 
disclosed the full extent of their political issues. The other 65% of their cohort were later 
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found to have ‘underreported’ their circumstances, and as a result were made to submit 
corrections after additional rounds of investigation.117 
The cadets were prone to two different kinds of misrepresentations. First, 
individuals from across the class spectrum tended to debase their class origins to 
improve their political standing. Hence, rich peasants reduced themselves to middle 
peasants, petty bourgeois turned into proletarians, and so forth. Second, many of the 
cadres who had worked in the white areas and lost contact with the Party downplayed 
the circumstances of their hiatus from the organization. This was even true of white 
area cadres who had not been arrested or captured, and did not appear to have 
anything significant to hide. Reviewing the rollout of cadre screening in 1940, the COD 
used the experience of the Central Party School to conclude that even ‘hardcore’ Party 
members were “intimidated” by the thrust of the campaign.118 
For Party elites, the recalcitrance of core cadres in registration spoke to the 
necessity of enhancing the organization’s investigative capabilities. One lesson from the 
first phase of screening was that even the most committed individuals would withhold 
information from the Party during self-reporting. For that reason, registration and 
personal history forms were inadequate for capturing the whole truth—these routines 
would need to be fortified with follow-up examination and additional rounds of 
evaluation. 
The leadership’s insistence on possessing certain knowledge of its personnel 
contributed to a material transformation in background investigation in the early 1940s. 
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By designating this transformation as ‘material,’ I am referring to both material 
production—in the sense that these new routines of investigation were based upon the 
making of paper documents—as well as borrowing the CCP’s preferred own term of 
“materials,” (cailiao 材料) which denoted this category of documents. Indeed, it might 
be argued that with the intensification and expansion of cadre screening beyond Yan’an 
in 1941-42, the physical production of ‘materials’ became the central bureaucratic task in 
the overall process of examinations. 
According to COD policy, cadre screening demanded “evidence” to allow 
“scrutinizing every link” in a person’s past, in addition to “observing the overall 
trajectory of a cadre’s revolutionary history.”119 To achieve these aims, it was necessary 
for any claims submitted by the cadre under screening to be verified by a class of 
documents known as ‘evidentiary materials’ 证明材料, commonly found in the form of 
witness affidavits. The ‘fact-checking’ of personal information closely resembled the 
bureaucratic practice of ‘verification’ in the Soviet Union, with nearly identical forms of 
documentation120 It was the responsibility of the screeners to investigate and cross-
reference any dubious claims in the registration forms against these evidentiary 
materials, and ensure that all the information given was made accurate. 
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Despite the terminology, the ‘evidentiary materials’ in question never referred to 
material evidence.121 Rather, evidentiary materials almost always indicated a written 
affidavit by an eyewitness, a former superior, or an investigator on the basis on in-
person interviews. In weighing the validity of the affidavit, the writer’s political 
reputation and years of service (党龄) were considered more germane than the writer’s 
proximity to the facts of the case. It was extremely common for evidentiary materials to 
address white area service; another ubiquitous topic was confirmation or denial of 
previous association with the Nationalists. An affidavit generally ran about a page in 
length, but might have been as short as a few lines stating a person’s whereabouts 
within a certain timeframe. More notably, it was permissible for the account in an 
affidavit to be based upon “firsthand experience, hearsay, or informed conjecture”—
how the witness acquired the information was considered less important than their 
political authority to speak on the matter.122 
While the purpose of collecting evidentiary materials was to certify self-reported 
testimony, the complexities of producing this genre of evidence introduced additional 
issues of fidelity and interpretation. A 1940 COD notice highlighted four recurring 
problems in sourcing these materials.123 First, there existed the challenge of overcoming 
the fickleness of memory. In order to protect themselves and others, witnesses 
approached the task of addressing a dimly recalled event by recourse to 
procrastination, fabrication and obfuscation. Secondly, many of the submitted affidavits 
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were out of compliance with COD standards. The offending examples included 
affidavits that were left unsigned, written on poor-quality paper that could not be 
archived, or another frequent complaint of administrators—written in pencil. A third 
issue, was that a significant number of the witnesses called upon were illiterate, 
requiring a special accommodations for dictation or recitation in the presence of an 
investigator. Lastly, there appeared at times to be misunderstanding on the part of the 
witnesses as to the means and ends of their testimony. Gao Hua asserts that it was not 
uncommon for an affidavit to assert that an individual in question was an 
“unwaveringly steadfast proletarian fighter” before confirming a series of counter-
revolutionary actions.124 
Such intricacies only added to the formidable logistical challenge of collecting 
evidentiary materials. Not only for witnesses, but for screeners in particular, the 
production of materials was an extremely labor-intensive process. At the very 
minimum, it required an administrator to comb through a cadre’s personal forms for 
references to witnesses and alibis; a back-and-forth of inquiries to outside departments 
regarding the status of named individuals; formal interdepartmental requests for 
materials; possible site visits; and the concordance of new materials with information on 
record. These steps were repeated for dozens of witnesses in each individual case. 
Because the focus of this process was not simply ascertaining the facts of a matter, but 
rather producing documentation to its effect, this mode of verification established a paper 
circuit in which internal flows of certificates, receipts, duplicates and notarizations came 
to consume the daily workload of cadre screening. 
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Beginning in 1942, the extension of cadre screening to the provincial base areas 
coincided with the official launch of the Yan’an rectification campaign. As local cadres 
were summoned back to the center to undergo examination and reeducation, the 
screening process was substantively folded into the rectification campaign. The latter 
initiative inherited the tools and methods of the former, such that the routines of 
investigation gathered under interchangeable headings of “cadre screening,” 
“rectification,” or “anti-subversion.”125 
But as the bureaucratic labor of screening continued to intensify, its supporting 
practice of verification and file-making shifted from the responsibility of the 
Organization Department to that of the security services. The resulting arrangement 
allowed the Organization Department to set policy and issue individual verdicts, but 
charged the security organs with producing the bulk of the evidentiary materials. The 
revised division of labor partially stemmed from the conspiracist impulses of the 
rectification campaign, which were accompanied by the belief that the security organs 
were more ideologically committed and better equipped to handle subversives than the 
Party as a whole. However, an equally important factor was that the material demands 
of producing evidence for cadre screening had outstripped the capacity of the 
Organization Department’s modest bureaucracy. Contradicting the Party’s own official 
figures, which routinely underreported the involvement of the security organs, Warren 
Kuo asserts that the vast majority of cases decided by the Organization Department 
were investigated and compiled by the Department of Social Affairs.126 
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The collapsing of political distinctions between cadre screening/organization on 
one side, and rectification/security on the other, was the continuation of a long-term 
trend. As both organization and security work became increasingly directed toward 
counter-subversion, the methods utilized to monitor the cadres versus its enemies saw a 
gradual convergence. In the 1940s, the shift to evidence as the essence of investigation 
also manifested in paper routines for monitoring enemies outside the Party. In this 
spirit, a 1941 Central Committee resolution called upon all state bureaus, party 
committees down to the district level, and base area governments to set up 
investigation and research organs to collect and study “all types of materials” on 
political, military, economic and cultural matters, as well as “class relations with respect 
to the enemy, our allies, and ourselves.” Among the materials to be collected, the 
resolution specified: 
Biographical sketches of well-known persons: write biographies of several 
hundred to several thousand characters of all landlord capitalists with 
property valued at more than 50,000 yuan; officers above the rank of 
regimental commander; officials of enemy, puppet, or allied parties in 
charge of a country or larger area; famous scholars, literary men, and 
newspapermen known both inside and outside a county, leaders of 
societies, sects, vagabond groups, local bandits, well-known actors, well-
known prostitutes, and men who have lived abroad…The contents of the 
biographies must agree with the actual facts. At the same time, attention 
must be paid to the collection of photographs of each person.127  
Whether the enemy biographies were fully implemented as planned, the 
resolution illustrated the extent to which the Party’s approach to monitoring its enemies 
now overlapped with its cadre policy. Because security threats were seen to originate 
from both internal and external sources, friends and enemies were subjected to parallel 
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forms of individuating surveillance. The Department of Social Affairs compiled files on 
subjects across the political spectrum, but using a unified toolkit of investigative 
methods. This resulted in one of the paradoxes of the surveillance state in Yan’an—files 
were only produced for the most ideologically pure or overtly problematic individuals, 
and records of either category created mirror images. 
 
Standardizing Virtue: The 1944 ‘State Cadre Evaluation Form’ 
If we may bracket for a moment the well-rehearsed history of the rectification 
campaign, pursuing the trail of the surveillance archive permits consideration of how 
the political anxieties of the CCP were transcribed in its material culture of file-keeping. 
Over successive attempts at rectification in the 1940s, personnel materials were 
continuously called upon to perform lofty epistemic feats. In a stark reversal for an 
organization that had only recently embraced the authority of the document, the 
archive was now looked to as a solution to the gaps in self-knowledge opened by 
internal ideological struggle. 
During the rectification campaign, messaging on counter-subversion had a 
tendency to portray the task of cadre screening in Manichean terms. The “we/enemy” 
dyad was taken for granted, while practical complexities in cadre screening were 
overcome by ideological exhortation to action. But following the implementation of 
cadre screening, and certainly by the high tide of rectification in 1943, it became clear 
that ‘ferreting out the enemy’ would not be limited to a single campaign. Part of the 
difficulty stemmed from the Party’s own ideological commitment to vigilance against 
an omnipresent enemy. This conspiracist notion informed inexhaustible mandates to 
the Organization Department and Social Affairs to investigate all cadres and suspect 
individuals for any potential problems in their past. For cadres on both sides of the 
  76 
screening process, this proved to be an impossible errand. Actual cases of screening 
were plagued by so-called “deviations” involving misused evidence, confessions 
extracted by torture, arbitrary punishment, and other problems. The various measures 
introduced to clarify the facts around ambiguous political identities—such as the 
production of evidence— created further points of interpretive tension.  
The Party Center responded by shifting their archival horizons to the longview. 
Instead of seeking to unmask the intimate enemy in a single sweep, the solution was to 
design a system of files that would accumulate material over time. Greater emphasis 
was to be given to political questioning conducted through annual evaluations. File-
management practices were revised so as to not only preserve the results of 
investigations, but rather the relevant investigation notes and corroborating materials 
that went with them. After 1943, the CCP Central Committee and the COD instituted a 
series of reforms to the personnel archive, issued along with a corrective “Nine-Point 
Principle” to reign in the perceived worst excesses of cadre screening.128 At the same 
time, the Organization Department also specified that henceforth, all of the “materials” 
produced in the course of screening should be collected and forwarded to the 
associated Organization Department branch for centralized file-keeping. This was the 
basis of the first dossiers.129 
The expanded timeframe of cadre screening dictated how the dossiers 
themselves were to be stored. Previously when the Organization Department or Social 
                                               
128 According to Dutton, this “Nine-Point Principle” was written by Mao himself, and then 
delivered specifically to Kang Sheng to send a clear message. However, Gao Hua disputes 
this and the significance of the Nine-Point Principle is still the subject of some debate. 
Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 126. 
129  ZGZYLS “中央关于审查干部的决定 (1943)” 28(117): p. 74-79. 
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Affairs was tasked with examining a work unit, they would collate all of the materials 
related to personnel within that unit in a single juan 卷, or folio, bound with a thick 
piece of twine. These combined records could be easily be reviewed by superior levels 
in the same manner as a large report. However, as files became permanent records, their 
organizational scheme switched from a unit-centric organization to a basis upon the 
individual. Some individuals with problematic histories had hundreds of pages of 
attached material. ‘One person, one dossier’ became a practical necessity. Each cadre 
within a unit was made the subject of a securely stored dosser where all materials 
collected in the course of past examinations —previous registrations, affidavits, 
evaluations—were permanently kept on record. In the event of a work transfer, the 
dossier would accompany the individual to the new unit of employment. 
The linchpin of the COD’s revamped strategy was a new protocol for cadre 
evaluation. By custom if not by rule, party organs customarily set aside a few days at 
the end of each year to conduct an annual performance review of their personnel. This 
practice drew upon a long tradition of annual assessment in imperial bureaucratic 
culture and focused primarily, though not exclusively, on professional conduct.130  
Owing to logistical factors, follow-through on the annual assessment had been 
sporadic during the 1920s and 30s. In the assessments that did take place, evaluators 
                                               
130 Compare for instance, Huang Liuhong’s description of 17th century assessments for Qing 
magistrates: “The service rating (ta-chi) is a means to assess the achievements and failures 
of local officials for which corresponding awards and punishments are administered by 
the state. A few outstanding officials are rewarded with promotion and an audience with 
the emperor, and those who receive poor ratings are punished or dismissed. The primary 
duty of local officials is to rule the populace according to the provisions of the law, so that 
all people within the four seas may enjoy peace and tranquility.” Liuhong Huang and 
Chu Djang, A Complete Book Concerning Happiness and Benevolence : A Manual for Local 
Magistrates in Seventeenth-Century China (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1984), 
507. 
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had tended to fall back upon literati conceits of the scholar-official, with praise for 
scholarly talents and the humane virtues. One such example was an evaluation report 
(doubling as a letter of introduction) from a 1924 assessment of Zhou Enlai. The 
statement, prepared by the Committee for Overseas Communist Youth in Europe, 
painted a lyrical portrait using multiple four-character chengyu 成语: 
Zhou Enlai, of Zhejiang, 26 years old. Sincere but temperate, his ability is 
abundant, his words compelling, and his prose nimble. Because of his deep 
study of ideology, he manifests working class spirit. His English is quite 
good, and his French and German allow him to read both books and 
papers. Our section hereby asserts that the man before you is one of ours, 
having previously served as a member of the Third Congress, working with 
energy and perseverance, and achieving great distinction.131 
Nearly two decades later, the wartime exigencies of Yan’an triggered an urgent 
overhaul of conventional assessments. In deference to the political priorities of 
screening and rectification, the Organization Department sought to disseminate a new 
procedure in which the political focus of counter-subversion was grafted onto the 
annual routine of professional assessment. Rather than indulge officials in hagiography, 
the evaluation was to combine performance review with a critical analysis of an 
“individual’s problems and contradictions.” This evaluation would take into account all 
of the collected “personal materials” filed in the dossier, and serve as a “summing up” 
of the cadre and their materials more generally. 
To implement the new policy, the COD took the unusual step of issuing its own 
uniform template, with detailed instructions for screeners, to all the base area 
governments. Created as the ‘State Cadre Evaluation Form’ 政权干部鉴定书, the six-
page template was intended to help administrators by eliminating the guesswork of 
                                               
131 “族欧共青团执委会向团中中央的报告” in Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 170. 
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open-ended evaluation interviews, while ensuring that the political questions of interest 
to leadership were fully exhausted. This form and its designated routines set in place a 
standard protocol for cadre evaluations for the next decade. 
 
Fig. 1.2 1944-45 Taihang Base Area Cadre Evaluation Form 
The 1944 ‘State Cadre Evaluation Form’ came packaged with its own how-to 
guide for evaluators. Prefacing the main body of the form was a two-page section on 
“Essential Instructions for Evaluation” detailing the practicalities of the new policy. The 
length and specificity of these instructions dwarfed the quantity of guidance offered by 
any previous iterations of the form. The commitment of these instructions to writing 
amounted to the codification of practices associated with cadre screening into the 
essential routine of organization work. Among other things, the instructions stressed 
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that cadre evaluation and the rectification campaign were “intimately aligned, and to be 
implemented in tandem.”132  
In principle, an evaluation took the measure of a party cadre along four related 
vectors: 1) “Ideological Consciousness and Reform;” 2) “Organizational Discipline;” 
and 3) “Understanding, Application, and Mastery of Policy;” and 4) “Distinguishing 
Individual Characteristics.” The first two vectors in evaluation drew upon boilerplate 
Party slogans. “Ideological consciousness” was explained as the ability to integrate 
theory and practice, capacity for class analysis, and attitude toward working with the 
masses. “Organizational Discipline” added overtures to Party unity, including 
responsiveness to superior orders, solidarity with fellow revolutionaries, and 
“embodying the spirit of self-criticism.” Vector three on policy expertise addressed 
administrative ability and technical skills, generally corresponding to cai 才 as 
highlighted in Chen Yun’s approach to party-building. 
The final vector, “Special Individual Characteristics,” opened the door to the 
examination of serious political issues. Specifically, the final rubric addressed: 
“distinguishing personal characteristics of the cadre in question (primarily strengths 
and weaknesses), and the cadre’s degree of self-awareness to those weaknesses.” This 
latter item was deliberately left open to interpretation, and hence invited the discussion 
of specific political ‘problems.’ In the broader discourse of rectification, individual 
problems and contradictions were given to be universal, such that political performance 
of criticism and self-criticism was viewed as obligatory rather than optional. Because 
evaluators themselves were liable to be judged for their ability to dispense political 
                                               
132 AC “State Cadre Evaluation Form : D--- Shiyi” 政权干部鉴定书 (1944). 
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wisdom through criticism, it was not uncommon for evaluations to dwell upon 
individual problems to the exclusion of other relevant topics. 
Before moving to a deeper analysis of the content of the Evaluation Form—
addressed in the next section in a case study taken from Shanxi in 1945—the State Cadre 
Evaluation Form raises the issue of how the CCP materially produced its permanent 
records. Insofar as the new template marked the beginning of a new archival regime, its 
novelty stemmed from its objectification rather than its ideological content. As the first 
in a new category of archival object, the standard Evaluation Form transformed how the 
evaluation was conducted, understood, and transmitted beyond the event of the 
evaluation itself. Material constraints limited the underlying paper- and print-making 
processes that constituted the dossier, which in turn informed the procedures of 
evaluating Party cadres.  
The Evaluation Form combined what had previously been scattered practices of 
cadre registration, background checks, and evaluations into a catch-all document. 
Developed at a time when only a fraction of Party cadres had any associated 
documentation, the new form was designed to be a cohesive, permanent solution to the 
issues of evaluation and record-keeping. The body of the form contained three main 
sections that cannabalized previous forms: I) “Professional History Form;” II) “Family 
Situation and Personal Experience Form;” and III) “Evaluation Decision.” A footnote 
addressed to the administrator stated that further evaluations could be appended to the 
document on loose-leaf pages. 
From a visual and a functional standpoint, the newly issued Evaluation Form 
staged a vision of technocratic regularity in personnel practices. In its official documents 
of the 1940s, the Organization Department deliberately sought to phase out long, 
epistolary discourses, substituting modular question-and-answer sections for what had 
previously been sheer blocks of text. New designs were based upon the device of the 
grid field, which sectioned off each page of the form into a uniform grid overlay. All 
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questions and responses were enclosed by a neat rectangles, and creating blank spaces 
that served to specify to the user the amount of information sought. Every item 
requiring a written entry was prompted by a field, including page numbers and a 
‘cartouche’ for the subject’s name on front cover. Subtle touches, such as the blanks for 
page numbers, and placeholder characters for years and months, added artifacts of 
printed forms that were otherwise absent from handwritten documents. This 
transformed the look and use of these documents to resemble the visual vocabulary of 
numerical or actuarial tables, lending an almost statistical facade for biographical 
information. The device of the blank field abstracted away from the underlying subject 
of examination and instead fit persons to what were quite literally bounded 
categories.133  
The production of the Evaluation Form reflected the organizational commitment 
of the Party to establishing bureaucratic regularity. In contrast to the prevailing use of 
mimeography (duplication using a hand-cut stencil) in official documents printed 
during the Yan’an period, the early editions of the form were printed on a medium-
quality bast paper, or 皮纸. Bast paper is traditionally made from softwood (inner bark). 
Most types of bast paper are pliable but sturdy, and reliably absorb ink. The most well-
known type of bast paper is traditional xuan paper 宣纸 (often mislabeled ‘rice paper’ in 
the West) made from mulberry fiber, which was the preferred material for paper scrolls 
in the late imperial era. In Yan’an, these early editions of the standard evaluation form 
substituted a different softwood for mulberry, but used a traditional labor-intensive 
                                               
133 I find Lisa Gitelman’s insights into the uses of the blank form particularly relevant here: 
“Blank forms are the way that bureaucracy assumes an objective character, strives to rid 
itself of all emotion and subjective judgement. Blank forms, enabled by advances in 
printing technology, allow for bureaucracy to be taken to new levels.” Gitelman, Paper 
Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents, 24-31. 
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paper-making method to obtain a stock of similar weight and texture. This paper would 
have been produced with a mechanical press, meaning it retained the wood lignin that 
produces discoloration. In the 1940s, the flaxen-colored paper would ideal for 
documents in ink, but the active acid caused the paper to become brittle over time. Use 
of this paper implied that Party officials intended for these evaluation forms to last as 
durable records, but made compromises due to material constraints.134 
 
Fig. 1.3 Taihang Evaluation Form (left) and derivatives 
Such practical compromises were also reflected in the printing of the Evaluation 
Form, which brought together mixed styles and materials. The bureaucratic desire to 
produce a physically robust Evaluation Form, reflected in the quality of the paper stock, 
ruled out mimeography, which would have been the most efficient method of 
reproducing a form template. A more equipment-intensive alternative was printing in 
                                               
134 I am grateful to Jacob Eyferth for corresponding with me on the topic of handmade paper 
supplies (May 27, 2016) 
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ink using a mechanical press, allowing for sharper text and lines, but at much greater 
economic expense. Due to its cost, the latter process was generally reserved for high-
prestige propaganda materials, such as the published works of Mao or Stalin.135 
At a glance, the version of the State Cadre Evaluation Form examined below 
appears to have all the bearings of a machine-printed document. On closer inspection 
however, all of the formal elements of the template were in fact meticulously created by 
hand, and then transferred onto a print master, most likely a wood or lithographic 
block. Given the small size and calligraphic quality of the characters, the transfer would 
have been a laborious and skill-intensive process. Manually crafting a template of such 
high quality required far more clerical labor and workmanship than a simple 
mimeographed duplicate. The investment in this visual sleight-of-hand was further 
evident in the painstaking execution of the script characters, which combined 
calligraphic elements of kaishu 楷书 (‘regular script’), with the angular stoke endings 
and thicker verticals characteristic of songti 宋体, a classic woodblock-based type.136  
It would be reasonable to argue that the documentary standardization in Yan’an 
was, above all, a visual motif of technocracy. The exacting production process of the 
Evaluation Form was a brute-force solution to the issue of standardized templates. It 
was understandable that the base areas lacked the equipment for mass producing a 
                                               
135 Because we are looking at paper and file-making at a handicraft level, recent analyses of 
print culture in urban areas in this period are interesting to compare, but tell a very 
different story. C.f. Christopher Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 
1876-1937 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
136 Songti type, as recognizable through its triangular stroke endings, thicker vertical strokes, 
and thinner horizontals, was developed to compensate for the natural grain in the wood 
used for wood blocks. Thicker vertical strokes were necessary to prevent incisions from 
disappearing into the grain, which was generally oriented vertically. The continued use of 
Songti types, like Serif fonts, is aesthetic preference. 
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typeset form of the desired quality; more remarkable was that faced with this 
constraint, the responsible bureaucrats went to such enormous lengths to simulate a 
mechanical reproduction. This underscored the Party’s organizational preference for 
using concentrated bureaucratic labor to overcome technical challenges, sacrificing a 
degree of efficiency to fully satisfy ideological preferences. The medium of the 
Evaluation Form reflects the material culture of the CCP in its contradictions—
committed to systematization and bureaucratic regularity, yet reliant on the skilled 
labor of modern scribes. 
 
The Evaluation of D--- Shiyi 
The following case study from Shanxi in 1945 demonstrates how the interpretive 
and archival practices of evaluation were carried out according to the new procedure. 
According to record, D--- Shiyi, a cadre stationed in the Taihang Liberated Area 太行红
区 of the North China Border Region 晋冀鲁豫边区, received his first evaluation on 
March 18, 1945.137 At the time, D--- was a 30 year-old tax officer at the county office in 
Wu’an, near Handan City in Hebei Province. Taihang provided an important backdrop; 
it was the most stable and administratively developed of the base area governments in 
the latter years of the Sino-Japanese War. Despite fierce fighting against Japanese forces 
in the surrounding territory, the Taihang base was central to the revolutionary cause as 
one of the few territories capable of supporting weapons production, food supplies, and 
                                               
137 AC “State Cadre Evaluation Form : D--- Shiyi” 政权干部鉴定书 (1944). 
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taxes.138 Taihang’s role as a strategic hub spurred the buildup of a skilled bureaucracy to 
administer civil and economic affairs. 
D--- Shiyi fit the profile of the young, educated, skilled recruit sought after by 
Chen Yun and the CCP’s organizational wing. Though he lacked strong revolutionary 
credentials, his background reflected the rising cohort of bureaucratic cadres in the base 
areas. D--- Shiyi had enjoyed a missionary school education and was highly literate; 
before he turned 19 years of age, he had become a technician in a weaving factory 
managing a small team of workers. The nature of D---’s professional experience—
technician, propaganda worker, one-time teacher—distinguished him as an 
‘intellectual,’ but one with prized skills that boded well for rapid advancement. 
The State Cadre Evaluation Form instantly became the new standard form of 
documentation, but it retained vestiges of past experiments in cadre screening. This 
combination of old and new approaches produced minor frictions. For example, D---’s 
1944 form inquired after his “special skills.” D--- could have claimed ‘machinery,’ 
‘propaganda,’ or ‘accounting,’ but instead he provided, “weaves fabric and western 
socks.” Another item, “Regional Familiarity” 熟悉何地, asked if the subject possessed 
area expertise. This item was taken directly from a common question on Soviet cadre 
registration forms, but its ambiguous phrasing caused D--- to leave the field blank.139 
The form template was a blunt tool for collecting information and liable to misreading. 
A number of minor design errors scattered across the form—a missing column divider 
                                               
138 Robert Rinden and Roxane Witke, The Red Flag Waves; a Guide to the Hung-Chi Collection 
(Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1968), 109. 
139 See for instance, “Document 155 Personal information on Andrei Vyshinsky” in Diane 
Koenker and Ronald D. Bachman, Revelations From the Russian Archives (Washington: 
Library of Congress, 1997), 331. 
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in one instance, a misplaced character in another—reinforced the sense of a work-in-
progress. 
Imperfections aside, the revamped evaluation process recorded a far more 
textured profile of party cadres than previous efforts at personnel file-keeping. With D--
- Shiyi’s standard evaluation form, we may observe how the intensified attention to 
detail in the new evaluations moved dossier work into the sphere of bureaucratic 
ethnography. Bureaucratic assessment was not limited to a closed-ended question of 
status—such as friend or enemy—but rather sought to accumulate a surplus of 
information from all areas of an individual’s life. 
As one example, D---’s recorded class status was given as ‘middle peasant,’ a 
favorable category in the pre-1949 schedule of class categories. However, in a question 
on “Family Circumstances,” D--- was compelled to disclose that when he was a child, 
his family had owned approximately 4 acres of land (25 mu 亩) along with a nine-room 
house for their family of seven. D---’s father was a teacher by profession, and constantly 
in debt. After D---’s father died, the family sold most of their land to pay off what was 
owed. Their house was later burned down by the Japanese army, a casualty of the 
“Three Alls Campaign.” These economic hardships caused D---’s family to officially fall 
from ‘landlord’ to ‘middle peasant’ status, but in a perverse outcome, greatly improved 
the family’s political prospects under Communist rule. The reversal of fortune that 
benefited the D--- family was in fact quite common during the Communist revolution as 
war and politics upended Chinese social life. However, the State Cadre Evaluation 
Form issued after 1944 was the first CCP record to take an interest in historicizing the 
status quo by documenting these fluctuations in class labels—in effect, undermining the 
stability of the labels themselves. 
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Fig. 1.4 1944-45 Taihang Evaluation Form (detail) 
The ethnographic turn in dossier work was most evident in the ‘Evaluation 
Decision,’ in which an administrative group leader provided a summary report of 
cadre’s character on the basis of ideology, organization and competence. D--- Shiyi’s 
Evaluation Decision was dated 1945 and signed by a superior officer named Song 
Zhen.140 D---’s case reveals how the revamped process of evaluation foregrounded 
social context. With a colloquial air, the decision began: 
Declassed middle peasant family. Due to his upbringing by his father and 
the influence of his environment, (D---) looks down upon labor. He seeks 
the lifestyle of a teacher, loves reading novels, and is full of tender 
thoughts. In his fantasies he dreams of his ideal lover, but because of his 
dissatisfaction in marriage, he becomes corrupted. 
                                               
140 According to normal procedure, Song Zhen as Examination Group Leader 正班长 would 
not have written the decision himself, but most likely signed off on a report written by the 
Evaluation Small Group. 
  89 
The new format of evaluation (contrasted, for instance, against the vague, quasi-
literary assessment of Zhou Enlai) expected the evaluators to provide an observational 
window into the life of the subject. If the Organization Department’s ideal of human 
resources was rooted in an idea of building ‘full evaluation,’ the leading cadres were 
expected to be experts on the private lives of their team members, and relay privileged 
information. 
Thus while the ostensible purpose of D---’s evaluation was professional 
assessment, the bulk of the report was concerned with thick description and criticism of 
D---’s personal habits and attitude, particularly his bourgeois sentiments toward 
romantic love. Within the culture of CCP officialdom, few topics illustrate the co-
determination of the personal and the political as the official treatment of intimate 
relationships. If social relationships were regarded as a means of triangulating a 
subject’s political identity, intimate relationships were fertile grounds for analysis. Sex, 
gender norms, and sexual taboos were a recurrent theme in the socialist discourse of the 
person, playing an important role in exposing underlying moral problems. In personnel 
assessment, sex and romantic love seldom appeared as stand-alone issues, but they 
were often mobilized as proof of a deficient political character. 
In D--- Shiyi’s Evaluation Decision, the subject’s romantic attachments are 
presented as a lens that reveal his true petty bourgeois class nature, and associated lack 
of revolutionary commitment. The decision recounted how D--- as a young man entered 
the textile factory with higher status owing to his education. At that point, “under the 
influence of the factory owner and his wife,” D--- pursued a romantic relationship and 
married—“he was extremely happy, and thereafter, put all his energies into love.” The 
hardly subtle insinuation was that the capitalist factory owners stoked D---’s preexisting 
bourgeois vulnerabilities, leading him toward a life of domestic complacency.  
With D---’s sentimentality as his fall, his political problems began to surface 
immediately. The decision continued: 
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Afraid of losing his job and being forced to return home to labor (in the 
fields), D--- began to hanker for the comforts of the military, with its 
provision of good food and clothing. With the opportunity to work 
alongside his wife, D--- decided to join the ranks (as a clerk). However, D--- 
in his work showed himself unwilling to endure hardship (lit. 不愿吃苦 
‘eating bitterness’), and could not bear to be separated from his wife. 
Whenever they were together, D---’s spirits were high; without her, he was 
depressed. After falling ill, he returned home for a period to convalesce. 
Because his political consciousness was confused, he fell under the 
influence of unsavory people. He feared revolutionary change (怕变天) and 
refused to return to work, sending for his wife to come home as well. 
Because of his depraved lifestyle and continued association with 
questionable individuals, our attempts to politically educate him were 
unsuccessful in completely reforming him. 
Taking up the entirety of the space allotted by the form, D---’s Evaluation 
Decision runs a concise two pages. At the halfway point through the decision, the 
evaluation had yet to touch upon specific examples of D--- Shiyi’s professional work. 
Instead, the evaluators’ dogged insistence on exposing D---’s personal weakness 
appeared to building toward a political indictment against him. 
The emphasis given to D---’s intimate affairs, or specifically, the use of his 
personal affairs as a device for explaining his politics, was a common feature of 
evaluations from this period. Besides the principled dilemma of de and cai, this exercise 
in thick description reflected how politics in the base areas had absorbed cultural 
signifiers, in the sense that a person’s background and habits could be quickly indexed 
to an ideological identity. D---’s evaluation clearly participated in a form of 
stereotyping—in his decision, the evaluators strategically employed a number of 
specific phrases and details (his ‘love of novels,’ emotional ‘sentimentality’ and 
unwillingness to ‘eat bitterness’) as keywords to draw a portrait of the reluctant petty-
bourgeois intellectual. These ad hominem characterizations provided administrators with 
pithy representational shortcuts. As a consequence, the increasing ‘individualization’ of 
the process of cadre evaluation went in hand with reinforcement and appeal to existing 
ideological stereotypes. 
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However, reliance on ideological stereotyping in the evaluation process was to 
some extent indicative of how the Yan’an Rectification Campaign cast a shadow over 
subsequent efforts at cadre examination. The preferred methods of mass rectification 
from 1942-44 were not so far from the procedure described by the standard Evaluation 
Form that the latter could not be misread as struggle by other means. The specific 
example of D---’s Evaluation Form also reveals the challenge faced by the Party in 
attempting to divorce the new routine of personalized, critical evaluation from the 
excesses of campaign justice. 
The standard Evaluation Form included specific language to avoid the 
devolution of personnel assessment into terror. On the one hand, the special 
instructions began by noting the ‘unity’ of the evaluation process and the larger aims of 
the rectification campaign. But immediately following, the instructions enjoined a 
moderate approach to cadre examination along the lines of Chen Yun’s “On Cadre 
Policy.” A further explanatory note defined evaluation as “a periodic, summing-up of a 
cadre for the purpose of understanding them and our collective education.” Rather than 
“repeatedly dig up old cases, and rehash from beginning to end,” the priority for 
evaluators was to “know to what degree failings identified in the previous decision had 
been overcome.” Because “all cadres differ by level and by background,” there was “no 
single standard to measure them by,” and ideological development had to be related to 
the entirety of a person’s history. 
With this provision, the special instructions offered subjects, as well as their 
evaluators, a means of offsetting ‘political historical problems’ in a person’s record. The 
possibility of ‘overcoming’ explicitly introduced progress and redemption as 
trajectories for evaluations to pursue. We see this in D--- Shiyi’s Evaluation in the final 
note on D--- Shiyi and zhengfeng (rectification): 
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During the rectification campaign, D--- harbored reservations. He feared 
bringing forward his materials, and his spirits fluctuated with highs and 
lows. However once he grasped that all of his problems could only be 
resolved by first changing his thought, he began to reveal himself, and was 
more positive in his study. D--- is not quick on the uptake, but he realizes 
who the revolution is for. He recognizes his problem is that he himself 
harbors doubts towards his superiors—not that his superiors doubt him. As 
a result of self-reflection, he has learned that past way of life was total 
pursuit of comfort, and at odds with the revolution. Gradually he realized 
that his thought was corrupted…and that fear of revolutionary change is 
counter-revolutionary thinking. He has grasped the greatness of the 
strength of the people and believes in our future, but he must put effort 
into study and raise his political consciousness; in absorbing the 
enthusiasm of the masses, learning to be proactive and take initiative, he 
may yet overcome his attachment to a life of comfort, and strengthen his 
proletarian conviction. 
In this final paragraph, D--- Shiyi’s Evaluation Decision took an abrupt turn 
toward the positive. In the previous sections, the detailed inventory of D---’s bourgeois 
habits appeared to be accumulating evidence toward a negative political verdict. Yet in 
this section on Zhengfeng, those earlier passages are revealed to be foregrounding for a 
redemptive story that hinges on the intervention of the Party, and leads to a dramatic 
personal rebirth through ideological awakening. 
Given its scope of use as an internal document, the Evaluation Decision exhibited 
an unexpected appreciation for the theatricality of revolutionary drama. That notion of 
political struggle as public spectacle is familiar from our understanding of the mass 
campaign, the papered reportage of cadre evaluations found a similar use for narrative 
exposition and emplotment. With its dramatic pretensions, it was perhaps appropriate 
the D--- Shiyi’s Evaluation Decision held his fate in suspense—only in its last lines do 
we learn of D---’s redemption as a moral individual and his recommitment to the 
revolutionary cause. The ‘evaluative’ outcome was inextricable from a wider history, 
whose meaning coincided with the social identity of the individual himself. 
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The Possibilities of Paper 
Gao Hua recounts a story involving Sima Lu, a Long March veteran and one-
time Politburo member, who was personally evaluated by Chen Yun while the latter 
was the head of the COD in Yan’an. Following the interview, Chen Yun sealed a 
completed Evaluation Form along with a letter of introduction, and instructed Sima Lu 
to deliver it to his new command in Japanese-controlled territory. En route to his 
assignment, Sima Lu illicitly opened the sealed package, where he found inside a 
generally positive evaluation, appended with the following critique: “(Sima Lu) has 
organizational ability and experience in political struggle, but he has a serious case of 
knight-errantry; besides his hardheaded, arrogant personality, he lacks in working class 
sprit, and doesn’t do enough to for the life of the organization.”141 
Such moments of recognition—in which individuals unexpectedly encountered 
themselves as subjects of the dossier—underscore the scope of transformation effected 
by the personnel archive. The organizational decision to commit to the archive created 
novel possibilities for the extension of the party-state created by the affordances of 
paper records. Drawing from Bourdieu’s observation that the state never appears more 
powerful than when it produces documents about itself, the emergence of the archive in 
Yan’an marked the moment when the Party’s powers of surveillance, evaluation, and 
discipline took on a material reality. 
The 1944 State Cadre Evaluation Form provides an illustrative case of how files 
reshaped the political culture of the base areas. In the brief historical existence of the 
PRC personnel archive, the 1944 Evaluation Form stands out as a classic archetype. It 
had a lasting impact as a template for bureaucratic actions. This function of the form 
                                               
141 Qtd. in Gao Hua, “1940: Cadre Screening in Yan’an 1940年延安审干,” 22. 
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calls to mind a notion of the archive as a means for the preservation and perpetuation of 
an organization’s own bureaucratic practices. The Evaluation Form not only sought to 
collect information on the rank-and-file, but disseminate a model that would train 
administrators in correct methods. With the design of the Evaluation Form, the Party 
anticipated how they intended the template to be completed. These blank forms with 
attached instructions sought to establish a predictable regimen of questions, 
observations, judgements, and classifications. The circulation of the template served to 
crystallize what had previously been a general approach to cadre evaluation into a 
prescribed set of bureaucratic routines. 
However, paper routines also had a disruptive impact on organizational life, and 
shifted the goals of evaluation in unintended ways. Prior to the era of the standardized 
evaluation form, all matters of consequence concerning an evaluation transpired within 
the course of the evaluation meeting itself. What was said during the session—even if 
unrecorded—was its presumed payoff. The judicious use of fault and praise in a small 
group setting was a valuable means of reinforcing or instilling desired behaviors. The 
face-to-face between superior and subordinate not only presented an opportunity for 
critique, it acted as a venue for ideological education. Evaluations were potentially 
constructive for group cohesion beyond the label of the ensuing decision. 
The advent of the standard evaluation form enacted a subtle, but important shift 
to the means by which evaluations were conducted. Most importantly, the requirement 
to leave a written record of the proceedings expanded the bureaucratic audience to 
include higher level authorities. The extent of an evaluation was no longer bounded by 
a physical meeting—dossier materials, meeting notes, and the written decision ensured 
that evaluation process could be monitored from above. Higher levels often exercised 
their access to dossiers to review completed evaluations—but with a critical focus on 
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evaluating the evaluators. Evaluators who had shown deficiencies in ‘work style,’142 
excessive leniency, or generally questionable judgement, might find themselves on the 
other side of fresh criticism. The reorientation of the evaluation to cater to higher levels 
was palpable in D--- Shiyi’s Evaluation Decision. For the stated task at hand, the two-
page document presents an exceedingly well-constructed, on-brand narrative. The 
decision did not merely intend to inform its reader about its subject, it was a 
performative enactment of socialist leadership by its author before an unnamed 
bureaucratic audience. 
The aftereffects of the 1944 Evaluation Form anticipated the broader changes to 
bureaucratic work with the emergence of the personnel archive. Deng Shaoxing claims 
that the CCP regarded these documentary materials as an “archival counterpart to the 
person.”143 It was not farfetched for Organization Department elites to imagine a future 
in which the dossier would offer a “total understanding of the person,” minus the 
inconvenience of the body. Even before liberation, any cadre reporting to a new post 
was to report to duty with their sealed dossier from their previous work unit. The 
physical file, along with a recent Evaluation Form, was a prerequisite for transit; 
without the file, the cadre could not begin work. A common saying was that “the 
person follows the file,” but its opposite held equally true—hence the related notion 
that holding the file was akin to taking someone hostage. 
The development of the file system in Yan’an marked a new approach to party 
organization geared toward scale. The dossier was the crucial underpinning of rapid 
                                               
142 Chief among the bad work styles, according to Mao, were “formalism subjectivism, and 
bureaucratism.” 
143 Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 190. 
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expansion in several waves of recruitment from 1937-1950. Material records were the 
logistical network that allowed a small office like the COD to identify, screen, and 
assign up to 91,000 cadres across the liberated areas in a single year.144 Despite their 
blind spots, the subroutines of dossiers supplied coordination, social intelligence, and 
leadership training, among other goods. The CCP’s uncommon level of organizational 
cohesion through armed conflict cautions against underestimating the Party’s skill in 
human resources—the personnel archive was sufficiently operable for the organization 
as a whole to be effective. 
However, the Yan’an era also foreshadowed how the dossier would be utilized 
as a instrument of political struggle. The genres of the dossier, insofar as they had 
crystallized in the intensified political atmosphere of Yan’an, were path-dependent in 
that they established facts, routines, and templates that endured long after the state of 
exception had expired. The formalization of the dossier system opened new pathways 
to internal disciplinary controls. The same practices of registration, verification, 
evaluation and file-making that sought to gauge professional ability were equally adept 
at capturing political transgressions. The Party’s approach to collecting ‘materials’ 
established a tendency in which dossiers remembered small slights, found fault in 
ambiguities, and re-litigated old issues well after the fact. Even a positive evaluation, 
such as that of D--- Shiyi’s above, could be mined for incriminating information and 
repurposed toward future struggles. But in spite of how the COD’s founding of the 
personnel archive is sometimes portrayed, using the archive to continually revisit the 
political histories of membership was, as they say, a feature, not a bug. 
                                               
144 Sullivan, “The Biography of an Ziwen and the History of the Ccp Organization 
Department,” 7. 
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It is without saying that the personnel archive was neither inherently biased 
toward motivation nor discipline. Dossiers did not ‘produce’ the existential threats to 
the Party that warranted the rectification campaign, or the enemies in political 
campaigns that followed. However, as was the case in 1940s Yan’an, dossiers created an 
exploitable resource that could be fit to any number of different political uses. Where 
ideological divisions were present, adding dossier materials tended to exacerbate the 
situation. In the morality system of the communist party, virtue was hard-earned, but 
easily squandered. Rather than serve as an empirical bulwark against arbitrary 
suspicion, the personnel file system was greatly liable to dwell on ‘historical problems.’ 
Seemingly routine evaluations could be derailed by an minor disclosure, a non-
disclosure, or the possible appearance of either. The dossier’s memory of strengths and 
weaknesses was cumulative, invoking a version of Kolakowski’s law of the infinite 
cornucopia: for any given hypothesis about a person, a boundless quantity of evidence 
existed to support that hypothesis. It was for this reason that in the PRC era, local 
authorities regularly launched mass campaigns by first revisiting personnel files. 
While the routines of the dossier were developed in response to a specific 
security crisis, Party elites would continually return to the political footing of cadre 
screening after 1949. The organizational growing pains of the Yan’an era served as 
prologue to a recurrent political cycle in the PRC—every expansion of the Party base 
was followed by a phase of ideological consolidation and rectification, in which the 
alignment of Party loyalists and outsiders was redrawn with archival evidence. As a 
political record and a unit of institutional memory, the dossier would continue to 
provide the source material for future struggles long after Yan’an. 
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Chapter 2 
The Afterlives of Documents:  
Total Archive and the Making of the Dossier 
 
In its broadest sense, the term ‘dang’an’ simply refers to a file and its contents. But in the 
Chinese context, ‘dang’an’ 档案 has historically taken multiple forms and meanings that 
lend themselves to different endeavors. Throughout this manuscript, I have opted to 
use the term dossier to highlight the distinctive character of the personnel file, but this 
usage imparts my own emphasis. There is no specific nomenclature in the Chinese 
language to distinguish the ‘dossier’ from a manila office envelope, or alternatively, a 
Qing dynasty historical record—all these objects take the sign ‘dang’an.’ Hence, in the 
People’s Republic, dang’an is a catch-all that indicates objects as disparate as personnel 
dossiers 人事档案, the records of state agencies 机关档案, secret police papers 公安档案, 
legal case files 案件档案, technical documentation 技术档案, and historical records 历史
档案. The ubiquity of dang’an across social institutions in the PRC marks its 
interdisciplinary practice. 
What is more unique to the PRC is that the party-state considers all of these 
abovementioned sites of dang’an to be part of a single state archive. Since 1954, the State 
Archives Bureau has claimed jurisdiction over all archival production in the PRC based 
on an esoteric principle known as the ‘state archival fond’ 国家档案全宗. According to 
this principle, adopted from the archives system of the Soviet Union—all historical 
records predating 1949, combined with the totality of records produced by party 
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organs, government agencies, enterprises, and social organizations, comprise the 
collective archival endowment of the nation administered under the stewardship of the 
Party. In other words, all archives past or present are ultimately state archives, whether 
they are housed in state repositories or passing through a documentary life cycle that 
leads to archivization. The semantic openness of the term dang’an serves an apt signifier 
for the totalizing conceit of the state archive. 
This leads us to the questions that guide the present chapter. If archive is 
everywhere, how do we situate the Chinese communist archive?  How did it take shape 
in the early PRC and what where its recognized ends? What routines, rules, 
peculiarities and contradictions figure in its politics of production? I take as a point of 
departure the tension between the notions of dang’an as an institution and site of power 
relations, contrasted against the dang’an broadly conceived as the technique of 
producing permanent records. As both of those meanings are present in this history, 
this chapter tacks between a study of archives as made objects and an institutional 
history of the PRC state archives system. 
We might note here that there is an subtle interplay between the PRC’s idealized 
conception of the unitary fond and recent critical interventions in the study of archive. 
At least since the publication of Derrida’s Archive Fever, we may point to a wave of 
theoretical interest in the archive as a larger metaphor for information technology and 
knowledge practices across disciplines.145 One of the byproducts of this wave of 
scholarship has been the progressive dismantling of the site-specificity of the traditional 
archive, once held to be privileged institution of knowledge formation. In fact, one of 
the most frequent criticisms of Derrida is that his notion of archive is too broad a 
                                               
145 Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. 
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metaphor, such that it “inflates” the concept of archive to a generalized set of practices 
related to documentation, organization and storage, and retrieval.146 But particularly as 
the digital turn has continued to challenge the traditional archive’s claims to priority, it 
seems the methodological uniqueness of the state archive has eroded away to reveal 
archive dispersed across different vernacular contexts. In disassembling the archive into 
its underlying knowledge practices, this theoretical literature has shown archive to 
indeed be everywhere. 
In the 1950s, the CCP posited the state archive as the sum total of historical 
documentation. Amid socialist construction, the project of the state archival fond 
intersected with visions of nationalization, collectivization, and bureaucratization as 
horizons of party-state expansion. These ideological commitments induced the party-
state to induct outlying sites of archival production and co-opt them into the officially 
sanctioned archives system.147 Post-1949 state-building brought about an unprecedented 
penetration of local and grassroots institutions, providing the political scaffolding for 
the party-state to make proprietary claims over the archival records of enterprises, civic 
institutions, mass organizations and local agencies. The rhetorical overtures to the 
unitary fond permitted the appearance of colonizing all sites of archival production, 
                                               
146 Manoff’s review of recent theoretical approaches to the archive contains an illuminating 
discussion of contemporary reassessments of Archive Fever. Derrida’s contribution to the 
‘inflation’ of archive is Manoff’s term. Marlene Manoff, “Theories of the Archive,” 
Libraries and the Academy 4, no. 1 (2004), 17. 
147 Jan Gross’ notion of the USSR as a ’spoiler state’ provides an interesting lens through 
which to view the socialist state archive in the PRC. Gross’ well-known argument is that 
the spoiler state views power as associated with initiative, and thereby seeks to maintain 
its hegemony by “denying it to others…with exclusive state-sponsored institutions 
amidst an atomized society.” See the epilogue in Jan Gross, Revolution From Abroad: The 
Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 225-40. 
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even while the actual labor of archive was carried out independently by administrative 
staff with only weak ties to central archival authority. 
With its grandiose ambitions, total archive was never as monolithic as it was 
envisioned, foundering upon the familiar shoals of central-local coordination, 
overburdened bureaucracy, and internal competition. Yet as I argue in this chapter, the 
state archive was not limited to this institutional structure, but became broadly 
dispersed through the apparatus of the state as technique.148 Viewed in historical 
context, the archive can be understood as a standard for bureaucratic file-keeping, 
whose development following communist liberation carried significant implications for 
the party-state beyond the officially demarcated archives system. This process of 
archival standardization informs the larger history of bureaucratic consolidation in the 
early Mao era, a period in which the professional norms and habits of CCP officialdom 
were taking shape. 
In this chapter, I trace archive as technique along two parallel thematic strands. 
The first strand follows the historical development of archival standards as a skilled 
approach to creating permanent file-records. In the early PRC, the construction of the 
state archives involved the diffusion of standards for best practices in documentation 
and file-keeping. This chapter tracks the growth of the archival field from a historical 
science taught by Soviet experts to a professional ethic and methodology for CCP 
bureaucrats. Through the neibu (internal-use only) periodical Archives Work 《档案工作
》, the State Archives Bureau sought to cultivate a culture of the archive that would 
                                               
148 Here I I am especially thinking of ’technique’ in the sense of Francesca Bray’s notion of 
“skilled practices that go into the material production of knowledge as well as the 
production of artefacts.” Francesca Bray, “Science, Technique, Technology: Passages 
Between Matter and Knowledge in Imperial Chinese Agriculture,” The British Journal for 
the History of Science 41, no. 03 (2008). 
  102 
preserve knowledge through records and fashion usable political resources. I undertake 
a close study of the prescriptive practices of archives work as part of greater efforts by 
central archivists to broadly promote archival literacy.  
The second strand follows the application of archival practices in socialist 
administration as a productive means of documenting human subjects. With the spread 
of archival literacy, archival standards permeated multiple fields of social organization 
where they were generative of new routines of individualized file-keeping on Chinese 
persons. The formalization of the state archives in the mid-1950s coincided with the 
archival turn in the dossier system, in which the Organization Department sought to 
apply archival thinking to the organization of people as personnel. The unique forms of 
information provided by the dossier system rendered distant sections of Chinese society 
intelligible to bureaucratic administrators for the first time. The adoption of archive as 
an approach to policing people was elaborated in the Sufan movement (1954-57), when 
the Public Security Bureau converted the historical archives of the Enemy and Puppet 
Regimes into a potent instrument of political investigation.149 Through that process, the 
Public Security Bureau evolved into one of the PRC’s foremost practitioners of archive 
with its own comprehensive collection of files on Chinese subjects. 
The coevolution of the archive and dossiers fostered the emergence of 
bureaucratic workflows in the early Mao era centered around documentation, file-
making, and flows of paper. But approaches to archive were deeply intertwined with 
the neuroses of socialist officialdom and an archival imperative to preserve the written 
word. Regulations to protect documents from destruction had the unintended 
                                               
149 Full name: ‘Campaign to Eliminate Hidden Counter-Revolutionaries’ 肃清暗藏反革命分
子运动 
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consequence of overburdening bureaucratic managers, suggesting that all archival 
routines entail their own particular forms of knowledge and incapacity. Situating the 
dang’an at its sites of production enables us to recover a practice that was instrumental 
to socialist administration and internal bureaucratic discipline, while also revealing the 
assumptions that bureaucratic officials brought with them to their everyday work. 
 
Archive in the Bureaucratic Imagination 
Archives are not spontaneous to governance.  Government papers, even those 
which are intended to be kept as permanent records, are not so accommodating as to 
organize themselves. They only become reconstituted as archives through the 
application of specific tasks—inventorying, categorization, preservation, file-making, 
and storage. According to the Chinese archivist, the primary difference between the 
document and the archive is the addition of labor (lit., 加工) that gives the archive its 
permanence. 
The relatively brief history of the term dang’an reflects this gap between the 
document and the archive. Dang’an first appears in the Qing dynasty, a compound of 
the words for “papers” or “cases” (案) with that of a wooden “frame” or “cabinet” (档) 
where the papers stored.150 During the Qing, the palace generally stored the records of 
                                               
150 A more detailed etymology comes courtesy of Luo Xiaoli, who notes in a brief history: 
The term, dang-an, first appeared in the book, Journal of the Willow Palisades 柳邊記略 (1707) 
by Yang Bin 杨宾 (1650-1720). In the book, it says, “text in the northeast region is almost 
always written on wood. That which is delivered and by hand to hand are called paizi 牌
子，bcus they are done on wood strips; those that are kept long-term are called dang’an 
檔案. As for these dangzi 檔子,a s they accumulate, they are looped onto the leather straps 
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the court and the six boards in designated facilities; however, the other specialized tasks 
associated with archive were not systematic.151 Officials devised a measure of inserting a 
written summary of a record as a preface to its main contents—this summary became 
known as a dang’an. Gradually, the moniker dang’an came to refer to the whole package 
of both summary and record, and its former meaning was completely uprooted after 
late Qing reformers, armed with Western notions of archival science, repurposed 
dang’an as a translation of archive.152 
The perception of an ontological difference between a document and an archive 
is neither particularly profound, nor unique to the Chinese context. But in the early 
years of the PRC, the institutionalization of that difference was a meaningful historical 
event with far-reaching social effects. From its beginnings as a revolutionary movement, 
                                               
then hung on the wall, which are called danggu 檔故.However nowadays, text written on 
paper is also called paizi 牌子 or dangzi 檔子.“ 
In the Shuowen Jiezi 《說文解字》, the definition of ‘an’ 案 is ‘of the category of ji 几’ 
a small desk-like piece of furniture. Due to the above, all the papers associated with a 
particular matter are known as a 案 (desk), which gives its meaning to official paper that 
is gathered up into 案 (case) or ‘anjuan’ 案卷 (file). 
罗小利 Luo Xiaoli, “A Brief Account of the Origins of Personnel Files in China 简述中国人事
档案的起源,” Dazhong Wenyi 大众文艺 16 (2014), 252. 
151 Esherick and Ye claim that the Qing archival enterprise generally subordinated the 
preservation of old records to the compilation of the official histories (lit. ‘veritable history 
of the Qing’ 清实录). Materials not needed for these histories was subject to periodic 
destruction to make room in overcrowded storehouses was common. Wa Ye and Joseph 
Esherick, Chinese Archive: An Introductory Guide (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California : Center for Chinese Studies, 1996), 5-6. 
152 邹家炜 Zou Jiawei and 周雪恒 Zhou Xueheng, Brief History of Chinese Archives 中国档案
事业简史 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin chubanshe 中国人民出版社, 1985), 160. 
  105 
the CCP maintained a contentious relationship with documents.153 Prior to the 
establishment of the Yan’an base area, the security risks of maintaining detailed records 
meant that the archival practices of the CCP were rudimentary by design.154 Insofar as 
CCP revolutionaries found use for archive, it was as a convenient symbol of 
bureaucratic conservatism and a foil for the socialist revolution. Historical records were 
attacked as exploitative instruments from the old society. Ye and Esherick have noted 
that in communist base areas, the destruction of old land deeds and debt registers was 
an important ritual of land reform and peasant mobilization.155 Even in spite of 
increasing reliance on personnel documentation in Yan’an, the Party made no provision 
for the creation of a state archive prior to liberation. Not until communist victory was 
imminent would the CCP elite issue specific instructions for the safeguarding of specific 
documents of political and historical significance to the Chinese communist 
revolution.156 
The groundwork for the formal institution of the state archives was the Party’s 
vital interest in state secrecy. In the revolutionary period, the preservation of Party 
history was not an objective that guided the Party’s work with documents. However, 
                                               
153 Oksenberg, “Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 32. 
154 See Liu Shaoqi’s “On Open and Secret Work (1939)” Tony Saich and Bingzhang Yang, The 
Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), 993-95. 
155 Ye and Esherick, Chinese Archive: An Introductory Guide, 12. 
156 In its own historical retelling, the State Archives Administration claims that a few far-
sighted party leaders – Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in particular – may be considered 
the forefathers of the Chinese socialist archive for initiating the preservation of 
documents pertaining to key moments in the revolution.  Those efforts, however, were 
quite exceptional to the revolutionary period. Zou Jiawei and Zhou Xueheng, Brief 
History of Chinese Archives 中国档案事业简史, 220-22. 
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security and counter-subversion was an overriding concern in records management in 
the base areas, which carried over into the PRC. The earliest initiatives toward the 
creation of a unified archive after liberation proceeded with the intent of safeguarding 
vital state secrets.  
In 1950, the Central Administrative Council and the CCP Central Committee 
each announced national-level conferences in Beijing to address the urgent issue of 
official secrecy.157 As a result of these meetings, a 1951 directive from the office of 
Premier Zhou Enlai assessed the Party’s newfound circumstances while explicitly 
identifying archival work as an extension of state secrecy. Zhou claimed that previously 
as a revolutionary movement of the countryside, the Party took a ‘facile’ approach to 
the security of written documents. But since moving its administration out of the 
countryside and into the cities, the Party’s handling of documents had been exposed as 
a “weak link” in its operations—vulnerable to spying, infiltration, and sabotage by 
internal and external enemies.158 A contemporaneous audit of provincial level 
governments found a disturbing pattern of negligence among cadres of all grades in 
their handling of working papers. Undesirable phenomena included cadres forwarding 
internal correspondence broadly and indiscriminately (乱发), the outflow of official 
secrets (失密), and casual non-work related browsing of classified materials (乱翻).159 To 
combat to these new threats, the party would have to overcome its “arrogance and self-
complacency” with regard to document management and adopt a proactive approach 
                                               
157 ZGZYLS “政务院关于各级政府工作委人员保守国家机密的指示 (1950)” No. 28(211): p. 533-
35 
158 ZGZYLS “中共中央关于加强保守党与国家机密的补充决定 (1951)” 28(211): pp. 539-542 
159 “中共中央关于加强保守党与国家机密的决定” Construction《建设》No. 1 (1951): p. 1-6. 
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to the preservation of sensitive information.  A supplemental directive called for the 
party organization at all levels to work toward establishing a unified archival system for 
official documents, which would ensure that the management of classified materials 
would be limited to trained, politically reliable cadres. 
With the 1952 adoption of a general plan for archival organization based upon 
the Soviet scheme, the Party elite sought to initiate a top-down transformation in 
bureaucratic approaches to the archive. The establishment of the State Archives Bureau 
in 1954 reflected the planned, collectivist impetus of socialist state construction. The 
PRC state archive was not merely a scaled expansion of documentary practices 
developed in Yan’an; it entailed a conceptual shift in the bureaucratic culture of the 
CCP toward office work and a new understanding of the life cycles of official paper. 
Beginning around 1952, the party-state initiated a push in organizational, educational, 
and propaganda channels to promote the awareness of ‘documents’ wenshu and records 
dang’an, defining the former as ‘working papers for actions in progress’ and the latter as 
‘permanent records for completed actions’160The central principle of the archival ethic as 
held by central archivists was that documentation was not to be regarded as a 
byproduct of bureaucratic work; instead every bureaucratic action ought to produce a 
secure permanent record as its end. 
A critical step toward the creation of the state archives was the establishment of 
an archives science specialization at Renmin University in 1952 with the help of Soviet 
advisors. Formed at the behest of the General Office of the CCP, the program was 
                                               
160 国家档案局档案工作社 State Archives Bureau, ed. Selected Documents on Documents 
Management and Archives Work 文书处理工作和档案工作文辑 (Beijing: Gongren 
chubanshe 工人出版社, 1956); William Moss, “Dang’an: Contemporary Chinese 
Archives,” The China Quarterly 145 (1996), 114. 
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designed to train the first generation of Chinese central archivists in the Bolshevik 
mold. The Renda program was itself modeled after the Moscow Historical Archives 
Institute and utilized visiting Soviet archivists as lecturers. At the outset, course 
materials consisted of translated Soviet manuals, including The Theory and Practice of 
Archives in the USSR, which remained the standard textbook at Renda for years 
afterward.161 The CCP Secretariat also commenced publication of an internal (neibu 内部
) periodical dedicated to document work and archival affairs, Reference Materials Work 
Bulletin 《材料工作通讯》, based upon the Soviet professional journal on the same 
subject.  The first several issues in 1953 consisted of serialized translations or summaries 
of key Soviet archival texts, but later under its new title, Archives Work 《档案工作》, 
contained mostly Chinese contributions. A central point of emphasis in the Soviet-style 
curriculum was that unlike bourgeois societies where archival practice was dominated 
by class interests, socialist archival management was based upon “the only scientific 
theory in existence, Marxism-Leninism.”162 
However, the implication of ‘Marxist-Leninist science’ in the PRC archive was 
most apparent in its organizational structure, which was a modeled after of its 
institutional counterpart in the Soviet Union. The formal organs of the state archive 
were inaugurated under the new 1954 PRC constitution, which called for three 
interlinked archival authorities: 1) a central-level State Archives Bureau to coordinate 
nationwide archival standards and administer the national historical archives; 2) the 
Central Party Archives to administer all high-level archival records related to the 
                                               
161 Chinese title:《苏联档案工作理论与实践》First translated serially in Archives Work, the 
text was subsequently printed with a full translation by Renmin University in 1960. 
162 Xue Lianjun, 薛连均, “驳斥吴学书对档案工作的诬蔑” Archives Work 《档案工作》No. 5 
(1957): pp. 8-9 
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history of the Communist Party; and 3) a hierarchy of provincial, prefectural, municipal, 
and county-level administrations and repositories.163 Reflecting the emphasis placed 
upon preservation and official secrecy, the first chief of the State Archives Bureau, Zeng 
San 曾三, was not a librarian or archivist by training, but rather had served as a military 
code worker and radio officer in the War of Resistance.164 
In principle, the sum total of all documentary records in the PRC comprised a 
unitary state archival fond, or ‘芬特,’ a Russian loanword from фонд.165 The unitary fond 
was a Soviet borrowing, stemming from a 1918 decree in which Lenin approved a 
centralized plan for the archives of the Soviet Union. According to the Leninist concept 
of the state archives, any institutional producer of documentary records—from 
collective farms, banks, schools, newspapers, churches—contributed to the state 
archival fond, which the state administered as the collective archival wealth of the 
nation. Through the unity of the fond, the state claimed preferment over all public and 
public and private records, which were designed to be absorbed into state repositories 
after a specified period of time.166 
While the ‘fond’ represented the historical ‘wealth of the nation’ 国家的财富, its 
use was overtly directed toward party-state objectives—namely, safeguarding state 
                                               
163 The Central Archives were not officially opened until 1959.  The Henan Provincial 
Archives was the first provincial archive to be established in 1956. Moss, “Dang’an: 
Contemporary Chinese Archives,” 115. 
164 Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, 332. 
165 In archival organization, the basic principle of respect des fonds refers to the organization of 
archival records to preserve their original order and provenance. 
166 Fritz Epstein, “Archives Administration in the Soviet Union.” The American Archivist 20, 
no. 2 (1957), 138; Patricia Grimsted, “Archives in the Soviet Union: Their Organization 
and the Problem of Access,” The American Archivist 34, no. 1 (1971), 28. 
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secrets, preserving useful technical knowledge, and enabling the evaluation of 
government employees, among other functions. Archival management was in this sense 
overtly practical, aiding and informing the work of the party-state in the larger task of 
socialist construction.  Reiterated through training and education, the Leninist ‘state 
archival fond’  became a Chinese slogan for centralized archival administration, or ‘国家
统一档案芬特’ (unitary national archival fond) in official parlance. For a time, fond ‘芬特’ 
was the default terminology for ‘archive’ both in the sense of archival file, as well as the 
unitary archival institution. However, the double valence of the transliterated term 
proved to be so confusing that in 1955, the State Archives Bureau declared ‘芬特’ 
defunct and divided its semantic uses among the terms ‘全宗’ (fond) and ‘档案’ 
(archive).167 
The ideological emphasis upon ‘the principle of unified governance of the state 
archives’ 统一管理国家档案原则 was reinforced by ensuing actions that stressed 
strengthening archival work through coordination with party initiatives. In 1956, the 
State Council issued a two-year national plan that laid out the main tasks for archival 
work, including the establishment of a comprehensive system of document 
management and filing for all party-state agencies, ‘cleaning out’ all old and enemy 
regime archives across all levels, and raising the proficiency of all personnel engaged in 
archives work to a uniform standard.168 That plan also subordinated the newly formed 
provincial and local level archival bureaus to the party committee of the same level, 
ensuring that the state archive would be controlled by the Party rather than become an 
                                               
167 Hu Mingcheng 胡明诚, ”论‘芬特’改称‘全宗’的必要” Archives Work 《档案工作》No. 5 
(1955): p. 35-36. 
168 “国务院关于加强国家档案工作的决定” in State Archives Bureau, Selected Documents on 
Documents Management and Archives Work 文书处理工作和档案工作文辑, 1-6. 
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independent entity within the state. In 1959, the adoption of a proposal from Zhou 
Enlai’s office merged the State Archives Bureau and the Central Party Archives under a 
single administration, whereupon the archives system became “one organization, with 
two nameplates” 一个机构两个块牌子. This action, completed in the initial stages of the 
Great Leap Forward, appeared to advance the vision of archival centralization to its 
fullest extent, while fully subordinating archives work to party control. 
 
The Lessons of Archives Work 
The years after the founding of the State Archives Bureau in 1954 marked a 
period of documentary standardization in the PRC. Because archival and clerical 
expertise were spread so unevenly across the growing bureaucracy, the State Archives 
Bureau took on the role of professional educator, working to formulate and disseminate 
professional standards for agencies at all levels. The demands of document 
management and archival work across the party-state implied that all officials would 
require some training in handing, organizing, preserving, and sourcing documents.  
Zeng San and the central archivists at the State Archives Bureau recognized that 
not only would most cadres have to ‘learn on the job’ 业务学习, but that state-wide 
standards for the management of documents and archives had yet to exist as of 1954.169 
Contrary to official pretenses, the State Archives Bureau did not exercise administrative 
oversight of local archiving institutions and their personnel; however, the bureau was 
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the nation’s highest authority in the young field of archival science and wielded cutting-
edge technology by virtue of the Soviet connection at Renmin University. Over the 
1950s, the State Archives Bureau would set up numerous archival science training 
programs in the provinces in the Soviet mold and advised the construction of some of 
the earliest provincial and county archives in China. 
Even with the emulation of the Soviet-style archival sciences program in 
provincial academies, only a few hundred cadres per year could be expected to undergo 
specialized archival training.170 Besides the organization of conferences and training 
workshops, internal publications such as Archives Work were the primary means by 
which central archivists were able to promote standards beyond the institutional 
structure of the archive system. These published materials were crucial vehicles for 
sharing best practices, as well as cultivating professionalism among officials engaged in 
different fields of administration. 
Archives Work was originally published under the title Reference Materials Work 
Bulletin by the General Office of the CCP. Shortly after the title change, it was entrusted 
to the newly formed State Archives Bureau as the internal journal for professional 
archivists, but gained wider readership as the focus of archival activity shifted toward 
the localities. In 1956, the State Archives Bureau announced that due to “the ever-
increasing scope of document and archival work,” the periodical would increase 
publication to a bimonthly schedule and increase distribution.171 By 1957, Archives Work 
had a circulation of 65,000 copies covering central level organs, large state enterprises, 
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local party committees, and numerous state agencies.172 As the periodical settled, 
content grew to include ‘featured contributions’ and ‘field notes’ from the provinces, 
through which archival professionals from across the nation would share suggestions or 
experience regarding common problems. 
From its first issues, the editors of Archives Work labored to establish a consistent 
ethic of clerical and archival practices across state agencies. In theory, working 
documents and archives were distinct categories with different governing rules. 
According to Archives Work, document management consisted of supplementary clerical 
routines that accompanied “active” documents, such as receipts for incoming or 
outgoing communications, whereas archival work dealt with “completed” tasks. But as 
evidenced by inquiries from local authorities throughout the 1950s, even the distinction 
between document management (文书处理) and archives work (档案工作) was not so 
clear-cut in practice.173 State agencies with investigative functions tended to frequently 
draw upon the material in their archive rooms in their everyday operations. Personnel 
dossiers, organizational records, party publications, meetings notes, and even 
blueprints for state buildings were among the types of records that might be repeatedly 
utilized and expanded upon.174 The perpetual fear of the central archivist was that a 
document that had suddenly become necessary could no longer be accounted for. To 
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prevent this occurrence, Archives Work sought to inculcate a culture of overwhelming 
preservation by specifying protocols for all different types of archival situations. 
Protocol mandated that whenever central level or inter-agency communications 
were involved, agencies were to apply a regimen of forms and receipts to account for 
every document in transit. As the structure of the party-state was being plotted in a new 
PRC constitution in 1953-1954, Archives Work produced a corresponding series of 
recommended templates for these supplemental forms with extensive instructions, 
initially based upon literal translations of Soviet examples. These templates included 
standard sample forms for receiving telegrams, registering complaints, reporting 
meetings minutes, and sending out orders for typing or printing.  
The instructions attached to the templates in document work were designed to 
be fastidious. For instance, for the single task of accepting an official document from 
another government organ, the central archivists called for four separate multistep 
actions on the part of the receiving office. The receiver was to 1) issue a delivery receipt; 
2) create a “registration card” for office use; 3) prepare a file folder for the archives 
room; 4) and finally complete an entry log in the communications register for tracking. 
In one issue of Archives Work, an administrator specified the procedure for the last of the 
aforementioned steps in representative detail: 
 
1. Print copies of the form in this format (Fig. 2.1) 
2. Fasten together with a clip sufficient copies of the form to make the 
register booklet.  Using Arabic numerals, start numbering the booklet 
beginning from ‘one’ through until the final page. For incoming documents 
with an original serial number, register the document on the page of the 
booklet corresponding to that number, along with all other essential 
information.  For instance, if an agency were to receive the Ministry of 
Finance No. 55 (as depicted), we would register that document on page 55 
of the booklet.  If we were instead to receive Department of Civil Affairs 
No. 44, we would register this on page 44, otherwise No. 56 on page 56, and 
so on and so forth. At this time, also fill in the date the document was 
received and the receipt number for that day.  When a situation presents 
itself where one needs to obtain Ministry of Finance No. 55, one can first 
search by going directly to page 55 in the registry booklet and from there be 
115 
able to ascertain that the document has been filled in ‘such and such’ 
location.175 
Fig. 2.1 Left: Archives Work Document Registration Index and Log (1953/56); Right:
Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Registration Card and Log (1953)176  
The high standards for file-making and conservation set by central archivists 
may have resulted in unintended effects for bureaucratic workflows downstream. Local 
archivists saddled with the directive to preserve as much of the documentary record as 
possible were often forced to choose between following procedure to the letter and 
cutting corners for the sake of practicality. The fastidious approach to preservation was 
further reflected in an elaborate policy that governed the sensitive issue of disposing of 
unneeded documents and archival materials. The original template authorizing the 
destruction of official papers was an extensive, letter-size form requiring multiple 
175 “苏联机关团体和企业中文件登记工作的介绍” Archives Work 《档案工作》No. 5 (1953): 
p. 23.
176 SMA B-59-62-12 
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approvals and signatures.(Fig. 2.2) Three copies of the form had to be prepared, two for 
the supervisory committee to evaluate, and one for the archiving institution to keep as a 
record of the destroyed documents.  The form was to contain a thorough accounting of 
the provenance and the content of the documents in question, as well as a brief rationale 
for their destruction.  If the supervisory committee was not satisfied with the 
information provided, a committee member would be dispatched to investigate the 
value of the documents in person and report back with findings.  After completing the 
relevant fields, the form was liable to be as lengthy as some of the documents in 
question.  Additional regulations stipulated that if any archival files were approved for 
destruction, the archival jackets were to be destroyed along with them, in case lax 
officials attempt to reuse the folders and sow confusion in the archives as a result.  The 
purpose of this procedure was to ensure that even destroyed documents left behind a 
written record, along with the identity of the official responsible for the order. 
Fig. 2.2 Left: Destruction Request (Archives Work); Right: Report (SHMPC)177
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Archives Work rarely specified the precise reasoning behind such clerical routines, 
but exhaustive accounting was a distinctive feature of a government that placed limited 
trust in its low-level bureaucrats. Elite anxieties over the control of sensitive materials 
were inflamed by occasional scandals of files stolen from storage, or sold by 
unscrupulous officials to the public. In Archives Work, the report of the work team 
dispatched to a rural office only to confront missing files and malfeasance, was so 
common so as to be a trope of archival literature.178 As a remedy, the move toward 
archival standardization engendered a growing system of receipts, confirmations, 
registries, and authorization forms to monitor the movement of materials. These 
practices constituted a means of documentary accounting whereby higher-ups were 
able to maintain oversight of documentary work at all times. Particularly in periods of 
normal bureaucratic order, these routines were adhered to and ensured that sensitive 
and classified materials were strictly accounted for.  However, such routines also 
informed unintended bureaucratic habits. A predictable outcome of the tedious new 
procedure for document disposal was that a very small proportion of papers were ever 
destroyed through the prescribed procedure. As central archivists would discover in 
later decades, local archives in China had a retention rate of over 50 percent, meaning 
they retained over half all materials that entered into their possession. When compared 
to a retention rate of less than 2 percent for archives in the United States, it appeared 
that the inundation of Chinese archives was due in part to a complicated procedure for 
177 “销毁单的格式” Archives Work《档案工作》No. 4 (1953): p. 9.; SMA B-59-62-12 
178 See for example, “不辛的档案” Archives Work 《档案工作》No. 9 (1956): p. 5. 
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the destruction and disposal of records.179 
 
Doing Things with Paper 
Methods for the processing, preservation and storage of official papers were a 
primary theme across issues of Archives Work. The meticulous description of best 
practices for handling and receiving important documents were accompanied by 
exhaustive guides on the practical, material aspects of archivization. One such primer 
from the June 1956 issue of Archives Work by a leading central archivist named Wang 
Tingkai 王庭恺, addressed the topic of manual file-making or binding (装订工作), by 
which existing documents were processed to create archival records. “How We 
Implemented File-Making Work“ was a summary of how the State Archives Bureau 
had processed provincial level documents from the land reform movement from 1951-
53.180 
Among other issues, the piece discussed three basic tasks in file-making: cleaning 
documents, paper mounting, and archival binding. The first task, cleaning and 
processing the received documents, was predominated by the manual task of removing 
metal staples. Wang noted that provincial bureaucrats were accustomed to stapling 
everything together to prevent pages from being lost. However over the long-term, the 
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metal staples would inevitably rust and eventually cause damage to the document. 
While staplers were extremely common in Chinese offices, staple removers were not. 
Wang proceeded to detail the precise method by which he and his fellow archivists 
tackled the problem of the staples: 
Unlike pins and clips, removal of staples is not an easy task due to the lack 
of a proper tool. We were unable to find a small plier with a sharp edge. All 
we had was one side of a small pair of old scissors. We used it to pry open 
the two ends, then removed the staple from the other side. Using this 
method, one could only remove the staples of files in 30 documents in one 
morning. After studying the situation, we discovered a shortcut. Other than 
for the few thick files which exceeded 50 pages (a small number) for which 
we still used the old method, we devised a new way of removing the 
staples: using the left hand to hold down one end of the staple, take the tip 
of the scissor to pry the one end of the staple flat, then use the left hand to 
pull out the staple. This method eliminated two movements. By this 
method, one person can process 100 documents in a single morning, more 
than doubling productivity.181 
After removing the metal staples, mounting presented another set of challenges. 
Documents from the provinces came in “all shapes and sizes.” Certain documents were 
broadsheets, others as narrow as two fingers; some were written horizontally from left 
to right while others were rotary printed “bamboo strip style” on a cylinder-shaped 
piece of paper 简子页. Wang called for longer sheets to be folded where possible, rotary 
sheets sliced open and laid out flat, and empty margins cut away. Preserving every bit 
of text was a high priority. Damaged sheets or small scraps were to be carefully 
mounted on a very thin sheet of paper of standard 16K-size (roughly equivalent to 8.5 x 
11”). 
                                               
181 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Fig. 2.3 Left: rusty nail staple; Right: pasted amendment  
The most difficult part of the mounting process was finding a suitable adhesive. 
Wang said that in their early days, the central archivists had attempted to use normal 
store-bought glue 浆糊 or a commercial epoxy. However, the diaphanous (or flimsy) 
wood-pulp paper used in Chinese office settings would easily wrinkle and become 
brittle when the epoxy dried. All the store-bought alternatives that the archivists tried 
were deemed unsuitable—either too thick and hard to spread evenly, or too thin and 
non-secure. As a final resort, the archivists decided to try a traditional paste used for 
mounting Chinese painting and calligraphy 裱糊点. They taught themselves the to 
make the paste, which turned out to be the most effective solution: 
The method to make the paste is as follows: mix flour with water; churn the 
mixture to agitate the flour and separate the starch from the mixture; 
remove starch by filtering; heat the remaining mixture of water and flour 
over flame until the flour in the mixture is cooked. This paste is sterile (卫生
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) but strong, not too soft, not too hard, easy to spread, and will not wrinkle 
the paper as it dries.182 
The flour and water paste described by the central archivist is familiar staple of 
the homemade science project—a version of the mixture is used as simple adhesive in 
making paper-mâché. The addition of further ingredients can help to strengthen the 
adhesive and resist mold and insects.183 After all the odd-sized pieces of paper had been 
correctly mounted, the archivists moved to the step of manually binding the documents 
in an archival cover. Normally documents were to be bound along the left side of the 
page, but documents with vertically printed text were to bound along the right side. It 
was considered important for the archivist to check the margins and ensure that any act 
of binding would not obscure the text. Before punching any holes, the archivist had to 
run a “final check” to verify that all text was within the readable area. 
182 Ibid., p. 14 
183 See the recipe for “mold-and-insect resistant paste” below. 
Fig 2.4 Stitching as Binding 
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Archival covers used two blank sheets affixed to the front and back of the 
document with twine. In later years these cover sheets would be replaced by sturdier 
archival jackets with regular printed fields. In a few examples of archival binding from 
the pre-1949 period, archivists used a thinner thread and literally sewed together the 
pages as if a garment. But by the 1950s, central archivists had moved to thicker twine 
with only two or at most three “stitches” to save time and effort. Wang described his 
experience in binding using different types of twine: 
We began by using wool yarn to bind. Wool is soft, therefore it does no 
damage to the files. However, it is expensive and tends to attract bugs. We 
changed to a double six-strand cotton twine, which is inexpensive but 
strong. When binding, a 1.5 meter section of twine (equivalent to the length 
of an open arm) is enough for three files. If the twine is cut too long, it is 
cumbersome to pull through, and gets knotted easily; if too short, the twine 
needs to be replenished often, which wastes time. When making holes for 
binding, it is important to make sure that the holes are not so big or so 
numerous as to damage the files. It is equally important to pull the thread 
with the proper tension and make a solid knot to ensure longevity.184 
With regard to all three tasks of archival file-making, Wang related the work of 
the archivist with an exacting attention to detail while foregrounding values of 
professionalism, thrift, and efficiency. Wang showed the central archivist to be 
punctilious about the maintenance of the written record—every word that might be 
preserved was to be preserved if possible—while also highly practical when it came to 
the use of time and materials. He explicitly refers to manpower and materials as 
resources 人力 / 物理 and budgets them accordingly. Each of the solutions to the 
practical problems of the archive are cost-effective and homemade where suitable. At 
184 王庭恺, “我們是怎样進行案卷裝訂工作的” p. 15. 
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one point, Wang analogizes the archive as a kind of workshop in which each person 
had a specialized role along an assembly line: 
It is important to properly organize and distribute the work. In the early 
stages of binding, we operated “independent enterprises” (个体经营), 
assigning one person to one file to perform on all tasks from beginning to 
end…However, we later streamlined and specialized the tasks, assigning 
one person to one task whether it is removing a staple, mounting or 
binding—each person only needs one tool, so that there is no waiting 
around for a tool to be available when changing to another task. This also 
enables the person doing the task to have a better grasp of their work, 
thereby enhancing efficiency. On average, after streamlining we now can 
finish binding 12 files each morning, (or twice as many as before). 
Wang Tingkai’s article was part of a common practice among central archivists of 
utilizing Archives Work to disseminate knowledge about professional best practices. 
Elsewhere, Archives Work served not only as a channel for top-down instruction, but 
also a mediated forum for discussion on the finer points of the profession. 
Supplementing these semi-official guides, the periodical also featured contributions 
from local archivists and bureaucrats, which speaks to the relevance of Archives Work to 
a broader community of archival practitioners. These contributions often contained 
concrete suggestions on improving techniques, endorsed by the editors through 
reprinting. 
 For instance, in a recurring column called “Bits of Experience” 小经验, a guest 
contributor offered an improved recipe for “Mold- and Insect-Resistant Paste” as a 
follow-up to the June 1956 guide to file-making. 185 The guest column prescribed step-
by-step instructions for making a variant of the traditional adhesive using a slurry of 
water, two pounds of high-quality flour, and traces of ash or lime. The slurry was to be 
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repeatedly heated, filtered and diluted to “the consistency of soybean milk” over a 
multi-step, two day-process. The secret ingredients of ash and lime, the author claimed, 
counteracted acidity and gave the paste its insect- and mold-resistant properties, which 
was crucial to archives work in the wetter, humid climates of the south. The author 
promised that the slurry was usable for up to three months, and the lack of 
papermaker’s alum in the resulting paste prevented discoloration or lumpiness. The 
entire recipe used only commonly available ingredients and was freely provided to the 
national community of archivists for the general benefit of the profession. 
Another practical contribution came courtesy of the archivists at the Third 
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.186 The staff at the Third Institute 
submitted an article to Archives Work to share their invention of a “Tidy Rack” 清整架 to 
aid document sorting. The Tidy Rack was a roughly six-foot tall, collapsible wooden 
rack for displaying and ordering documents that required immediate attention. The 
contributing authors described their innovation as a much-needed solution to a 
common problem faced by archivists: 
When putting loose documents in order, sorting and putting documents 
into files often requires “tearing down the house” to make enough open 
space to lay things out. An ordinary office table almost never has the area 
necessary, while floor space is too narrow and difficult to clear. Under these 
conditions, it would be easy to make a mess of things, and work would be 
harmed as a result. The Tidy Rack not only solves this problem, but can 
increase the efficiency of sorting loose documents… 
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Fig. 2.5 Introducing the “Tidy Rack” 
As stressed by the contributing authors with the flavor of an infomercial, the 
Tidy Rack had the added advantage of allowing the archivist to work while sitting 
down, while making it unlikely to misplace pages. The invention was commended for 
its “simplicity, efficiency, and space-saving” qualities. Ensuing articles discussed 
mechanical or design improvements upon this type of sorting rack, special cabinets 
with sorting features, and other furniture related to the trade. The recurrent topic of 
material storage was indicative of the pragmatic culture of preservation that occupied 
the central archivists. Indeed, in a fitting summation of the practical ends of archival 
work, Wang Tingkai’s 1956 guide to file-making was followed by a separate illustration 
of a real-life event in a Chinese archive—the discovery of a wasp’s nest in an archives 
cabinet. The cartoonist used the opportunity to fashion a pun which would have only 
been humorous to another archivist: 
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Fig. 2.6 “We want mi (密: secrecy) not mi (蜜: bees!)” 
 
The Problems of File-Making 
For archiving institutions, the material processes of file-making and 
categorization were intertwined with the topic or file-making as categorization. The 
classificatory aspect of file-making fell under the term of lijuan 立卷, specifically defined 
as the “deliberate process of organizing documents into files and cases.” As part of its 
mandate to “improve the efficiency of all government work,” the State Archives Bureau 
in 1956 sought establish guidelines for file-making and categorization across party-state 
institutions.187 Prior to this intervention, the default practice for categorizing permanent 
records was to let documents ‘lay where they fall,’ an organizing principle similar to 
respect des fonds whereby a files were ordered by seriality and their issuing institution. 
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This approach suggested itself to a simple form of archival organization that 
reproduced the structure of the state over time.  
However, Chinese archival administrators critiqued this practice for its “passive” 
approach to filing. Instead, socialist archival science called for utilizing “discretion and 
judgement to anticipate” the needs of work.188 The origins of a document were deemed 
to be of lesser significance than how a file might be employed for new purposes. In this 
sense, Chinese central archivists broke with conventional respect des fonds and instead 
advocated greater intervention in organizational categories to facilitate future use. This 
proactive approach to categorization was also reflected in the reorganization of the 
contents of individual files, which were to be taken apart and put back in order 
according to their “priority.” 
In the 1956 guidelines for creating new permanent records, central archivists 
advocated a scheme of six basic criteria for all new files. Once again using Soviet 
conventions as a model, these filing-making criteria included: 1) General Problem 问题; 
2) Title 名称; 3) Creator 作者; 4) Date 年代; 5) Place 地区; and 6) Issuing/Receiving 
Organ 收发机关. These came to be referred to as the ‘six features’ (六个特征) of official 
files, a prescribed set of metadata to cover the filing systems of local state agencies. The 
‘six features’ were to serve as the basis for not only file-creation, but also labeling, 
indexing, cataloging, and storage.  According to Archives Work, this standard made it 
possible to reconcile the endless “complexity” of the work performed by different state 
agencies to a single system, allowing cadres to easily “disseminate knowledge and 
exchange experience.” The unification of all the nation’s archives around a single 
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standard was explained as a “socialist” methodology and the “most advanced, most 
scientific” approach to archives in the world.189 
 Of the six features, the most important intervention by the file-maker pertained 
to the criteria of the ‘problem’ 问题. The association of files with ‘problems’ or ‘issues’ 
was decisive to the order of the collections, as these created keywords and groupings. 
However, apart from identifying the ‘problem’ as the most important of the six features, 
the state archives administration did not explain to archival practitioners what a 
problem in the archival sense might be. There was no follow-up list of legitimate 
problems to aid in the task of file-making, nor did the centrally approved use of 
‘problem’ entail a predefined size or scope. The vagueness of the ‘problem’ in file-
making left local archivists with a considerable degree of responsibility in determining 
the organizing categories of the archive. It was largely for each archiving institution and 
its political leadership to ensure that file categories had applied the ‘correct’ set of 
problems with respect to central policy. 
For local archivists, the wide latitude in file-making and categorization was a 
mixed blessing. Owing to their subjective boundaries, which also tended to shift 
according to the politics of the moment, delineating file categories was a point of 
constant stress in the work of the archive. The question of what satisfied a ‘scientific’ 
hierarchy of problems and topics was not immune from the pressure to match archival 
categories to current ideological fashions—for instance, all archives after 1957 or so 
invariably designated a separate archival collection (usually the first of a series) for the 
speeches and writings of Chairman Mao. Despite being one of the most fundamental 
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tasks of archival practice, file categories remained one of the most debated topics in the 
professional literature. Even as late as 1960, a local archives bureau in Hongdong, 
Shanxi province, found itself reiterating guidelines on filing methods promulgated 
years prior: 
Filing is based upon the six features of problem; title; creator; date; place; 
and issuing/receiving organ. When filing, first refer to the feature of ‘the 
problem’ and the importance of the document to decide where it should be 
filed. This practice ensures the integrity of the contents of each file, enables 
them to reflect the Party’s guiding principles, and facilitates their use…For 
those documents that are not conducive to filing by problem—such as 
general summary reports, work plans, meetings notes, etc.—those 
documents may be filed by name or another feature. The instruction in this 
notice to file according to the feature of problem should not be understood 
to rule out other schemes of filing; rather, filing by problem should take 
other features into account.190 
As described by a central archivist, the benefit of affording lower level personnel 
the discretion to define and create ‘problems’ in the archival sense was to aid 
expediency in future use.191 Unlike the organic inflows of paper in regular office work, 
archivists had the ability to return to otherwise scattered documents and impose order 
with the goal of consolidating curated, topically focused collections. In theory, a user of 
the archive could enter the stacks with a practical question and find all of the records 
pertaining to that problem grouped together. A measure of skill and experience was 
required of the archivist to determine where the fluid boundaries of a particular 
problem began and ended, but the intent of this approach was to make archives readily 
available as applied knowledge for the concrete needs of administration. The previously 
                                               
190 ECNU B0357-055-013 ”洪洞县档案馆文书与档案” (1960): p. 223-6 
191 王明哲, “关于编制案卷类目的几个问题” in State Archives Bureau, Selected Documents on 
Documents Management and Archives Work 文书处理工作和档案工作文辑, 124. 
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cited memo from the Hongdong Archives Bureau reiterated the importance of selecting 
problems and cases judiciously: 
Problems come in different sizes, big and small. Their characteristics can be 
divided into the categories of the general and specific, the simple and 
complex.  One cannot simply have an ‘Organization Department Problems’ 
file, or a ‘Cadres Problems’ file. Instead, one should find smaller issues 
within those general problems to create files.  For instance, within 
‘Organization Department Problems,’ we might have ‘Party Building,’ 
‘Party Rectification,’ and ‘Party Discipline.’ With regard to “Cadre 
Problems,’ one could divide this up between ‘Cadres Participating in 
Physical Labor,’ ‘Cadre Appointments,’ ‘Cadre Work Styles, and Cadre 
Education.’192 
In this vein, archivists in the field were to taught to approach their work by 
identifying the latent ‘problems’ that lay among documents. The task of the archivist 
was to select problems of the right size, which could then be fit to a hierarchy of issues 
descending from the general to the specific. The basic unit of the archive was the file—
ideally one aspect of larger problem, such as a sub-policy, committee meeting, calendar 
unit or specific case. For each individual file, two hundred pages was considered to be 
the maximum practical limit for a usable record; any file of greater length was supposed 
to be subdivided and rebound as separate items. 
A classified catalog of archived Organization Department documents from the 
1960s demonstrates how problem categories were to be superimposed as an organizing 
scheme over past records. The catalog in question accounted for all high-level 
documents received by the COD in a seven year-period. Rather than organizing the 
documents serially or by issuing institution, all of the documents were re-indexed 
according to five broad headings such as “Cadre Work,” “Organization Work,” and the 
                                               
192 ECNU B0357-055-013 
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obligatory “Important Remarks by Chairman Mao.” Under each of those main headings 
were subtopics in the form of general problems, such as: “Problems pertaining to the 
formation of revolutionary committees,” “Problems pertaining to the work assignments 
of technical colleges,” “Problems pertaining to sending down for verification” (under 
‘Organization Work’). Each subtopic occupied one to several pages in the catalog, 
which then listed individual records and their associated documents according to date 
of receipt. It should be noted that this post-processing radically revised the order of 
documents registered by the protocol for receipt described above (cf. Fig 1); the 
resulting system removed the files from their institutional context in favor of a 
hierarchy of organizing concepts based upon problems, or schematically: General 
Problem >> Specific Problem >> Date of Receipt >> Name of Document. Records organized 
in this way could be easily indexed according to a card system, or reproduced as a 
catalog with clearly demarcated groupings to facilitate search and retrieval. 
The headlining of the ‘problem’ in file-making was indicative of a general 
fixation with ‘problems’ and ‘cases’ in the habits of Chinese bureaucracy. In the 
technical context of archival science, the ‘problem’ 问题 simply denoted a ‘topic.’ The 
problem in question was not necessarily ‘problematic’ in the sense of carrying an 
explicitly negative connotation. However, when applied by Chinese bureaucrats in the 
course of work, the archival category of problem was inextricable from its meaning in a 
politicized discourse where problems were identified with ubiquitous social and 
political threats. The identification of minor, non-transgressive administrative issues as 
a ‘问题’ was something of a cliché in naming files, official notices, speeches, pamphlets, 
and other written genres. Central archivists in Archives Work sometimes complained of 
‘problem fever’ in the lower bureaucracy—the tendency to define all matters as a “某某
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问题” (a problem of such-and-such) without having a firm grasp of the practical issue at 
hand.193 
The centrality of the problem in archival file-making translated to the 
organization of the dossier system as well. With regard to individualized files such as 
personnel dossiers, criminal case files, or cadre screening materials, file-persons were 
commonly categorized to their ‘primary political problem’ 主要政治问题. At the local 
sites of the political organization where dossier work was carried out, this reflected the 
subtle elision of the archival ‘problem’ as a technical category versus a popular 
understanding of how one’s politics were liable to be ‘problematic.’ The imperative to 
partition the archival domain into problems general and specific was reproduced in 
dossiers with labels and cases corresponding to subjects and their historical issues. Files 
could be shaped to fit a particular label, as in “右派分子, X” (Rightist Element, X), or a 
problem attached to a particular individual, as in “X 的问题” (X’s problem). Applied to 
dossiers, this most commonly manifested in the simple scheme: political label (problem) 
>> person’s name (title). In the course of a political campaign, hundreds of 
individualized dossiers might be entered into record under the ideologically salient 
epithet of the moment. One such example of problem categories in action is an archival 
collection of ‘Admission Materials’ 交代材料 from the Rectification Campaign in 1957.194 
The collection, which sits intact in the Kunshan County Archives (昆山档案馆), consists 
of the confessions, self-criticisms, and reform plans of 79 ‘rightists’ from various walks 
of life. In the archive, the categories of organization were: “rightists >> admissions 
                                               
193 Wei Zhensheng 魏振声, “批判文书档案工作中的右倾思想” Archives Work《档案工作》
No. 1 (1956): p. 7-8. 
194 JTU 101-9-1 to 101-9-79 
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material >> individual’s name. All of these people were made rightists at least twice, first 
by struggle, and again by archive. 
Archival order as composed of problems and cases, or labels and dossiers, 
provides insight into the co-dependency of bureaucratic governance and the 
methodologies of record-keeping. Making the problem the central constraint of the 
archive was a logical scheme of organization for entities such as the Organization 
Department and the Public Security Bureau due to their engagement in ongoing tasks of 
investigation and research. For these organs, individualized dossiers grouped according 
to problem labels was by far the simplest and most convenient means of organizing 
archival affairs. To create a permanent record, all official rulings, evaluations, 
supporting evidence and personal data related to a specific individual entered into a 
single file that became that person’s file-identity. Shared problems then consolidated 
file-identities under exclusive groupings.  
These habits of file-making, however, carried interesting implications. The 
archival reproduction of persons as problematics to sort and preserve reiterates the 
familiar Weberian observation about how bureaucratic rationalization inverts the 
means and ends of administration. That practice brings into relief the circuitous logic of 
the archival project: the production of the problem categories through the craft of the 
archive was taken as a precondition for their resolution, and yet, never was the problem 
more real and necessary to the bureaucrat than at the moment of its archival reckoning. 
Moving deeper into the history of the dossier system, archivization was the process by 
which the bureaucracy processed, inscribed, and stored concerns about its own field of 
administration. 
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Archives in Action I: Archiving Cadres 
 
The Dossier System and Sites of Archive 
To fully appreciate the ‘archival turn’ in the dossier system of the mid-1950s, it is 
worthwhile to contextualize the dossier system by returning to bureaucratic institutions 
in the PRC and conceits of the state archive. Despite official pretenses to the ‘unitary 
archival fond’ the claim of the State Archives Bureau over all archival matters in the 
PRC did not translate to meaningful control. Even with the appearance of increasing 
archival centralization throughout the 1950s, the ’state archival fond’ was largely an 
ideological slogan rather than a description of how archives in the PRC were governed. 
In reality, the State Archives Bureau was sometimes referred to as a “tier-two 
department,” meaning it took secondary importance to front-line political institutions 
as well Party units. In spite of the contemporaneous trend toward administrative 
centralization, the state archival project left an extraordinary degree of decision-making 
power in the hands of lower-level archiving institutions, leading to a ‘state archival 
fond’ that was in actuality more voluntary and fragmented than suggested by the 
central bureau’s pronouncements.  
The fragmentation of the archives system manifested along several different fault 
lines. The first was the administrative framework and the positioning of the local 
archive bureaus. Officially, the State Archives Bureau was the executive authority on 
the archival affairs of all party-state agencies down to the grassroots.  However, the 
State Archives Bureau only directly managed only the three national historical 
archives—the No. 1 Historical Archive, the No. 2 Historical Archives, and the Central 
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Party Archives.195 In the provinces, the local archive bureaus consisted of field offices 
and archival repositories that reported not to the State Archives Bureau, but to the local 
party committee of the corresponding administrative division.196 Particularly at the 
lower levels, it was not uncommon for the party secretary of a local party committee to 
also serve as head of an archives bureau, even if that person lacked specialized archival 
training. It was by a deliberate planning of organizational responsibilities that placed 
local state archives under local control, and insulated them from the power of the State 
Archives Bureau. For this reason, any attempt to centrally plan archival policy would 
have to go through multiple layers of political intermediation, and even then gave the 
relevant Party Committee final say.197 At the risk of overstating the point, William Moss 
has described the capacity of central archivists as limited to “rhetorical leadership 
rather than actual enforcement.”198 
The second and perhaps more significant factor in the decentralization of the 
archives system was the autonomy of party-state agencies to act as their own archivists 
within the framework of the fond. This is to say that the Archives Bureau hardly 
possessed a monopoly over archival production. Parallel to the institutional apparatus 
                                               
195 Founded in 1951, the Institute for Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences was grafted onto what formerly had been the KMT Historical Institute in 
Nanjing.  In 1964, it was renamed the No. 2 Historical Archives joined the Central 
Archives and the No. 1 Historical Archives under direct administration of the State 
Archives Bureau. 
196 Hence, the Shanxi Archives Bureau would report to the Party Committee of Shanxi 
Province, the Shanghai Municipal Archives to the Shanghai CPC Party chief, and so on. 
197 Despite the assertion of ownership over all archival resources in the nation, the frictions 
of center-local coordination in archival affairs was seemingly a planned feature of the 
archives system, and presented archival planners with far challenges to centralization 
than similar projects. 
198 Moss, “Dang’an: Contemporary Chinese Archives,” 121. 
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of the officially designated archival bureaus and repositories, other party-state organs 
were prolific practitioners of the archive, and frequently resisted the Archives Bureau in 
order to maintain control over their own collections of files and records. Agencies and 
party branches at all levels, from the Bureau of Water Resources to county committees 
of the CCP routinely produced ‘agency archives’ 机关档案, which were maintained 
onsite in ‘archival rooms’ 档案室 for use as office resources.  According to the principle 
of the state fond, these agency archives formed the “most grassroots level of the 
indivisible archival whole;” however, in reality they functioned as semi-independent 
archival miniatures. Archive rooms employed at least one, but generally a team of 
specialists from the staff of the local agency who reported to the bureau head. 
 According to statute, all agencies were ordered to deposit these records at a 
state-managed repository 档案馆 after fixed period of time had elapsed—a ten year-
limit for agencies below the provincial level, twenty years for the provincial level and 
equivalent.199 However, the deposit rules were treated as general guidelines rather than 
strict requirements. For some agencies—the PSB is a prominent example—archives 
were deemed instrumental to performing ‘politically progressive actions,’ such as 
criminal investigations or public relations work. As a result, these front-line 
revolutionary organs were permitted by the Party to retain their archives in their own 
facilities beyond the legal limit, in some cases indefinitely. As the archive rooms were 
extensions of the agencies they served rather than the Archives Bureau, this 
arrangement ensured that the majority of the archival work performed in the PRC each 
                                               
199 Zeng San 曾三, “略谈机关档案工作当前几个问题” in State Archives Bureau, Selected 
Documents on Documents Management and Archives Work 文书处理工作和档案工作文
辑, 9-20.  
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year was done outside of the formal institution of the state archives system by rank-
and-file agency officials. 
What this fractured organizational landscape implied was that central archivists 
possessed no administrative mechanism for the standardization of archival practices 
across the party-state’s manifold archiving institutions. The detailed description of ‘best 
practices’ provided in professional training materials lacked a process of enforcement; 
central archivists could only define the professional standard with the hope that local 
archivists and their political leadership would adhere to those standards. As a 
consequence, the efforts of central archivists undoubtedly shaped the bureaucratic 
habits of party-state institutions, but primarily in a pedagogical and advisory capacity. 
Central archivists thought deliberately about the craft of archival work, but there was 
no guarantee that so-called ‘best practices’ would remain intact as they were transcribed 
and adapted at actual sites of archival work. 
This brings us back to institutionalization of dossier system and its abrupt 
archival turn after 1956. In many respects, the dossier system exemplifies the notion of 
archive as a local bureaucratic product, along with the deliberate, yet uneven attempt to 
propagate archival technique throughout the bureaucracy. Though technically also part 
of the state archival fond, personnel files were expressly intended to be an internal 
instrument of monitoring and managing individuals within the work unit. Because 
removing them from their specific context would utterly defeat their purpose, personnel 
files were permanent exceptions to archival preferment—they were always produced 
and maintained as agency archives in their own archival rooms. As previously in the 
Yan’an era, the Party through the Organization Department continued to exert the 
greatest influence over the standards and organization of personnel file-keeping after 
liberation. Beginning in the 1950s, bureaucratic approaches to the dossier increasingly 
adopted many of the same material practices that were being developed in the archival 
field. This archival turn in dossier work witnessed a convergence between standard 
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routines of the dossier and those of archival work more generally; however this 
assimilation was by no means an inevitable conclusion. 
In the Yan’an years, the CCP personnel archive made strides toward making 
personnel files into usable permanent records, but significant headroom remained. 
Previously, provisions for the management of personnel records in Yan’an suggested 
that archival tasks were of a generally low priority. The personnel archive of a low level 
unit only called for a single full- or part-time cadre, who ought to be “politically 
reliable, but not necessarily highly educated.” Files were to be “stored in a wooden 
box,” granted one was available. The ‘cadre dossier system’ 干部档案制度 was still an 
aspirational label. 
In 1951, the results of an unofficial audit of these early dossiers published in the 
general-purpose bureaucratic periodical Work Bulletin 《工作通讯》 noted a host of 
irregularities in technique. In no particular order, the audit found fault with the quality 
of dossier work with regard to problems of form—illegible penmanship, narrative 
incoherence, off-the-mark field responses, mixed date formats; problems of content—
vague evaluation decisions, sketchy autobiographies, overuse of clichés; and problems 
of records-management—missing files, files corresponding to unknown persons; among 
other failings. The bureaucratic hand-wringing that accompanied the report 
emphasized that dossier work was a “political imperative,” and hence all cadres should 
be thoroughly educated on the importance of properly administering and filling out 
forms.200 
                                               
200 “对填写干部表格与建立干部档案工作的意见” Work Bulletin《工作通讯》No. 56 (1951): p. 
39-40。 
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By the time of the 1954 State Constitution and the inauguration of the State 
Archives Bureau, the Central Organization Department was preparing to apply some of 
the lessons of archival organization to personnel administration. According to COD 
officials, the disarray of the dossier system was a direct cause of its current 
underutilization. Some effort at the standardization of personnel files was deemed 
overdue for a bureaucratic workforce that had experienced a fourfold expansion in size 
since 1949, as well as a series of purges that had explicitly targeted internal enemies 
(‘three-antis’ 三反 / ‘five-antis’ 五反 / ‘sufan’ 肃反 campaigns).201 
 
Rules of the Dossier System 
It was under these conditions that the Central Organization Department 
convened a national conference in Beijing in August 1956 to discuss the standardization 
of personnel files. The immediate result of that conference was the promulgation of the 
“Temporary Regulations on Cadre Personnel Files” 干部档案工作暂时规定.202 The 
Temporary Regulations marked a milestone for the institution of the dossier system. 
Issued under the authority of the Organization Department, they not only established 
binding requirements for the management of party-state personnel records, but also put 
in place the model for all other areas of personnel administration, including educational 
                                               
201 For an excellent overview of early mass campaigns in the PRC, see Julia Strauss, 
“Accusing Counterrevolutionaries: Bureaucracy and Theatre in the Revolutionary 
People’s Republic of China (1950–1957),” in Staging Politics Power and Performance in Asia 
and Africa, ed. Donal B Cruise O’Brien and Julia C Strauss (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007). 
202 “中央组织部关于频发《干部档案工作暂时规定》的通知 (1956)” Hong Jun, Cadre Dossier 
Work Selected Documents 干部人事档案工作文献选集, 441-52. 
  140 
institutions, enterprises, collective farms, as state expansion and collectivization 
continued through the 1950s. Broadly speaking, the Temporary Regulations laid out 
rules for the dossier according to two areas of concern: the first area covered the actual 
substance and required components for a personnel dossier; the second area described 
the rules for the management of dossiers, such as procedures for sending, receiving, 
duplicating and retrieving dossiers on file. Both areas were seen to require the 
application of standard archival technique and organization to implement a foundation 
for dossier work. 
The Temporary Regulations stated that the unique qualities of the dossier as a 
material record directly called upon the field of archival expertise. Like other typologies 
of archive, dossiers required specific procedures and personnel in order to handle the 
functions of inventorying, sorting, file-making, conservation, and issuing loans and 
transfers. The status quo of archival literacy was deemed insufficient to sustain those 
tasks. The Temporary Regulations lamented “the present state of confusion in 
individual dossiers,” which included “missing information, unrelated information, 
unsubstantiated information and non-sequiturs,” as well as “loose scraps, old or 
damaged paper, illegible writing, and non-uniform pages.” To stem the “outflow of 
secrets and destruction of information,” the basic requirement of dossier work was the 
“implementation of technical archival management.” The central government and party 
committees of all levels were urged to “reinforce leadership and attention to archival 
affairs” within their units, and “strengthen the training of archival personnel to elevate 
their skills and political awareness.” Moreover, those organs were instructed to “stay 
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abreast of the state of the field, exchange experiences, and share suggestions for 
improvement” in the quality of archival work.203 
The intensified focus on the dossier as an archival medium precipitated practical 
changes in administration. Procedures for handling dossiers took on the standard 
routines of archive management, such as specialized forms for transfer and receipt, file-
making and binding techniques, and index card catalogs. Dossier management within 
agency offices also became a specialized profession with mandatory qualifications. 
Agencies above the county level were expected to employ an archival specialist who 
had passed cadre screening and possessed “political reliability and talent as a 
Communist Party or Communist Youth member.” Any cadre with this important 
responsibility—and access to sensitive information—was “not to be transferred to other 
jobs lightly.” 
On the topic of dossier contents, the COD acknowledged that the “confusion, 
defects, and deficiencies” in dossier work arose in large part from “the lack of specific 
instructions as to what a dossier should contain.” To remedy this, the Temporary 
Regulations settled on a definitive list of nine items:  
 
1. Personal History Form 
2. Autobiography 
3. Cadre Evaluation Form 
 (items no. 1-3 mandatory) 
4. Campaign reports related to the individual’s thought, behavior, and 
learning during recent political campaigns (party reform, rectification, 
three-antis, etc) and any related accusations against them, etc. 
5. Investigation reports and decision from background verification, 
including evidentiary materials, admissions, and appeals, etc. 
6. Applications / admissions materials for the Communist Party or the 
Communist Youth 
                                               
203 Ibid., p. 448-449. 
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7. Awards and punishments, including amendments to the sentence by 
party or non-party organs, investigative report on past errors, and personal 
statement on those errors, etc. 
8. Official transcripts attesting to theoretical, educational, or technical 
certification. 
9. Any other material that provides insight on the organizational role or 
employment of the individual (such as a previous summary from 
management, or material from appointments and dismissals) 
 
Fig. 2.7 Contents of a COD Official’s dossier file 
Of the nine categories of documents, the regulations specified that items no. 1-3 
were “absolutely mandatory” in all cases. Items no. 4-9 on the other hand, were 
considered “discretionary with respect to the particular circumstances of the individual 
cadre.” Several of the items codified existing forms inherited from cadre screening and 
rectification in Yan’an. Routines associated with personal history forms, cadre 
evaluations, and background investigations from past campaigns were updated with 
the introduction of new forms, while retaining their function of helping to expose 
political or historical problems. 
The terse language of COD regulations rarely provided detailed commentary on 
political issues, but the standard contents of the dossier revealed a continuing 
preoccupation with qualities of ideological virtue and security. In descriptions of the 
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various discretionary documents, two types of investigation reports and the portion on 
awards and punishments alluded to procedures for dealing with the political-historical 
problems of individuals. Those sections, which featured the telling usage of the term “et 
cetera,” seemed formulated in such a way as to allow responsible officials maximum 
flexibility in filing material of interest to party security. It is also useful to consider what 
types of documents the rules excluded. “Personal materials” not fit for filing included 
employment notifications and marriage certificates—those could be returned to the 
individual. “Material of no use” such as outdated dossier indices, transfer forms, 
receipts, letters of introduction or recommendation and the like, could be “destroyed 
with permission from leadership.” Any material which did not belong in the 
individual’s dossier, but possessed “long-term value” were to be given over to the 
relevant organ.204 
A salient feature of the new system was the division of the dossier into two 
sections. To both simplify and complicate the tasks of dossier maintenance, each dossier 
was to consist of a primary file, or zhengjian 正件, as well as a supplemental file, or fujian 
附件. The zhengjian was to contain all of the most important and up-to-date components 
of the dossier, such as an current personal history form, autobiography and evaluation. 
If the subject had received a political-historical verdict stemming from cadre screening 
or a campaign, that verdict would also be filed in the zhengjian. The contents of the 
zhengjian were updated at least once a year along with the annual evaluation cycle, or as 
new and urgent information came to light. 
The specific contents of the fujian were not as strictly defined, but it was 
generally understood that the fujian held secondary documents and appendices for 
                                               
204 Ibid., p. 452. 
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supporting documentation. For instance, when a new Evaluation Form or similar 
document was filed in the zhengjian, the old Evaluation Form from the previous period 
was not destroyed, but transferred over to the fujian. Discretionary items which were 
listed in the nine items, but not deemed to be important (transcripts, for example) might 
also be kept in the fujian. A significant portion of the fujian was also devoted to 
preserving working notes and evidence from past political investigations. The 
verdicts—if applicable—were filed in the zhengjian, but the fujian retained all of the 
various witness affidavits, archival receipts, and interview notes produced by 
investigators in the course of research. In other words, if the zhengjian was an executive 
summary of the dossier containing the most authoritative and up-to-date information, 
the fujian provided the research, working drafts, and the deep background of the 
subject. 
While the partitioning of the dossier was complex, the administrative system for 
handling dossiers muddled the picture even further. The Temporary Regulations 
established an intricate set of rules mandating which administrative units were 
responsible for maintaining which dossiers. The most general principle of this system 
was this: any ranking cadre managing a team of subordinates also supervised their 
dossiers. Those dossiers were kept on-site in the agency’s archive room, where they 
were closely secured and restricted to the division head and designated archival 
personnel. Pursuant to this general rule, the dossier of this hypothetical division head 
would have been held at the next highest level by that individual’s direct supervisor. 
Certain exceptions applied, but this general principle imparted dossier handling with a 
basic degree of order and predictability. 
Where the administration of the dossier began to devolve was in its rules on 
duplicates and triplicates. For central party organization that often found reason to 
doubt the activities of lower level officials, it is not surprising that the higher levels 
wished to maintain oversight of the rank-and-file through their dossiers. The challenge 
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to facilitating dossier access was not political, but rather a matter of physical materials 
and its location—the dossier could not be referenced in a local archives room and 
available to superior levels at the same time.  
To fulfill the needs of oversight, the Temporary Regulations laid out stipulations 
for creating duplicates. For any given dossier, the master file 正本 (containing both 证件 
and 附件) would still be maintained in the agency’s archive room.205 However, cadres in 
key local posts—including officials on the party committee of central, provincial, 
municipal, autonomous regions, and major city governments or their equivalent—all 
had two duplicate dossiers, and in some cases three. These duplicates were to be kept 
by higher level “control organs,” either the supervising party committee, and/or the 
appropriate division of the Organization Department.206 Cadres at lower levels with less 
significant responsibilities were not required to have duplicates. 
                                               
205 The primary file 正件 which I have likened to an executive summary, should not be 
conflated with the master file 正本, which is simply the original copy of the whole dossier 
and contains both parts. Despite the similarity in language, the two terms are not 
interchangeable and refer to different things. The conflation of these terms has led to a 
tremendous deal of confusion in the small body of Anglophone academic literature on the 
dossier system. 
206 A fuller description of the role of the control organs is found in Lawrence Sullivan, “The 
Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977-83,” Asian Survey 24, 
no. 6 (1984). 
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Fig. 2.8 Zhengben and Fuben 
The policy on dossier duplicates reveals subtle aspects of the CCP’s notions of 
political authority, particularly in the manner which oversight, information, and official 
secrecy intersected at the dossier. Katherine Verdery, in her work on the Romanian 
Securitate, reminds us that secrecy “bounds communities and sorts people into those 
who are allowed or not allowed to ‘profit’ from knowledge and information.”207 The 
Temporary Regulations made it a point of emphasis to state that the number of 
duplicate dossiers should be “limited to the minimum number necessary for their 
effective use.”208 Even in the Temporary Regulations, the drafters communicated a clear 
sense that party leaders did not intend for multiple copies of dossiers to drift freely 
through the state. However, there was also a sense that keeping a specific number of 
                                               
207 Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of the Romanian Secret Police, 143 
208 “中央组织部关于频发《干部档案工作暂时规定》的通知 (1956)” p. 448. 
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duplicates was an indispensable check on lower level personnel. Dossiers were to serve 
as resources, but selectively, so as to sustain privileged flows of information. 
All versions of the dossier, including duplicates, were protected by a strict 
regime of official secrecy.209 Access to any level of dossiers was limited to the levels 
above, marking a political hierarchy in which information was a prerogative that 
flowed exclusively upward. Cadres undergoing registration, investigation and 
evaluation quickly discovered that their personal information was theirs to give, but for 
the Party to keep. Once submitted to the authorities, these ‘findings’ disappeared 
behind a firewall of ‘state secrets.’ Meanwhile, having access to someone’s personnel file 
was a source of real control. It allowed access to potentially damaging information that 
could be leveraged in any number of ways. According to Michael Dutton, the PSB on 
this basis would re-examine personnel dossiers at the launch of any major political 
campaign.210 The secrets in dossiers did not merely mark gradations in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, they were the artifacts that gave that hierarchy material force. 
 
The Golden Age? 
Deng Shaoxing refers to the ten years after the enactment of the Temporary 
Regulations (1956-66) as the “golden decade of the cadre dossier system.”211 By 
                                               
209 Dossiers pertaining to senior party leaders were marked top secret (绝密), cadres of 
central level departments, ‘secret’ 机密, and county-level officials and their equivalents, 
classified (秘密). John Burns, “Cadre Dossier System: Introduction,” Chinese Law and 
Government 27, no. 5 (1994), 9. 
210 Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 185. 
211 Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 209-11. 
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codifying specific parameters for the dossier system, the Temporary Regulations had a 
transformative impact upon bureaucratic practices the PRC. Because the cadre dossier 
was undoubtedly the model for filing systems for students, workers, and political 
figures, the archival turn of the dossier extended outward to broad areas of social 
organization. 
However, if the primary aim of the COD was standardizing and enhancing the 
quality of dossier work, specific features of the regulations worked to undermine the 
new system. In one important respect, the newly standardized version of the dossier 
remained a capacious container. Particularly in the supplemental fujian 附件 section, the 
broad definition of valid types of documentation accommodated a broad swath of 
materials. Annual evaluations, mass campaigns, and current events all tended to 
produce copious amounts of material with passing relevance to the subject. These 
materials often found their way into the supplement and remained there. Some persons 
who were deemed to have political issues have fujian files that number hundreds of 
pages. The porous boundaries of the dossier, combined with the CCP’s political archival 
ethic for preservation promoted the use of the fujian as an annex for unwanted, poorly 
analyzed, inconsequential paperwork.  
A related problem that was entrenched by the Temporary Regulations concerned 
the policy on duplicates. Producing duplicates and triplicates fed a desire of party 
leaders to be kept in the loop regarding the activities of their local subordinates. They 
also served a legitimate purpose in the system of nomenklatura, as they were utilized by 
the control organs at higher levels to make decisions on promotion and advancement.  
However duplication was also an arduous process with a propensity for error. 
For even high-ranking CCP cadres, the vast majority of the documents that entered into 
a dossier were completed by hand. Occasionally, a political verdict, legal appeal, or an 
Autobiography (in rare cases) might be typed, but generally all materials were filled out 
or composed in ink pen by the subject or an administrator. At various points in the 
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1940s and 50s, the Organization Department issued notices to specify what types of pen 
and paper were valid for each item. When it became necessary to duplicate these 
dossier materials, that process fell back upon manual methods.  
Given the technological resources that were available to an average local 
government office in the PRC circa 1956, duplication essentially offered three options: 1) 
打字 typing up the document on a typewriter; 2) 复写 hand-transcribing the document 
onto carbon paper to make multiple duplicates; 3) 抄写 hand-copying the duplicate 
regularly, one print at a time. The first option, the typewriter, was constrained by the 
availability of the machines. Many local government offices would have had access to 
one, but typewriters and typists were generally reserved for documents deemed to be of 
greater significance than personal materials for one individual.212 The second option, 
carbon-copy, was very efficient if the situation required producing more than one 
duplicate quickly, for instance—a criminal sentence to be sent out to multiple agencies 
and offices. However, many components of the dossier were form templates that had no 
carbon-paper equivalent, and the use of relatively expensive carbon paper could be seen 
as wasteful. 
The bureaucrats tasked with dossier work almost invariably practiced the third 
option. Hand-copying documents manually consumed time and was not always 
precise. But this route seems consistent with the habits of archival work in the PRC, 
which often attempted to harness skill and labor to fill gaps in resources. In personnel 
sections and archive rooms, a large share of manpower was devoted to the clerical task 
of reproducing documents. Demands for reproduction had a constant backlog, which 
was one of the reasons why some central archivists called for mass mobilization in a 
                                               
212 Michael Schoenhals, “Elite Information in China,” Problems of Communism Sept-Oct (1985). 
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‘Great Leap in archival work’ during that movement from 1958-60.213 Documents might 
be duplicated immediately following the creation of the original, or they might be 
produced for another agency upon request. Reproductions were marked with a stamp 
to indicate their provenance. 
The policy on duplicates consumed bureaucratic bandwidth, but also presented 
headaches in version control. The Temporary Regulations specified that any “duplicate” 
should reproduce both sections of the dossier (zhengjian and fujian), but overstuffed files 
and seasonal bottlenecks were a constant reality of dossier work. Moreover, whenever 
the master file of a dossier was updated with new material, duplicate versions of those 
documents had to be hand-generated, sent out via secure post, and entered into the 
appropriate record. Not surprisingly, and often with the tacit approval of their 
superiors, low level bureaucrats cut corners where possible.  
Updating duplicates with new material took place haphazardly. Sometimes page 
of notes on an original document might be used to substitute for a hand-copy, but that 
was preferable to the habit of dismembering a master file for short-term use. The 
distinction between zhengjian and fujian in the duplicate file was deliberately ignored, 
which often made duplicates bloated, disorganized likenesses of their source. Instead of 
enabling oversight, the policy on duplicates created multiple, unreconcilable versions of 
individual dossiers. While not the root problem, the tedious, unreliable process of 
duplication accelerated the fragmentation of the archive. Dossiers of every type, at 
every level, were constantly acknowledged to be “missing pages, lacking crucial 
information, or outdated” in some fashion. One might attribute these lapses to officials 
                                               
213 Zhang Baolin 张玉林, “一个乡的公安档案工作” The People’s Public Security 《人民公安》
No. 13 (1958): p. 16-17. 
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not adhering to the rules, but it is equally likely that contradictions in the rules 
themselves contributed to this incapacity. 
For the purposes of preparing this manuscript, research was carried out on 
approximately forty deaccessioned dossiers, including master files and duplicates, 
primary files and supplements, along with a fair number of individual documents torn 
from context.214 A chronological sample of these files is contained in Appendix I. None 
of the dossiers in this sample precisely followed the script laid out by the Temporary 
Regulations. No file contained all the requested items, provided unimpeachable 
documentation, or completed all fields the letter. Moreover, all the files were fashioned 
differently and diverged from one another in style, materials, and construction. Even 
with the rules in place, dossiers after 1956 were unified by their flaws and 
idiosyncrasies. Those differences, slippages, and contradictions do not negate the labors 
of the dossier system any more than Deng Shaoxing’s label of a ‘golden decade.’ But 
they do serve to reiterate that the knowledge produced by the dossier system also 
produced dysfunction, and that dysfunction was part and parcel of the operations of 
the archive. 
                                               
214 The diversity in these examples is exhibited in Appendix I. 
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Fig. 2.9 Dossiers of COD cadre, commune cadre, village cadre , comparison 
 
Archiving in Action: II: Archiving Enemies 
 
The Sufan Campaign 
Another area of administration where the technique of archive took root was the 
organization of the political mass campaign. The archival turn in movement politics 
stemmed from the Sufan campaign of 1954-57. Officially known as the ‘Campaign to 
Eliminate Hidden Counter-Revolutionaries’ 肃清暗藏的反革命分子的运动, Sufan began 
in 1954 as a high-level party purge, but developed its own objectives and methodologies 
as it shifted to the provinces. One of the unexpected catalysts for Sufan was the 
consolidation of the state archives system in 1955-56, which included an effort to “clean 
out the enemy and old regime archives” (清理敌伪政治档案). With the intensification of 
the campaign, the Public Security Bureau drew upon the enemy archives as a means of 
uncovering the names of individuals who had served or collaborated with the enemies 
of the Party during the revolution. 
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As a campaign targeting the elusive category of ‘counter-revolutionaries,’ there 
was no specific ideological rationale for the Sufan campaign to entangle itself in the 
politics of old documents. Long after the communist military victory was secure, the 
specter of clandestine enemies among the people supplied the grounds for repeated 
programs of mass mobilization and political struggle. However, earlier political 
campaigns had found little use for the seemingly academic field of the archive. It was 
not immediately clear as to what fine documentation, historical research and archival 
evidence had to offer permanent revolution.  
The deliberate activation of the archive as an instrument of struggle was instead 
an innovation keyed to the political landscape of the mid-1950s. Situating the Sufan 
campaign in its proper context calls attention to the scholarship of Yang Kuisong and 
Julia Strauss, who have retraced the history of 1950s mass campaigns in rich 
depth.215 Sufan is often presented as a spiritual successor to the Zhenfan movement 
(‘Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries’ 镇压反 革命) of 1950-1951.  Like Sufan 
thereafter, Zhenfan was ideologically directed against the specter of clandestine KMT 
agents and conspirators, who were feared to have eluded detection by burrowing deep 
into the structure of socialist state. As Yang has argued, Zhenfan was deliberately set in 
motion as a mass movement conducted through emotional public spectacles and show 
trials. Denunciations coaxed from a primed citizenry formed the starting point of many 
investigations, and it was not uncommon for capital sentences to be carried out on the 
                                               
215 Kuisong Yang, “Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,” The 
China Quarterly 193 (2008); Julia Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 
1950-1953,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 1 (2002); Strauss, “Accusing 
Counterrevolutionaries: Bureaucracy and Theatre in the Revolutionary People’s Republic 
of China (1950–1957).” 
  154 
spot to satisfy the so-called ‘indignation of the masses.’216 The Party Center would 
subsequently fault this reliance on accusations and political theater as “excessively left” 
(左) because of the “disregard for procedure that resulted in many false verdicts.”217 
Beginning some four years afterwards, Sufan shared with its predecessor an 
ideological affinity for exposing the intimate enemy, but diverged in terms of method. 
Growing out of a purge of cultural and bureaucratic elites, Sufan expanded into a 
deliberately top-down, inquisitorial campaign carried out by special committees behind 
closed doors. While denunciations and witness testimony were still taken seriously, an 
explicit imperative of the Sufan campaign was to closely “work from sources” 从材料工
作, referring to the practice of building cases around documentary materials. To prevent 
the recurrence of past errors, the Party Center issued instructions in 1955-1956 on the 
indispensability of evidence in evaluating individuals’ political histories. A 1955 
directive entitled, “Ensuring the Healthy Development of the Sufan Movement,” 
declared that in order to guarantee victory in this “new chapter of revolutionary 
struggle, the alliance between the party and masses only required time and evidence” (
时间 / 材料). Investigation groups were subsequently advised:  
The preparation of evidence is the most important step of all…With regard 
to all evidentiary materials, everything must undergo investigation and 
verification.  Do not admit evidence lightly. We should work to ensure that 
the overwhelming majority of cases are secured by positively reliable 
evidence. Moreover, for severe cases involving targets of struggle, we 
                                               
216 Julia Strauss has insightfully termed the Zhenfan movement the ‘ruralization’ of the cities 
under the guise of transitional justice.  Not unlike the land reform movement in the 
countryside, the participatory rituals of zhenfan could be considered political ends unto 
themselves.  See Strauss, “Paternalist Terror” p. 82. 
217 ZGZYLS “中共中央关于肃清暗藏的反革命分子的运动的群众已经发动之后必须注意保证运
动的健康发展的指示 (1959)” 28(92): p. 29. 
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should possess at least one or two pieces of certain proof attesting to 
actions of a counter-revolutionary nature.218 
Within the rhetoric of Sufan, documents were evidence, and evidence was reified 
proof. But what actual, tangible sources satisfied the practical threshold of evidentiary 
materials in proof-making? We can deduce at least a partial indication from the contents 
of a Sufan case file. For one, all evidentiary materials related to an investigation were 
exclusively text-based, often provided as appendices to a dossier to allow upper levels 
to review view the evidence in support of its conclusions.219 This textual evidence came 
in ‘three varieties’ 三材: 1) recorded ‘self-admission’ or ‘confession;’ 2) ‘evidence 
obtained by inquiry,’ including witness testimony; 3) and ‘old and enemy regime 
records.’220 
This third category of evidence was a notable addition to the CCP tradition of 
political investigation and research. Consisting primarily of the official records of the 
Nationalist and Wang Jingwei governments, the enemy and old regime archives (‘敌伪
政治档案’ or ‘旧政权档案’) had not been deemed exceptionally sensitive nor relevant 
prior to the Sufan campaign.221 After the communist victory in 1949, the Central 
Administrative Council (the precursor to the State Council) established a body called 
                                               
218 ZGZYLS “中共中央关于必须把肃清暗藏的反革命分子的运动又好、又快、又省地进行到底
的指示  (1956)” 28(92): p 56. 
219 The media of evidence was entirely text-based.  The use of material evidence, even to the 
extent of fingerprints or photographs, was exceedingly rare in the 1950s, with only 
limited mention in the security services journal 《人民公安》as a technique of policing. 
220 ECNU As0351-028-060 “太原五人小组关于清理肃反档案工作总结” (1960): p. 250. 
221 Ye and Esherick note that these documents were considered sufficiently dangerous that in 
the waning days of the Chinese civil war, the retreating Nationalists made it a priority to 
destroy their records out of fear that the Communists would retaliate against KMT 
supporters.  Ye and Esherick, Chinese Archive: An Introductory Guide, 12. 
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the Expropriation Work Commission under the direction of Vice-Premier Chen Yun. 
This commission was tasked with inventorying all leftover KMT state property, ranging 
from real estate to currency deposits, before transferring these assets to relevant organs 
of the new government. Archives formed a sizable portion of the CCP’s spoils. 
The Expropriation Work Commission had a department devoted to handling the 
central level archives, but the copious papers of provincial, municipal, and county level 
divisions of the enemy and old regime governments became a topic of debate. The files 
from the local governments was staggering and spanned the full gamut of government 
affairs. Apart from files of obvious military or strategic value—such as army, police, 
and prison records—the recovered papers were determined to be “generally useless,” 
and hence turned over to the archivists whose domain was that of useless things.222 At 
least initially, the “cleaning out” of the enemy archives was considered to be an archival 
project, attached to the State Archives Bureau’s work plan. 
In the course of cleaning out the enemy archives however, the archivists would 
occasionally uncover documents referencing old enemy personnel, intelligence 
operations, criminal cases, and other evidence of counterrevolutionary activity. Around 
this time, with the Sufan campaign gaining momentum, the Party Center began to take a 
renewed interest in the contents of the enemy and old regime archives as potential 
sources of intelligence. The party center’s own pronouncements on the ‘left errors’ of 
Zhenfan had already highlighted the problematic nature of cases built on self-
                                               
222 Archivists reported after liberation that most enemy archives suffered from neglect, often 
abandoned in large hemp bags and picked over by insects.  Some local cadres, due to 
their “low political consciousness,” had concluded that the old files were useless and 
unceremoniously destroyed sections of materials; See Wu Shanchang 吴善昌, “清理敌伪政
治档案应注意的几个问题” Archives Work《档案工作》No. 5 (1955): p. 4-6; Also, “中共中
央关于迅速清理敌伪政治档案资料的通讯” 《档案工作文件汇集》: p. 319 
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incrimination and accusation. Partly as a result, ‘old and enemy regime records’ came to 
be privileged above the other two types of evidence as “objective” grounds of proof and 
“the most precious of materials.”223 
In 1955, the Party Central Committee unveiled a plan to “clean out” the enemy 
archives within two years, and explicitly ‘linked’ this effort to the Sufan campaign 
currently underway (配合当前肃反运动).224 In the first phase, this ‘cleaning’ was to be 
carried out by local party-state organs in the major cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, 
Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing and other principalities where materials were 
concentrated.  Party Committees of each city were to supervise, but for staffing reasons, 
the actual investigative labor was assigned jointly to the local divisions of the Public 
Security Bureau and the Archives Bureau. This unconventional partnership of archival 
and security agencies perhaps reflected the Party Center’s own anxiety over the 
rediscovery of the archive as a site of political contestation. In a clear sign of elite 
priorities, the work plan made the Public Security Bureau the leading authority in the 
project (以各极公安部门为主). This action not only contravened the Archives Bureau’s 
primacy in archival matters, but also thrust the PSB into a new role as historical 
researcher and archivist. 
 
                                               
223 ZGZYLS “中共中央关于迅速清理敌伪政治档案资料的通讯 (1955)” 28(48): p. 319.  
224 ZGZYLS “中央批准上海市委关于清理敌伪政治档案资料的指示” 28(48) p. 321 
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The Enemy and Puppet Regime Archives 
Despite the heightened political stakes, the concrete work of ‘cleaning out’ the 
enemy archives work drew upon standard practices advocated by central archivists, or 
archives work as usual. The Sufan researchers spent most of their time performing the 
same mundane archival subroutines as those practiced by low-level archivists 
nationwide. For all enemy archives, initial steps consisted of inventorying, 
categorization, preservation, and file-making, with only slight adjustments to process 
the enemy documents for the task at hand. With customary attention to practical detail, 
the archivists devised a workflow to determine when an old archival folder should be 
reused or replaced, what corner of the archival jacket should note the issuing enemy 
agency, how to properly assign serial numbers, among other practical minutiae.225 
In addition to the expected outputs of archival work, the joint task force was 
assigned to carry out political research. The treatment of the enemy archives produced 
an elaborate system of ‘name cards’ for this purpose 人物卡片. In the process of 
working through enemy records, the researchers created a ‘name card’ on each 
individual whose name appeared in a suspicious context. At a minimum, persons 
named in intelligence files, records of enemy bureaus, the security services, or voluntary 
political associations all had name cards created for them.226  Name cards included 
essential information such as alternate name, gender, age, and residency, but also the 
‘Primary Problem’ 主要问题 of the person implicated. In addition to approaching the 
preparation of name cards with “utmost attention and care,” the responsible official was 
                                               
225 ZGZYLS “公安部、国家档案局关于清理敌伪政治档案的办法 修正草案 (1956)” 28(48): p. 
327 
226 Ibid., p. 329. 
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to make an archival citation that linked back to the original document where the 
incriminating evidence was first uncovered, along with a brief explanation of type of 
evidence on file.227 
The resulting name cards served as the basis for an index that allowed agencies 
in different localities to cross-check and share information. All the name cards produced 
by a local organ would be compiled into an annotated list to be checked against those of 
neighboring areas. Duplicate entries were streamlined, and different references to the 
same individual consolidated. Separate lists existed for different categories of people 
who had been exposed by the archive for traitorous crimes, such as surrendering to the 
enemy, acting as enemy informants, or banditry. These lists were then reported up to 
the provincial level, where they were compiled into a comprehensive index and 
circulated for reference purposes.228 
Archival findings were the source of fresh political cases and extensive paper 
flows. Revelations from the archives were sufficiently common that new form templates 
were created in order to streamline correspondence. For example, in Baoding, Hebei in 
1955, researchers encountered the names of several persons in the enemy archives.229 In 
response, the Sufan small group of Baoding (officially known as the ‘five person-small 
group) sent a series of urgent notifications to the local organs using the form template 
below: 
                                               
227 A similar scheme of registration cards also existed for the naming of counter-
revolutionary organizations. 
228 “公安部、国家档案局关于清理敌伪政治档案的办法 修正草案 (1956)” p. 331. 
229 AC (Baoding Public Security Bureau Dossiers 1954-1965) 
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To (five person-small group or Public Security Bureau): 
While cleaning out the enemy and puppet regime archives, we discovered 
materials related to related to one X, who is of your city. Please see the 
attached for reference and inquire into situation. Enter your findings into 
the attached two forms, and return them to us. If you have need of any 
original materials, you may write us or send a representative. 
 
X | male | age 28 | Hebei | Baoding | Jiaojia 
Primary Problem: This person was a member of the Nationalist Party! 
 
Fig. 2.10 PSB Notification and reply (diff. cases) 
The ‘unmasking’ of persons in the enemy archive would, at a minimum, prompt 
a full political investigation and verdict, over the course of which all important findings 
entered into the permanent record. A small sample of cases from Baoding city 
demonstrates the impact of archival evidence in these political cases.  
One man, surnamed Zhao, was a 22 year old worker at a lightbulb factory in 
Baoding when in the summer of 1948, he was approached by a Nationalist agent to 
become an undercover operative. He accepted the role, but shortly after, the Nationalist 
war effort collapsed, and his handler disappeared. In the course of cleaning out the 
enemy archives, Zhao’s name turned up in the files of Qingfan county (清范县党部，第
12区党部，第一区分部). In the ensuing Sufan investigation, Zhao was forced to confess 
his past affiliation. The Party granted Zhao leniency in part because he had never 
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completed a mission for the enemy, but also in part because Zhao disclosed the name of 
another undercover operative. Zhao was given the less severe label of “common 
counter-revolutionary” 普通反革命. However, the investigating committee determined 
that Zhao should “never be promoted or assigned to work in any critical department 
without the greatest consideration.”230 
Another individual, surnamed Wang, was found to have committed more severe 
crimes. Wang had a formal education which had allowed him to work in the city 
treasury of the Nationalist government of Tianjin. His work for the Nationalists was 
brief, lasting no more than a few years between the end of the Sino-Japanese War and 
the communist liberation of Tianjin in 1949. However, during Sufan in 1956, it was 
discovered that not only had Wang served the Nationalists, but he had played a role in 
suppressing a civil disturbance that resulted in the death of four people. For this 
undisclosed crime, Wang was imprisoned for over a year. Upon his release, Wang was 
allowed to take a job as a construction manager in Baoding. However, Wang soon 
landed in trouble again, this time for alleged economic crimes. Because investigation 
records are forever, the Baodoing Public Bureau dug up Wang’s file, and used his 
record of criminal activity to recommend the most severe verdict. The final sentencing 
recommendation in his file read: “Definitely deserves the label of counter-revolutionary, 
should undergo supervised reform through labor.”231 
From a prosecutorial standpoint, evidence thus collected from the enemy 
archives was extremely productive.  In the major cities, Public Security Bureaus quickly 
put their archival findings to immediate use. While only a subset of political cases in the 
                                               
230 AC “对有政治历史问题的干部使用意见登记表: 赵XX (1958)” 
231 AC (Baoding Public Security Bureau) “王XX” 
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Sufan movement brought archival evidence to bear, both the evidence and the verdicts 
in such cases were often insurmountable and carried lasting consequences. In 
Guangdong, the provincial committee reported that the chance discovery of three hemp 
bags of scrap paper in 1955 contributed to the unmasking of over 200 mid-level officials 
with ties to the enemy and bandit regimes.232 The aftereffects of the enemy archives 
were perhaps most pronounced in Shanghai, where the clean-up effort uncovered over 
6000 former prisoners of war, and nearly 5000 individuals in the past employ of enemy 
governments.233 Because the Shanghai party committee made it a policy to permanently 
file the evidence obtained through investigation in an individual’s personal dossier, 
suspicion remained over these individuals even if the initial charges were dismissed.234 
Several years after the Sufan campaign, an administrative review of cases in Taiyuan 
commended the enduring trustworthiness of evidence from the enemy archives, which 




By virtue of its evidential commitments, the Sufan campaign highlighted a potent 
new means of exploiting the archive. The enemy and puppet regime archives were 
                                               
232 CCPM “中共中央批转广东省委关于处理敌人各系统有关档案的紧急通知的指示 (1955)” p 
1-2. 
233 CCPM “中共中央批转上海市委关于清理敌伪政治档案资料的指示 (1955)” p. 321-322. 
234 SMA B48-2-633-84 “中共上海市委专门委员会关于处理肃反清查对象材料的通知 (1957)” 
235 ECNU As0351-028-059 “中共太原市委五人小组甄别定案工作总结 (1960)” 
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unique informants, but the underlying method of deriving ‘materials’ from archival 
records could be reapplied to other political activities. The rediscovery of archive 
during Sufan increased the Party’s reliance on central filing systems, and initiated a 
rethinking of the kinds of work performed by the PSB and the Archives Bureau. 
It should come as little surprise that in fulfilling their joint mandate to clean out 
the enemy and puppet archives, the working relationship between the PSB and the 
Archives Bureau became strained. According to Party directives, archival specialists 
were on hand to ensure that “correct archival practices were followed,” but they were 
clearly assigned a support role and defer to security personnel in investigative matters. 
The divergent priorities of the two types of professionals could be detected in work 
reports where archivists criticized unnamed “political organs” for their “single-minded 
concern with producing name cards,” and rushing archival work to an unreasonable 
degree.236 Another frequent complaint of the archivists was that the Public Security 
personnel, in their urgency to move investigations forward, “violated the integrity of 
the archival folders” and scattered historical documents across old and new files.237 In 
the view of the archivists, their PSB counterparts had little respect for the professional 
standards of the archival discipline, and were damaging the historical integrity of the 
archive as a result. 
For the PSB, the tendency to move fast and break files was partly by design. In its 
first foray into the archive, the PSB viewed matters through its own institutional 
priorities of security and discipline. Security personnel, however, proved quite adept at 
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237 Wu Minghan 吳明汉 “整理敌伪政治档案的一些初步体会” Archives Work《档案工作》
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assimilating the practical expertise of the archivists—such as specific habits of file-
making and preservation—and applying them to their own growing collection of 
security files. Name cards, indexing, and citational practices would all feature 
prominently in the surveillance of political enemies in subsequent campaigns. The 
preparation and documentation evidence to accompany case files became one of the 
most essential and routine tasks in the daily work of the bureau. 
As a culmination of its work in the Sufan campaign, the PSB became an unlikely 
custodian of the historical record. In its original conception, the state archival fond was 
an institution of total archive governed by central archival specialists. However, after 
the Sufan campaign, party elites arrived at the conclusion that some holdings—
including those of the enemy and puppet regimes— were too politically volatile to 
leave in the hands of technical specialists.238 As the campaign was demobilized in 1956, 
the Party Central Committee notified provincial organs that historical materials from 
the enemy archives would indefinitely remain in the possession of local Public Security 
Bureaus, rather than transfer over to state repositories as planned. Simultaneously, 
according to that same policy, the PSB would assume primary responsibility over all 
records that fell under the broad definition of ‘political archives’ 政治档案, including 
records of problems among the people, which were now sequestered from state 
archives system proper. This action would guarantee the protection of vital secrets and 
place these archival resources in the hands of the most politically capable organs. 
If this foreclosed the vision of a unitary state fond, the elevation of the PSB to 
archival authority was met with a fitting coda. After their initial eagerness to take on the 
archive as a resource, the PSB encountered firsthand the challenges of managing a 
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perpetually expanding historical archive. The evidence produced in the course of Sufan 
political cases was by all accounts, an enormous amount of material.239 The enemy and 
puppet archives accounted for only a portion of the source material for investigations; 
elsewhere, other types of evidence, including accusations and hearsay, were also given 
weight. Officials noted that the quality of evidence—and the ‘Left’ tendencies of the 
campaign—had deteriorated as the quantity of evidence grew.240 But in addition to the 
evidence itself, the supplemental routines of political investigation generated derivative 
paper routines—the name cards, lists, handling receipts, affidavits, notarizations and 
summaries that accompanied the evidence itself. The evidence, its supplements, and the 
reproductions of all of the above were protected by the same type of strict policies on 
destruction that protected other archival documents.  
A significant portion of these materials were filed into the dossiers of the subjects 
of investigation, where they tended to remain on file indefinitely. Within only a few 
years of the Sufan campaign, these files had become bloated. Reflecting the wishes of the 
central and provincial party committees, in 1957-1958 the municipal committees of 
Shanghai, Taiyuan, and Tongzhou all initiated reexaminations (复查) of their Sufan 
cases for potential ‘left errors,’241 mitigating verdicts that had been decided by unreliable 
evidence. In some localities, such as Taiyuan two years later, this was followed by a 
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review of records and another “cleaning out” of the archive—only this time, it was the 
Sufan archives themselves that were the target for cleaning out.242 
Despite best efforts, these minor corrective measures could only temporarily 
slow the overall tendency toward overaccumulation. On the whole, the PSB approach to 
the archive shared the bias toward preservation held by the state’s central archivists. 
PSB investigators were extraordinarily resourceful in producing and procuring 
evidence; however, they were undiscriminating when it came to editing and culling 
those materials for long-term storage. As a consequence, PSB files, which included the 
dossiers of problematic subjects, became venues for archival hoarding. From the Sufan 
campaign in the mid-1950s until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966-68), the 
PSB surveillance archive grew by magnitudes, but without corresponding gains in 
effectiveness with regard to the productive use of evidence. After a Sufan file reached a 
certain threshold, there was no way to account for what was contained within. 
We might close on this point with a brief illustration from the Sufan archives. 
One ‘Rightist’ dossier belonging to a man surnamed S--- contains a ‘Sufan Evaluation 
Form’ along with materials stemming from the case in 1957.243 In the summer of 1957, S-
--, a government warehouse manager in Shangqiu, Henan Province, had voiced some 
pointed political opinions during the abortive Hundred Flowers Movement. By 
November, the political winds had reversed, and S--- was brought before a special 
committee of his superiors and colleagues for what was termed a ‘study session.’  
In the first study session, which lasted for seven days, approximately twenty of 
S---’s former colleagues, acquaintances, and fellow citizens of Shangqiu came together 
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to recount various slanders and misdeeds that he had committed. A few of the charges 
involved actions going as far back as the three-antis movement, but the majority of 
accusations consisted of disparaging quips that S--- had made concerning workers 
(“nothing can be learned from the proletariat”) or the government organs (“the 
planning commission doesn’t even know its first name”). These accusations were 
meticulously recorded by a committee secretary, and circulated as ‘supplementary 
discussion materials’ before the following meeting. At the second study session in 
December 1957, S---’s interlocutors reviewed the damning evidence, and then took 
turns “giving gifts to S---” consisting of suggestions for reforming his incorrect 
ideological thinking. Finally, each of the attendees drew up a wall poster with a cartoon 
caricature of S--- in an imaginative counter-revolutionary scenario. 
S--- appeared to understand the precarity of his situation from the first meeting, 
and confessed to all charges and more. Shortly before he was sentenced to reform 
through labor on a collective farm in Hubei, he expressed contrition for his errors and 
gratitude to the Party in a self-criticism: 
After experiencing the campaign, I understanding the profound meaning of 
the Sufan campaign for the first time. Our nation races toward socialist 
development at one thousand meters per day, and yet counter-
revolutionaries despise our work of socialist construction and oppose us. 
To say that there are no longer any counter-revolutionaries—that is 
mistaken. Even though China has been liberated…the counter-
revolutionaries are highly cunning, they will not expose their destructive 
actions by the light of day—they will find other means, hiding themselves 
among the people to carry out their sabotage… 
My consciousness has been elevated by ideology. The essence of our 
nation’s Sufan Campaign, in line with the directive of Chairman Mao, is 
that we must eliminate counter-revolutionaries wherever they may be. 
Through study I have awakened my own consciousness—not only have I 
confessed my own faults, but I have reported on others as well… Whatever 
ties I had in the past to counter-revolutionaries, I will submit, examine 
myself, and eliminate all doubts. 
S---’s case and its outcome were highly unexceptional by the standards of 1957. 
The timing and nature of the offense placed the matter squarely in the Anti-Rightist 
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Movement, but for reasons that are not completely clear, S---’s documents were filed as 
a Sufan case. S---’s ‘Sufan Evaluation Form’ amounted to a straightforward report on the 
main points of the matter. However, the supplemental section of the dossier contained 
the meeting notes from S---’s two study sessions as supporting materials. There, not 
only had a committee secretary recorded all of the criticisms leveled at S---, but that 
same anonymous official had also reproduced the wall posters drawn by his 
interlocutors.  
As a result, S---’s case file holds a unique collection of evocative illustrations. 
Hand-drawn in pen, there are a dozen unique caricatures of S--- by different persons, 
alternately scathing, grotesque, sarcastic, and ribald. We see hand-drawn images of S--- 
throwing verbal grenades (microphone in one hand, bomb in the other), oppressing the 
working-class (forcing workers to fan him), as well as his ‘original form’ (a screaming 
monstrosity). The images themselves are jarring, but surprisingly imaginative. They are 
not quite art, but given the manner in which they all depict a different aspect of S---’s 
‘rightism,’ their usage in the context of the meetings makes a certain amount of 
historical sense.  
What seems more remarkable is the fact of their archivization. Why do these 
images survive? Practically speaking, their continued existence means that some sixty 
years ago, an anonymous bureaucrat took great care to painstakingly reproduce these 
amateur caricatures. Shortly thereafter, another bureaucrat came along, and deciding 
the reproductions to be of value, bound them together with archival solicitude to make 
them part of the permanent record. Was this farsightedness? The preservation of these 
strange, useless drawings speaks to the tenacity and the neuroticism of the Chinese 
archival ethic. 
  169 
 
Fig. 2.11 "Giving Gifts" to a ‘rightist’ 
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Chapter 3 
The Anatomy of a Dossier:  
Ritual and Routine in Cadre Examination 
 
The archives of Neixiang County, a sparsely populated, agricultural corner of Henan 
province, hold an exceptionally well-preserved set of personnel files from the county 
school district. The dossiers, produced in the course of cadre examination and the Sufan 
campaign in the 1950s, account for the life histories of several primary school teachers 
in exacting detail.244 Over dozens of painstakingly researched pages, representing years 
of investigative and archival work, these schoolteachers are positioned as biographical 
subjects and imbricated in the greater history of the Communist revolution. What did 
the creation of these dossiers entail, and what project did their fashioning serve? 
The Neixiang dossiers represent the early efforts of the CCP to expand the scope 
of the dossier from an institution of internal party records to a broadly dispersed system 
of files encompassing wide segments of Chinese society. The extension of the dossier to 
the greater population coincided with a broadening of the technical definition of the 
‘cadre,’ with a corresponding enlargement of internal routines of personnel 
surveillance. Amid socialist state-building in the decade of the 1950s, the technical 
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definition of the cadre grew to also include civilian professionals who were not 
bureaucrats in the traditional sense, but nonetheless employees of the state. These 
newest state cadres included teachers, railwaymen, sanitation managers, central 
archivists, journalists, publishers, technicians in key industries, among others. As a 
corollary of their official statuses, these professions were subjected to ‘cadre 
examination’ according to the same principles as those used to vet party officials. This 
1950 wave of examinations, interwoven with the political campaigns of the time, 
extended the research agenda of the dossier system to new fields of social concern. 
The main body of this chapter is a close reading of a dossier file belonging to a 
primary school teacher named Q-- Shu.245 Born to a landlord family in Henan with deep 
ties to the former Nationalist government, Q-- Shu sought to overcome his bad class 
background by proving his ideological commitment and revolutionary contributions. In 
the course of his examination, certain elements of his self-presented history faced 
skepticism from his work unit leaders and the Public Security Bureau. The progress of 
the case offers a ground-level view of how the investigative process of cadre 
examination unfolded, as well as the complicity of paper records in a larger disciplinary 
project. 
The examinations of the 1950s doubled as a form transitional justice for 
unexamined historical crimes. Dossier files were not merely byproduct of investigation; 
the forms, statements, and evidence they provided were the raw material and 
infrastructure that rendered investigative routines possible. In its work to transcribe the 
complexity of individual historical experience, the dossier undoubtedly carried archival 
ambitions. It was hoped that these dossiers would amount to a definitive record that 
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would forever remember the revolutionary past, serving as references and informers in 
subsequent political campaigns. 
The technique of refashioning a political subject as text drew upon acts of 
narrative and editorial labor. The dossier compiled its political microhistories by 
piecing together heterogeneous sources. Polyphonic at its foundation, the dossier 
synthesized the work of multiple voices, interests, and temporalities. After the dossier 
law of 1956 (issued as the ‘Temporary Regulations on Cadre Personnel Files’), each of 
the main components of a dossier—registration, autobiography, evaluation, and 
investigation—was installed within its own historically-coherent genre. Those different 
elements of the dossier variously employed language and exposition imitative of 
memoir, literature, ethnography and reportage, among other ways of writing. 
Moreover, only a portion of a dossier’s contents were the words of a bureaucrat, whose 
primary responsibility was instead to organize the disparate texts into a coherent 
historical exhibit. Even in routine cases, the bulk of the dossier’s material consisted of 
scraps submitted by subjects, accusers, witnesses, and clerks to acknowledge and satisfy 
requests for evidence. Administrators charged with piecing together these odd-fitting 
texts became editors of historical esoterica. 
But as an instrument of political discipline, the efficacy of the dossier system 
pivoted on in its ability to co-opt Chinese subjects in their own surveillance. The case of 
Q-- Shu discussed in this chapter demonstrates this clearly—critical perspectives we 
encounter in the dossier are often those of the investigated, who are called upon in 
repeated self-evaluations, self-criticisms, and autobiographies to testify for and against 
themselves. This feature is representative of broader trends in political investigation 
and surveillance in Maoist China, which was counterintuitively dependent upon 
ordinary Chinese citizens for the ‘self-reporting’ of their own alleged transgressions. 
Autobiographical writing is of great interest to historians for the manner in which it 
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reveals the voices of marginal historical actors.246 But as Q-- Shu was aware, writing 
about the self was a practice fraught with peril—all submissions were pored over by 
Public Security Bureau (PSB) investigators for possible leads or discrepancies, making 
the written word of Chinese citizens a primary instrument of their discipline. Q-- Shu 
and his contemporaries were not merely narrators of their own experience, but agents 
in the administrative process. 
In closing, I evaluate the mobilization of autobiographical writing in Chinese 
dossiers in relation to a rich scholarly literature on identity formation and self-
fashioning in the Soviet Union. Collectively, this body of literature reframes 
autobiographical writing as a ‘productive practice’ in which Soviet subjects contested 
and constituted their status before the state. I seek to address why bureaucrats in the 
Chinese context seemed agnostic to the possibilities of ‘subject formation,’ and instead 
consumed themselves with producing facts, or as Mao alleged, “narrow empiricism.” 
This empiricist tendency raises further questions regarding the culture of the Chinese 
bureaucracy and how bureaucratic values informed approaches to file-making and 
paperwork. But even if leveraged to different ends, the Maoist dossier shares a formula 
with its Soviet counterpart insofar as both were permeated by performance—subjects 
performed for their interrogators, rank-and-file bureaucrats for their superiors, and 
citizens for other citizens. By establishing these scripted practices as ubiquitous rituals 
                                               
246 Michael Schoenhals has written extensively on the uses and limitations of 
autobiographical writing as a historical source. Meanwhile, Yang Kuisong’s contribution 
to the Brown and Johnson edited volume show demonstrates the potential of these 
sources to microhistories of the Mao era. Michael Schoenhals, “自传”材料与我的中国当代
史研究,” Reading in China 中华读书报 10 (2013). Also Yang Kuisong, “How a Bad Element 
was Made” in Brown and Johnson, Maoism At the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of 
High Socialism. 
  174 
of everyday life, the dossier produced the conditions for far-reaching political acts. 
 
The Dossier of Q-- Shu 
Q-- Shu, a 40 year-old Neixiang native, was employed by the Handan Municipal 
government as a primary school teacher when he was examined in 1956. His primary 
file 正件 consists of sixteen mostly handwritten pages, prefaced by a table of contents 
and enclosed in a standard archival jacket. Despite the relative brevity of the file, the 
dossier is complete according to the 1956 dossier law (’Temporary Regulations on 
Cadre Personnel Files”). Inside are four documents: 1) Cadre Background Form; 2) 
Cadre Evaluation; 3) Autobiography; and 4) Investigation Report. These documents 
were produced over the course of a two year-long process of examination and kept as a 
permanent record in accordance with state regulations issued in 1953-54.247 The four 
documents correspond to the main elements of an examination as it was practiced in the 
early years of the PRC: 1) initial registration; 2) ‘criticism/self-criticism’; 3) self-reported 
personal history; and 4) field investigation by the PSB. The lack of a formal ‘verdict’ 结
论 in the dossier indicates that Q-- Shu’s case was uncontroversial by 1950s standards. 
Analysis of Q--’s dossier allows a reconstruction of the methods, routines, and 
implements used in the determination of his political standing. 
The main facts of Q-- Shu’s personal history, as he provided in his dossier 
materials, were as follows. Q-- Shu was born in 1916 in Neixiang County, one of 12 
children. His father, Q-- Zhen, was a gentry landlord who rented out land to tenant 
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farmers. Being from a family of means, Q-- Shu was literate and enjoyed formal 
schooling. He was completing a degree in education while apprenticing as a lower 
school principal at the outset of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).  
Q--’s whereabouts and allegiances during the war years were extremely 
convoluted. By his own account, he joined the Communist underground as a mid-level 
operative in the Funiu Mountain 伏牛山 region of southwest Henan. However, a 
Nationalist crackdown in 1942-43 forced his unit to disband, and Q-- fled to briefly join 
his second brother in Chongqing. After returning to eastern China, he rejoined the 
Communist underground in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), helping to smuggle 
cash and opium into Kaifeng to fund subversive operations. Before liberation, he left the 
Communist forces a second time and settled in Handan with his second wife and six 
children. In 1956, when he underwent examination, he was employed as a primary 
schoolteacher at the Handan Normal University Primary School, earning a generous 
teachers salary of 34.4 yuan a month.248 
If Q-- Shu’s activities in the revolutionary period were difficult to pinpoint, that 
ambiguity was commonplace among his demographic cohort of military-age 
individuals. Despite the official presentation of cadre examination and dossier work as 
processes of empirical fact-finding, the organic complexity of social life tested the limits 
of bureaucratic knowledge. The pages of Q-- Shu’s dossier contained glimpses of a life 
tossed by uncertainty, misfortune, and randomness. During the war years, he lived in 
almost a dozen different locations across Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Shanxi, and Sichuan 
provinces. Trained as a schoolteacher, Q--’s various occupations and roles from 1931 to 
1950 included store clerk, printer, moneylender, opium smuggler, and self-trained 
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herbalist. His political loyalties wavered between his left-leaning professional circle, 
and his family’s ties to the ruling KMT.  
The creases around Q--’s life story provoked questions that the 1950s wave of 
examinations tended to dwell upon. Despite Q--’s revolutionary credentials, he had 
never been a formal member of the Party, nor did he hold documentation attesting to 
his revolutionary service. Prior to the founding of the People’s Republic, party 
authorities had shown limited interest in the political backgrounds of persons on the 
fringes of the Communist Party. However after 1949, when previously marginal 
operatives such as Q-- Shu were officially recruited into the government sector, their 
ideological loyalty became cause for suspicion. Q-- was one of several million state 
employees to be ‘examined’ for the first time in the 1950s. ‘Cadre examination’ was in 
essence, a deferred background check to resolve the political questions that hovered 
over the newest professional employees of the state. 
The 1950s wave of ‘cadre examinations’ echoed ‘cadre screening’ in Yan’an, as 
well as the larger political cycle in which every instance of expansion was followed by 
political consolidation. It should be pointed out that while what I treat as ‘cadre 
examination’ and ‘cadre screening’ are two distinct historical episodes, both take the 
same name in the Chinese language, ganbu shencha 干部审查. The Chinese use of the one 
title for the two initiatives is not in itself indicative of sameness. Rather, it largely shows 
that like analogous terms of ‘rectification’ 整风, ‘thought reform’ 思想改造, or ‘turning 
over’ 翻身, the success of cadre screening had made 审干 a political brand. These loose 
monikers were endlessly recycled in various campaigns throughout the Mao era. 
While I would argue that ‘examination’ (1953) and ‘screening’ (1940) diverge in 
important terms of context, scope and methodology, there is no doubt that the cadre 
examinations of the 1950s drew upon inspiration from Yan’an. Similar to the 
circumstances of Yan’an, cadre examination was a delayed reaction to a massive influx 
of new personnel into the officially demarcated sphere of the state. However, as the 
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meaning of a ‘cadre’ had significantly changed since the base areas, the object and 
approach to examination had necessarily shifted as well. For much of the 1940s, it could 
be said that the majority of state cadres—understood to denote an employee of the state 
at clerical level and above, were also members of the Communist Party.249 In key 
government agencies, ‘party member’ 党员 and ‘cadre’ 干部 could be used quite 
interchangeably, or referred to as a group, as in ‘party cadres’ 党政干部. Moreover, 
since CCP membership was a de facto prerequisite for holding office, the party 
application process served as an initial round of political vetting for all persons with 
higher ambitions. 
By the 1940s and increasingly after liberation, the respective boundaries of ‘party 
member’ and ‘cadre’ begin to diverge dramatically. In graduating from a guerrilla 
resistance movement to the sovereign authority of a nation of 541 million, vast numbers 
of non-party cadres were recruited into the public sector.250 In the first three years of the 
PRC, the cadre ranks expanded fourfold from top to bottom; the number of cadres at 
the central level alone expanded from 720,000 to 3,310,000 in that same timeframe.251 
Though party members continued to retain the most important posts throughout the 
government bureaucracy, non-Party members staffed the majority of official 
positions.252 
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However, state expansion tells only a portion of the larger story. As the party-
state established new civil institutions to meet the needs of administration, its 
workforce grew to encompass categories of persons who were not traditional 
government bureaucrats, but rather professionals employed in the public sector as 
teachers, journalists, policemen, factory managers, among other lines of work.253 As a 
result, the term ‘cadre’ also experienced a slippage in meaning—or title inflation—as 
many professional employees from these aforementioned groups came to be referred to 
as ‘cadres.’254 Our subject, Q-- Shu, an elementary school teacher, joined the cadre ranks 
in this way. To an increasing extent as the nationalization of private enterprise and 
agricultural collectivization advanced through the 1950s, the newest ‘cadres’ of the state 
were often much closer in status to ordinary civilians than their base area 
predecessors.255 
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Cadre Examination 
Into the 1950s, the suddenness of the CCP’s political takeover combined with the 
immense needs of administration resulted in a chronic shortage of qualified cadres to 
staff government jobs. Precisely because so many of these new cadre positions were not 
regarded as positions of political authority, the Party responded to personnel 
constraints by relaxing its conventionally strict ideological screening in filling new 
posts. At the local levels, the need for qualified personnel in key agencies promoted a 
policy of recruiting candidates with professional credentials, while temporarily turning 
a blind eye to questions of political history. For a time, pragmatic policy-making and 
individual qualifications outweighed ideological purity. During this transitional period, 
many cadres of the former Nationalist regime retained in their posts in government 
service, sometimes along with their entire departments.256 
The policy of openness lasted only until 1953, when the Party Center announced 
a coordinated initiative of ‘cadre examination.’ In November of that year, the Central 
Organization Department (now headed by An Ziwen) issued new regulations to 
sharply tighten personnel policy nationwide. The “Resolution of the Party Center on 
Cadre Examination” echoed the conspiracist rhetoric of the counter-subversion 
campaigns in 1940s Yan’an. Brushing aside concerns of bureaucratic standardization 
and professional ability, the resolution sounded a familiar alarm about lax security and 
enemy infiltration. Specifically, the resolution stated that among the newest cohort of 
cadres, there existed “significant numbers” of “unknown elements” and persons of 
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“uncertain background.” The Party Center was certain that countless “counter-
revolutionaries had hidden themselves within the ranks.”257 
In response to this perceived threat, the COD mandated a “one-time, systematic 
examination of all cadres nationwide” in order to “promote knowledge of the cadres 
and rapid socialist development” within two to three years.258 Noting that in the past, 
staffing policy mistakenly emphasized “professional ability” in job candidates only to 
subsequently uncover serious political problems, this examination would include both 
new inquiries as well as a comprehensive review of all existing materials. As laid out in 
the COD resolution, the main tasks of this work were to: 1) “bring together and collect 
all the existing materials related to cadres;” 2) “intensify research and investigation;” 
and 3) “put these materials under close analysis and to pass clear conclusions.” 
With the sanction of the nation’s highest authority, the program of cadre 
examination was thus set in motion. But we might pause to consider how the 
subsequent implementation of the initiative reveals the principal-agent problem 
intrinsic to PRC central planning. As a constraint of the PRC’s vastly expanded political 
geography, it would take years for cadre examination to work its way through the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Though announced as a central priority, the actual 
implementation of cadre examination took place in the provinces as a local effort, 
involving significant interventions by lower authorities to interpret and translate high-
level directives. Examinations were envisioned by COD elites as solemn security 
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screenings, but the bulk of their work was shouldered by local work units, or more 
precisely, small groups of ‘politically reliable’ educators, office staff, and factory 
workers examining their own colleagues.259 This observation fits the grain of recent 
scholarly accounts that underline the ‘decentralization’ of central planning in the early 
People’s Republic. The devolution of examination to the lower levels left local 
bureaucrats with considerable authority to adapt broadly articulated central 
objectives.260 
To use the rollout of cadre examination in Jiangxi as an example, the COD 
provided the Jiangxi Provincial Committee with overarching political objectives and 
tapped relevant investigative organs—the Public Security Bureau, the courts, and the 
Procuracy—with support responsibilities. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee then 
ordered the formation of study groups to research best practices and designated ten 
‘model units’ 试点单位 to run pilot examination programs. The lessons from this 
preliminary testing were collected and summarized in a top-secret “Cadre Examination 
Reference Manual,” which for comparison contains far more concrete and useful 
guidance on examination methods than central-level guidelines.261 Based on this 
framework, the provincial Organization Department reissued all superior resolutions 
along with supplemental instructions to their own prefectural subcommittees, who 
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repeated the process downward. Because instructions were expanded at each 
administrative level, the ideologically capacious slogans of the central resolution 
became more targeted, managerial and concrete as they cascaded down the 
bureaucratic ladder.  
Dispersed throughout the different levels and branches of the bureaucracy, each 
process of cadre examination was embedded within the basic institution of the ‘work 
unit’ 单位.262 There, the realization of high-level objectives was mediated by the 
micropolitics of the small group and the culture of the office. In each work unit, the 
head of the work unit supervised an ’examination small group’ 审查小组, a core of 
politically reliable staff who were tasked with investigating the rank-and-file of the 
unit.263 The small group began its work by collecting Cadre Background Forms and 
Cadre Autobiographies from all employees. They read the materials closely and then 
met to discuss potential problems in each cadre’s submitted materials. At some point, a 
copy of these materials would be passed on to the local Public Security organ to verify 
the information disclosed. The examination small group then proceeded to call the 
examinees for a comprehensive in-person evaluation. After the meeting, the conclusions 
of the committee would be transcribed onto a Cadre Evaluation Form, to be sealed 
along with the cadre’s background materials in their classified personnel dossier. 
Subjects were not permitted to access the contents of their own file, but the dossier 
                                               
262 For a full discussion of the role of the work unit in China, see Victor Shaw, Social Control 
in China : A Study of Chinese Work Units (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). 
263 The head of the work unit was examined by screeners in the bureaucratic level 
immediately above. 
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would transfer with the cadre when taking up a new appointment, generally delivered 
ahead by secure military post.264  
At any point in the process, the revelation of ‘political historical issues’ 政治历史
问题 could trigger the referral of the case to specialized disciplinary bodies—such as a 
Sufan committee—for a closed-door investigation of political crimes. Escalation in this 
fashion was very bad news for the examinee. It was the difference between say, having 
one’s political commitment questioned by a school principal before a group of senior 
colleagues, versus fielding those same questions from an experienced interrogator from 
the Public Security Bureau with a dossier full of secret evidence. Escalation placed the 
case on a completely separate extrajudicial track. A higher political authority would 
either review the case or direct a new investigation, culminating in a formal historical 
‘verdict’ on the nature and category of the offense—with punishments ranging from 
surveillance and control 管制, imprisonment 关押, to execution 杀.265 
All cases and verdicts, wherever they arose, were always subject to review. Not 
only were decisions revised as new evidence came to light, but the mobilization of new 
political campaigns always included the reexamination of existing dossier materials.266 
The tightening of the party line tended to be the primary force behind the 
administrative review of old cases ‘复查.’ For this reason, administrators tasked with 
collecting dossier materials were likely to err on the side of caution, archiving 
                                               
264 Deng claims that individuals without political problems were permitted to hand-deliver 
their sealed dossier to their new work unit, but this seems to have been characteristic of 
the Yan’an years, and far less common after liberation. Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事
档案学, 180; Doak Barnett, “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in 
the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy,” The China Quarterly (1966), 10. 
265 Yang, “Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,” 102. 
266 Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 185. 
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seemingly trivial or unrelated evidence in the event that it would prove useful under 
different political conditions. Guidelines issued in 1955 stated, “all materials that can 
verify the cadre’s background, political character, professional competency, or personal 
information of long-term value, should all be filed in the dossier.” (emphasis added).267 
 
Background Form 
When reviewing dossier materials, first work to gain a general idea of the 
individual’s background, academic history, family history, social history, 
and any issues existing in his files. Pick a more complete registration form, 
autobiography, and investigation reports from the Three-Antis/Zhenfan 
campaigns, and examine them thoroughly. Compare them to other 
materials in the file, and make note of any conflicts in a brief. Based on this 
brief, reexamine everything again to obtain additional information. If 
necessary, conduct interviews, request supplemental materials by post or 
visit, and clear up the questions that arise one by one. All of these steps are 
taken to ensure a more accurate determination of political categories.268 
—Cadre Examination Reference Handbook 
The contents of Q-- Shu’s dossier illustrates how the process of cadre 
examination unfolded in practice. Routine cases such as Q-- Shu’s followed an 
alternating sequence of disclosure and verification. The initial disclosure was the 
submission of a Cadre Background Form. Q-- Shu completed one such form for his 
employer, the Handan University Elementary School, in 1956. This mandatory Cadre 
Background Form prefaced the main contents of the dossier as a biographical summary. 
                                               
267 “Temporary Regulations on the Management of Cadre Personnel Files of the Party 
Committee of ---City” 中共---市委组织部关于干部档案管理制度的暂时规定 in Deng, 
Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 201. 
268 Jiangxi Provincial Committee Office of Cadre Examination, Cadre Examination Reference 
Handbook 审干工作参考手册, 14. 
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Many localities, including Handan, required subjects to fill out a new Background Form 
each year under the assumption that personal history was also liable to change. With its 
tripartite structure—a header for identifying information, a political questionnaire, and 
a professional record of service—the document approximated a political and 
professional vitae for cadres. 
Issued by the Organization Department of the Handan Municipal Committee, 
the form filled by Q-- Shu was emblematic of a post-liberation shift toward 
professionalization in personnel file work. The Handan Form replaced the block printed 
questionnaires used in the base areas during the 1940s.269 This revamped edition was 
machine printed with grid lines and typeset on higher-quality acid-free paper. In 
contrast to older registration forms, some of which included some 40 to 80 short answer 
questions sprawled over multiple pages, the new format featured only ten questions 
with grid fields for responses. The new format internalized a shift in emphasis in 
personnel investigation from analyzing persons for general qualities—such as ‘virtue’ 
and ‘ability’—toward a ‘fill-in-the-blank’ approach, or fitting information to preexisting 
fields. The streamlined template allowed the entire Handan Cadre Background Form to 
be printed on a single folded sheet. 
                                               
269 By point of contrast, in Chapter 1 on Yan’an dossiers, I detailed the two of the classic 
instruments of party registration used in the Communist base areas during the 1940s: the 
‘Party Cadre Registration Form’ 政权干部登记表 and the ‘Personal History Form’ 履历表. 
Past approaches had sought a “holistic evaluation” of a person, from intimate details of 
personal relationships to opinions on current events. 
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Fig. 3.1 Cadre Background Form 
On its face, the updated Cadre Background Form formalized the parameters for 
queries and responses, with less room given to descriptive reporting. But the result was 
a biographical summary that collected scattered points of highly specific information 
from Q-- Shu’s life history. For instance, a question on family relationships revealed that 
Q--’s landlord father owned an 11-acre tract of land which he rented out to tenant 
farmers, bringing in an annual harvest of 3000 lbs. of wheat. On the topic of service, Q-- 
responded that he had first joined the Party underground as a student in 1938, listing 
his positions as small group leader and branch secretary. In response to a question 
about Party affiliation, Q-- Shu claimed that after falling ill in 1948, he “lost touch with 
the party” and returned home to convalesce. As Q-- would elaborate in his 
Autobiography, he and his wife suffered from a respiratory illness until Q-- took it 
upon himself to “master” the Materia Medica 本草纲目, a traditional Chinese medical 
classic, which he used to cure himself. His wife was not as fortunate, and passed away. 
This setback did not prevent Q-- from claiming the skills of a healer, which he identified 
in his evaluation as one of his “strengths” as a schoolteacher.  
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Despite its formal pretenses, Q--’s Cadre Background Form was an incomplete 
record of limited informational quality. This low production value was a feature of the 
design and issue of the form itself rather than any failure on the part of the respondent. 
Even to an experienced eye, the questions on the Handan Cadre Background form were 
profoundly vague. The form lacked guidance in the way of written instructions or 
definitions of key terms. All answer fields were open-ended, leaving respondents like 
Q-- Shu to not only interpret questions according to their own prior knowledge, but to 
also supply their own descriptors for important categories such as “class status” or 
“education.” 
Some items on the form appeared to serve no discernible purpose. One 
representative example was the question regarding “Physical Condition” 身体健康状况. 
The answer field for this prompt only allowed for a one- or two-character response, but 
lacked any specification as to what a valid response might entail—a number, a quality, 
perhaps a description? Q-- Shu opted for the two-word character for “Good” 良好. As it 
turns out, everyone who filled out ‘Physical Condition’ on a Cadre Background Form in 
this period also wrote “Good.” I have found no examples of a subject putting down 
something other, nor are there any cases in which a cadre claimed ‘Good,’ and was later 
told otherwise. In this case, the form posed a non-question to receive a non-answer. 
’Physical Condition’ was one of several purely perfunctory queries that sought no real 
information, signifying only the formality of the form itself.270 
                                               
270 A more charitable reading of the question that we may entertain is that it was meant to 
gauge a candidates readiness to take up a state post. In that sense, there is a performative 
aspect—in the sense of a script that does something rather than means something—to both 
question and reply. A response of “good” assents to the Party’s right to know about one’s 
health, and confirms preparedness for the rigors of the position. 
  188 
The haphazard approach of the Cadre Background Form may be partly 
explained by its role in the overall scheme of cadre examination. Background forms 
were neither intended to be exhaustive nor definitive, but simply perform as an initial 
filter. Their immediate purpose was to aid administrators in flagging serious problems 
for further scrutiny and referral to the security services. But on a functional level, the 
Cadre Background Form was also a site of ideological education, in which Chinese 
subjects encountered new sociopolitical categories as constructs of compelling force. In 
affixing these labels to Chinese subjects, the dossier system reproduced knowledge and 
misunderstandings around those categories that existed among bureaucrats themselves. 
One instance of a slippage in terms concerned the matter of Q-- Shu’s ‘class 
status.’ According to the information provided by Q-- Shu, his father owned a three-
room house on land tilled entirely by tenant farmers, retaining six small hills for 
silkworm-cultivating mulberry trees. These facts fit the elder Q-- to the definition of a 
landlord. According to the pre-1949 approach to determining class labels, the elder Q--’s 
status made Q-- Shu and all of his siblings members of the landlord class as well.271 In 
1950 however, the Party Center issued a revised taxonomy of class categories that 
appeared to sever the ‘hereditary’ connection between paternal and individual 
identities. Local bureaucrats were vexed by the new scheme, which introduced a slew 
of new “class descriptors” for individuals based on specific professions, such as 
                                               
271 The assumed heritability of class status was a convention that predated liberation—in the 
1940s, whenever the Red Army gained control over a village, the army proceeded to 
classify all members of a family according to class status of the male head of household. 
Walder, China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed, 109. 
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“transport worker” or “petty bourgeois—office employee,” intermingled with a few 
non-economic categories, such as “idler.”272  
The 1956 Handan Cadre Background Form reflected this moment of confusion 
with an idiosyncratic exception. In the sole explanatory note for filling out class status, 
the form instructed: “Fill according to your pre-revolutionary class status,” but then 
added, “If you were a student when joining the revolution, “you may write the 
characters ‘student’ instead.” Here, the officers of the Handan Municipal Organization 
Department had mangled the new class schedule through the design of a form, creating 
an exception through a non-standard class category.273 In this instance, what appears to 
have happened is that the Organization Department of Handan, in drawing up their 
Cadre Background Form for 1956, copied features of a registration form used in the base 
areas before liberation, a period when many of the newest revolutionaries were 
students coming from the white areas. 
                                               
272 David Goodman, Class in Contemporary China (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 14-15. 
273 Lynn White, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 10. 
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Fig. 3.2 Shanghai, Design of Cadre Registration Form274 
Despite having a landlord father, and being a 40 year-old elementary 
schoolteacher earning a comfortable state salary, Q-- duly claimed “student” status. 
During this crucial phase of cadre examination, Q-- erased a serious blemish from his 
record by taking advantage of what appeared to be an administrative loophole. 
Such errors in social accounting—whether benign or detrimental to ordinary 
citizens—were commonplace as a result of the decentralized administration of the 
dossier system. Unlike in the Soviet Union, were personnel forms had numbered codes 
and were intended for use across different jurisdictions, Chinese provincial level 
governments provided only basic templates, leaving local authorities to design and 
print official forms to their own preferred specifications. This saved the central 
government from the expense and logistical challenge of coordinating the distribution 
of millions of paper templates; but the result was that each administrative locality was 
                                               
274 SMA B-59-62-12 
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required to be a self-sufficient fiefdom in the production of paperwork. The resulting 
forms were hand-drafted by local administrators, who devised the instructions, the 
questions, and the design according to their own preferences.275 The division of labor 
reinforced a theme of dossier work during the Mao era—local interpretation of central 
templates created diversity in practices and outcomes. 
 
Evaluation 
The method of evaluation interview is an important part of the 
investigation and research process in cadre examination. For person being 
interviewed, it is also a primary means of ideological education…When 
conducting the evaluation interview, the examiner should adopt an attitude 
that is serious, sincere, compassionate, patient, approachable…Make it 
clear that the evaluation interview is to confirm understanding of the 
individual for the purpose of fully utilizing their strengths…During the 
interview, listen more, speak less, and think critically. Take notes while 
listening, analyzing at the same time, flag in notes points of contradiction, 
write down details of names, places, occupations precisely word for word. 
Then ask questions. In general, do not interrupt while the individual is 
speaking, express no opinion about the truth or falsehood, completeness or 
incompleteness of the statement being made.276 
—Cadre Examination Reference Handbook 
Q-- Shu’s main dossier holds records for his evaluations from the years 1956 and 
1957, conducted by his superiors at the Handan Normal University Primary School. By 
mandate, all cadres were evaluated annually as part of a routine performance review.277 
                                               
275 Barnett and Vogel, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, 74-75.  
276 Jiangxi Provincial Committee Office of Cadre Examination, Cadre Examination Reference 
Handbook 审干工作参考手册, 23. 
277 Campaign initiatives such as Sufan occasionally supplemented this routine with 
additional examinations of political behavior and background. Barnett and Vogel, Cadres, 
Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, 50-51. 
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In a typical process of evaluation, each cadre submitted an initial self-evaluation to the 
examination small group. After reviewing the materials, the small group called the 
subject in for a meeting in which leadership pointed out problems in the cadre’s 
materials and overall conduct. The subject was expected to listen diligently to the 
group’s critique and respond with a thorough self-criticism. The main discussion points 
of the in-person assessment yielded a ‘Cadre Evaluation Form’ 干部鉴定表 to be filed in 
the subjects’ dossier.  
A standard Evaluation Form offered minimal guidance or instruction on how to 
fill out the respondent’s portion, which was simply a bland field labeled, ’self-
evaluation‘ 自我检查 (or 个人检查). Evidently, it was the respondent’s duty to intuit 
what items of information were germane to the evaluation and how to approach them. 
However, Q--’s 1956 自我检查 lacked even the benefit of an official Evaluation Form to 
work with—his self-evaluation was instead written directly on a sheet of unlined, loose 
leaf paper.278 Left to his own devices, Q-- divided his 1956 self-evaluation into three 
headings:‘Thought’ 思想, ‘Work’ 工作, and ‘Learning’ 学习. In each section, Q-- listed a 
positive observation on his performance, followed by a negative one. Under “Work” Q-
- commented: 
Strengths: With regard to work, I am more proactive and responsible than I 
used to be. Previously, I would only take on tasks that were assigned to me, 
and seldom took initiative. Now, whenever I believe that doing something 
would benefit the people, I simply go do it. In teaching, I use any means of 
instruction that will improve the children’s comprehension. Also, I am able 
to concoct health remedies for the children when they experience health 
issues. I have good relations with leadership. 
 
                                               
278 This may indicate that it was a hand-copied duplicate of an original form, or simply that 
the Handan School System failed to produce sufficient copies of the official template that 
year. The handwriting looks to be Q--’s. 
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Weaknesses: I often procrastinate when doing my work. I often put off 
grading student homework assignments to once every two to three weeks. I 
am not thorough in planning my lessons, my lectures are overly simplistic, 
and I often gloss over matters. Overall, I am quite careless. 
Q--’s first self-evaluation was typical for the genre, using specific examples that 
he extrapolated into personal and professional qualities. In each case, the qualities he 
evokes are quotidian in the most benign sense. His self-professed strength in work—his 
spirit of public service—was a classroom readaptation of the slogan, “Serve the People” 
为人民服务. On weaknesses, Q-- took up the most familiar peccadillos of the profession, 
knowing he was unlikely to be faulted by a group of teachers for being late in returning 
papers. Some of his self-observations even contradicted one another: in one moment, he 
indicated his willingness to improve his teaching by any possible means, in the next he 
admitted to indifference and lack of planning in his lessons. 
Q--’s self-evaluation reflects some of the homegrown tendencies of mid-1950s 
Cadre Evaluation Forms. Through the related initiatives of cadre examination and the 
1956 dossier law, the Party Center had broadly outlined processes of internal 
investigation and archive to address political concerns. However in tasking cadre 
examination to local work units, the objectives of Party leadership were refracted 
through the culture of the particular workplace. At actual sites of cadre examination, 
examiners and examinees were not trained to view ‘political historical problems’ 
through the same lens as PSB officers. Q--’s evaluation leaves the impression of 
ideology deflated by the everyday concerns of teaching, lesson-planning, and student 
health. 
Q--’s dossier also holds a second Evaluation Form for the following year of 1957. 
Compared with the previous evaluation, the 1957 version presented content along 
similar lines, albeit in a different format. The 1956 self-evaluation referred to above was 
completed on an ordinary sheet of loose-leaf paper without any printed objects to 
designate it as an official document. In contrast, Q--’s 1957 Evaluation Form comes in 
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the standard format of a biao 表, or “form.” Similar to the Cadre Background Form that 
it follows, the 1957 Evaluation Form is a double-sided printed sheet, with fixed 
question-and-answer-fields locked between neat grid lines. “Hebei Handan City 
Educational Employee Evaluation Form” appears in a bold printed header above the 
rest of the document. A series of fields for entering biographical information begins the 
document, while areas of suggested size are partitioned off for individual self-
evaluation and comment by ascending levels of bureaucratic review—small group, 
work unit chief, and municipal government. 
 
Fig. 3.3 Left: 1956 Self-Evaluation; Right: 1957 Evaluation Form (full) 
These features of the biao as a form might be distinguished from a shu 书, or 
document, as used in earlier historical eras of personnel administration. An important 
distinction is that in the late imperial context, most personnel evaluations, along with 
most bureaucratic documents, took an epistolary format. Lettered conventions for 
addressee and sender enclosed a main body in the form of a narrative report. These 
types of narrative evaluations, often known as 鉴定书, continued to be used at least up 
until the Yan’an period (as the case study in Chapter 1 attests). 
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Following liberation, the routinization of the personnel file system witnessed the 
gradual replacement of epistolary evaluations (shu) by form templates (biao). Long-
winded narrative reports were largely phased out in favor of predefined categories that 
appeared to subject the evaluation process to the interests of efficiency. This 
proliferation of biao was hardly specific to personnel forms, and can be read as a greater 
process of bureaucratization that informed the documentation of persons in other areas 
such as schools, neighborhood associations, and prisons. It bears noting that Evaluation 
Forms as characterized by grid layouts, question and answer fields, and predefined 
labels are not inherently more efficient in capturing information than their narrative 
counterparts. Even compared to the unlined sheet from the year previous, the printed 
1957 form does not so much streamline information as abstract away from it. Its real 
intervention is its use of graphic artifacts to convey technocratic regularity as a visual 
style. 
In the self-evaluation portion of the 1957 form, Q--’s written responses took on a 
more serious register, dropping the first-person pronoun in favor of clipped, assertive 
statements: 
Strengths 
1. Proactive in work, close to leadership 
2. Team worker, timely exchange of ideas with superiors 
3. Committed to class preparation and teaching, highly efficient 
 
Weaknesses 
1. Procrastinates work, not prompt in grading 
2. Occasionally arrogant in attitude 
3. Not attentive to professional and cultural self-cultivation 
4. Closed-minded toward criticism and self-criticism 
5. Lacking in personal hygiene 
Q--’s enumeration of his merits and demerits presents an interesting microcosm 
of cadre assessments. Thematically, his 1957 self-evaluation was a classic performance 
of self-criticism. Once again, Q-- employed the mitigating tactic of contradicting his 
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positive qualities with an immediate critique—hence, he was “proactive” and 
“efficient” while “inattentive” and prone to procrastination. More puzzling was his 
admission to a lack of personal hygiene, particularly given that his evaluation would 
culminate in a discussion between his work unit leaders. What possibilities did Q-- 
foresee in discussing his poor personal hygiene? To take note of the context, the 
acknowledgment of vague, commonplace, personal failings was a safer alternative to 
fulfilling the obligation to self-criticism than citing specific ideological transgressions. 
On the whole, both of Q--’s self-evaluations measured their words to communicate a 
minimum of concrete information. It seems plausible that the topic of Q--’s hygiene fits 
this role as an intimate disclosure in response to the scenario, but one without 
damaging political implications. In fact, among all of his listed weaknesses, only his 
fourth point—“closed-mindedness toward criticism and self-criticism”—was a 
meaningful statement. It revealed Q--’s level of political education, as it reflected 
positively on Q-- to make this admission. Among the many shortcomings an individual 
might disclose in an evaluation, self-criticizing one’s lack of self-criticism was always 
politically correct. 
With Q--’s self-evaluation in hand, the focus shifted to the examination small 
group to guide Q--’s edification. The ideological significance assigned to this task was 
evident in the composition of the examination small group, which consisted of all senior 
leaders and party members of high political reliability. Though only the first layer of 
bureaucracy that Q--’s Evaluation Form would pass, the small group performed the 
heaviest labor. Apart from scrutinizing the submitted materials and administering the 
interview, the small group evaluation established a narrative framework for higher 
levels to adopt. The small group was expected to ensure that all evaluations were 
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personalized, and produce commentary that was “objective, but measured,” and “not 
hogwash, overly flowery, or abstract.”279  
In theory, “criticism/self-criticism” 批评与自我批评 was the governing principle 
in all cadre evaluations. Adapted from the Soviet Union in the 1950s through translated 
texts, criticism/self-criticism was heavily promoted by the CCP ideological apparatus 
as a uniquely “Marxist-Leninist weapon.”280 In the PRC, the translingual discourse of 
criticism/self-criticism was subsequently used to repackage a broad set of existing 
political concepts and practices. But in contrast to the popular mode of ‘self-criticism’—
used in mass campaigns as a punitive confession—the officially sanctioned practice 
referred to an idealized method of critical discussion among party groups. More 
specifically, criticism/self-criticism was a ‘work style’ in which cadres systematically 
critiqued their own performance, and absorbed pointed critique from colleagues in the 
interest of collective improvement.281 
Cadre manuals from the 1950s envisioned criticism/self-criticism as applicable 
within the context of any small group discussion, but especially important to cadre 
evaluations. Examinees were expected to fully accept the critique of the small group 
with the knowledge that evaluation was a temporary suspension of comity designed to 
                                               
279 Deng, Personnel File Studies 人事档案学, 180. 
280 This terminology was first used by Stalin in the 1920s, though Mao subsequently adopted 
his formulation as his own. Joseph Stalin, “Against Vulgarising the Slogan of Self 
Criticism” in Works, Vol. 11 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954); Mao 
Zedong, Quotations from Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). 
281 龍潛 Long Qian, Develop Inner-Party Democracy and Strengthen the Institution of Criticism 
and Self--criticism發展黨內民主和加強批評和自我批評 (Guangzhou: Huanan chubanshe 華
南出版社, 1952), 26-27. 
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help them overcome weaknesses.282 Meanwhile evaluators were instructed to abstain 
from merely ‘hanging labels’ on individuals, and instead make good faith attempts at 
teaching and persuasion. A 1956 cadre manual from Jilin advised: 
In order to help comrades correct errors, when doing criticism and self-
criticism, seek truth from facts – that is, closely analyze the reality of the 
situation and the nature and cause of problems. Emphasize raising the 
ideological understanding of these party members… don’t fixate on 
administrative punishment or rely on simple epithets and punitive 
measures as a crutch for solving problems…There is no need immortalize 
good deeds with song or sweep mistakes under the carpet.283 
In Q-- Shu’s 1957 evaluation, the examination small group focused their attention 
on the subject’s professional behavior. The small group noted several positive qualities 
in Q--’s evaluation that would have been welcome in any academic setting, but also 
made several points of criticism gesturing toward a lack of collegiality. No note was 
made of the subject’s personal hygiene. 
Small Group Assessment of Strengths: 
1. Readily expresses viewpoints… 
3. Utilizes intuition, able to teach lessons extemporaneously with good 
results 
4. Good relationship with students… 
5. Up to date with currents events 
6. Capable in preparing herb medicine, teaching tools 
 
Small Group Assessment of Weaknesses: 
1. Inadequate in criticism and self-criticism 
                                               
282 Lowell Dittmer has likened this ethic to the Weberian principle of “collegiality,” in which 
the shared professional comity of the group members served to rationalize collective 
decision-making. Once individual problems had been dealt with collectively, the group 
would resume its collective identity and cohesion, hence the oft-invoked formula: “unity–
criticism–unity.” Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 272. 
283 金波 Jin Bo, How Grassroots Party Organs Can Initiate Criticism and Self-Criticism當的農村基
層組織怎麼樣開展批評和自我批評 (Jilin: Jilin chubanshe 吉林出版社, 1956), 17. 
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2. Occasionally arrogant attitude in work and learning 
3. Poor planner 
4. Not thoughtful when voicing opinions at work, sometimes causing harm 
to workplace environment. 
The small group evaluation, like Q--’s own self-assessments, was deliberately 
equivocal. Evidently the work unit leaders were pleased with Q--’s teaching abilities, 
but harbored reservations about him as a colleague. Three of the four criticisms lodged 
against him pertained to problems of ‘attitude,’ and viewed cynically, some of his 
‘strengths’ were perhaps backhanded compliments. The last complaint about “causing 
harm to the workplace environment” related to a specific incident from 1953, also 
recounted in the attached Public Security Investigation Report. In that episode, Q-- led a 
group of teachers in criticizing the school principal for poor leadership. It is possible 
that this was only a minor transgression as the principal, surnamed Wang, signed off on 
Q--’s 1957 evaluation.284 
While Q--’s examiners noted him to be arrogant, occasionally negligent, and 
lacking in collegiality, none of these findings were seriously incriminating. The more 
significant result was that the small group had spared the examinee from ideological 
accusations or negative labels. In the calculus of cadre evaluation, being recognized for 
professional conduct was desirable, but the higher priority was avoiding bad politics. 
By limiting their criticism to points of workplace attitude, the small group had, in effect, 
passed Q-- on his intangibles. The resulting evaluation was a mixed one, but the sum 
total was favorable to Q-- by virtue of being non-controversial. 
When viewed in context, what is most striking about the small group comments 
is the extent to which they resembled the subject’s own self-assessments with regard to 
                                               
284 The principal is unnamed in the Investigation Report, so it is not possible to ascertain if 
the target of Q--’s complaints and his head evaluator were in fact the same individual. 
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their talking points, choice of language, and vagueness. This verbal back-and-forth 
reflected how the evaluation process functioned when political issues were not in 
dispute. Cadre evaluation was a highly formalized procedure in the sense that it relied 
on a ritualized exchange of criticism for purposes other than communicating content. 
For his part, Q-- played the role of examinee as expected. Q-- was experienced enough 
to understand that the ends of self-criticism were performative, and hence the preferred 
strategy was to admit to a significant number of minor transgressions while 
maintaining a posture of sincerity. As both sides had fulfilled their obligations to 
criticism/self-criticism, regular work could resume. Principal Wang approved the small 
group comments and stamped Q--’s evaluation with his personal seal. 
 
Autobiography 
When the person first arrives in Yan’an, they must write of their own, 
personal journey. When rectification is underway, they must write about 
their lives. When they are undergoing checking within the organization, 
they must write of their own introspective thoughts. All these three 
components of their autobiography are then compared so as to bring out 
the many contradictions. Some people are a bit scared about getting into 
trouble, so they just write a very general outline, beginning with various 
versions of their personal history, according to the general guidelines. 
These hardly have any contradictions in them. Then if you ask them to 
write in front of you, they will. Then you get them to write at home. It is at 
this point that many contradictions can be found.285 
—Kang Sheng to officers from the Social Affairs Department 
The implementation of cadre examination in the provinces prompted the 
enforcement of a long-ignored requirement that all cadres prepare a full 
‘Autobiography’ 自传 to be filed in the dossier. Though specifications were deliberately 
                                               
285 Kang Sheng quoted in Shi Zhe, qtd. in Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics a History, 118. 
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vague, the Autobiography was capaciously envisioned as a political self-testament, 
covering topics of family background, activities during the revolution, and any other 
information relevant to evaluating one’s political character.286 Among the genres of self-
reporting contained within the dossier, the Autobiography was the most substantive 
and politically complex. 
In 1955, Q-- Shu submitted his Autobiography to his work unit. Over ten densely 
packed, handwritten pages, Q-- proceeded to detail minute points of his personal 
history and ideological self-awakening. While the entire document was a sprawling 
free-form manifesto, it contained one concession to convention.287 The Autobiography 
begins thus: 
Q-- Shu, original name Q-- Jianji; previous alias Q-- Ruiqun; male; 40 years 
old; family origin landlord; class status (left blank); currently residing at 
Handan city, place of origin—Henan, Neixiang county. 
Beginning in the 1950s, this fixed sequence of identifiers—name/s, gender, class 
background/status, current residence, and place of origin—became a biographical 
shorthand for use in legal statements, Party applications, and other official papers. This 
formulaic, third-person introduction is the only indication that Q-- Shu followed 
                                               
286 (1) it must be detailed and specific; (2) the contents must be accurate; (3) it must clearly 
provide the current addresses of all the people who could serve as witnesses for every 
historical period; (4) material must accompany the writing as it is submitted.” Songshan 
Zhang, “Days of Dancing With Wolves: The Confessions of a Special-Case Group 
Leader,” Chinese Law & Government 28, no. 2 (1995), 28. 
287 Q-- Shu’s Autobiography just predates the moment in the mid-1950s when 
Autobiographies joined other dossier genres in migrating to printed templates. 
Subsequent Autobiographies were often preprinted official forms with labels and fields, 
including a large space for the Autobiography itself. 
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guidelines in writing his Autobiography. After this line, the Autobiography switches to 
the first person, and Q-- begins the story of his life:  
I was born in 1916. At the age of twelve I entered the village elementary 
school. During this time, I had three teachers, Qin, Liu, and Yang who were 
underground Communist Party members. Under their tutelage, I grew to 
despise the old society, and started to imagine a free and prosperous new 
society. In 1930, when I was fourteen, my mother passed away. I ceased my 
studies, and at my father’s behest, I went to…apprentice in a general store 
for one year. Then, under the guidance of Manager Qin Xinyi—who can 
verify this information—I read revolutionary pamphlets. This gave me an 
ideological foundation for following the path of revolution. 
 
Fig. 3.4 Autobiography 
Autobiographies constantly threaded the personal and the political. As per his 
official label, Q-- Shu was born to a ‘landlord family’ of some means, but the loss of his 
mother at a young age appears to have thrown the family into turmoil. At several 
points in the narrative, Q-- Shu suggests that it was his father’s decision to pull him out 
of school and send him to work for extra income. Q-- Shu spent many of his teenage 
years working odd jobs far from home to support himself and his 12 siblings. 
In this Autobiography, Q-- Shu’s early bout of personal hardship provides a 
vehicle for his political origin story. The general arc of this story, which runs through 
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the entire account, involved a linked process of distancing himself from his landlord 
father, while coming to understand the ills of the old society through socialist tutelage. 
In a section on “Family Members,” Q-- Shu disclosed that his father had been a low-
level Nationalist official, and “harbored deep-seated feudalist thought.” The younger Q-
- made a point to state that as of Communist liberation in 1949, he had not seen his 
father in over ten years. Meanwhile, Q--’s account of his own youth was a classic tale of 
revolutionary education against trying circumstances. In 1932, Q-- began his secondary 
education at a teacher’s academy which he characterized as a “hot-bed of counter-
revolution.” However, Q-- caught the attention of a group of underground party 
members, who influenced him to “steadfastly travel down the path of socialism.” In 
1943, Q-- apprenticed for a moneychanger in Hubei, supervising print operations. 
Despite the capitalist nature of his workplace, he claims to have secretly read 
progressive publications such as the New China Daily 《新华日报》 passed to him by 
fellow travelers on the printing floor. 
Autobiographies regularly deployed origin stories in this style. For Party 
veterans or the committed ‘activists’ 积极分子 engaged in political campaigns, the 
details of these narratives had been carefully rehearsed through years of self-editing 
and retelling.288 Across these origin stories was a ubiquitous narrative structure in 
which the subject begins in an initial condition of political ignorance and error, but then 
experiences a process of ideological awakening through exposure to the teachings of the 
                                               
288 William Hinton’s Fanshen relates the Communist Party’s efforts to train peasants in North 
China to speak bitterness in public meetings, a ritual firsthand account about the ills of 
the old society, which change with the coming to power of the Party. This effort would 
continue in the 1950s as a method of ideological education and was a frequent topic of 
bureaucratic discussion. See William Hinton, Fanshen : A Documentary of Revolution in a 
Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Also ECNU As0351-028-
031 “诉苦大会发动群众的经验” 
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Communist Party. Heavily inflected with Confucian-Mencian notions of self-cultivation 
through ‘study’ 学习, this trope of self-presentation was a convenient means of 
signaling deference to the Party while simultaneously writing oneself into the history of 
the revolution.289 Party officials sanctioned this literature of self-transformation through 
numerous campaigns; in the mid-1950s when Q-- Shu was writing, state media was 
engaged in promoting a wave of virtuous ‘ideological reflection essays by well-known 
intellectuals, providing models and discussion material in political study sessions.290 
But in contrast to other forms of political discourse—such as the ‘party 
application’ (请入书)—the Autobiography was not a rhetorical exercise so much as a 
historical argument. Among several others, the trope of ideological awakening was 
useful to autobiographical writing because it served to overwrite, explain, and justify 
discomfiting facts about the author. Particularly for the revolutionary generation of the 
1930-40s, the political complexity of the times ensured that nearly everyone carried 
liabilities on their record. Rather than attempt to obfuscate these issues—perilous, but 
not impossible—the Autobiography offered a singular opportunity to attach context 
and meaning to certain facts to mitigate their implications. Authors sought to turn these 
past errors into narrative pivots.  
                                               
289 The synthesis of Communist and Confucian-Mencian ideals is perhaps best reflected in 
Liu Shaoqi’s “How to Be a Good Communist,” in which Liu frequently points to the 
transformative qualities of study. Shao-ch’i Liu and J Mathews, “Self-Cultivation in 
Organization and Discipline,” Chinese Law & Government 5, no. 1 (1972). 
290 ‘Ideological reflection’ essays is my term. These pieces were on the whole more academic 
and exhortative than writings by the general public, but carried the same political 
impetus. The larger campaign of which these essays was part is known as 思想改造, 
sometimes translated as ‘Thought Remolding.” For a representative collection, see: 费孝通 
Fei Xiaotong, ed. Jiu Renwu De Gaizao 旧人物的改造 (Guangzhou: Chunqiu shudian 春秋
书店, 1950). 
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In his political Autobiography, Q-- Shu labored to explain two fateful choices 
that would follow him for the rest of his life. The first called into question Q--’s 
dedication to the communist cause through adversity. As previously noted, Q-- first 
joined the communist underground while a student in the late 1930s. Q-- claimed to 
have held several positions of responsibility, including small group leader and branch 
secretary. In 1942, the Nationalists launched a violent crackdown on underground 
operatives in Hebei, and Q--’s group disbanded. Each operative was instructed to find 
their own way to safety. In his Autobiography, Q-- claimed that he ‘contemplated’ 
joining the main communist forces in Yan’an, but instead when he resurfaced, he was in 
the Nationalist capital of Chongqing under the care of his second brother, who was a 
Nationalist county chief. After liberation in 1954, this second brother would be charged 
and executed as a collaborator once his role in the enemy regime was uncovered. In his 
own defense, Q-- claimed that he tried to “persuade his brother to the revolutionary 
cause” during their time in Chongqing, but second brother was “very corrupt,” and 
“refused to listen.” The brothers parted ways when Q-- accepted one million yuan from 
his brother to return home and start a business with their uncle. Q-- engaged in self-
criticism on this issue, calling both his decision to go to Chongqing and accepting his 
brother’s help as “serious mistakes.” 
A second episode in Q--’s autobiography required him to answer suspicions of 
desertion. Back in Henan in 1945 at the outset of the Chinese civil war, Q-- rejoined the 
communist underground through an officer by the name of Li Junsi 李军泗. In his 
second stint with the underground, Q-- made himself useful as a smuggler—shuttling 
opium, arms and cash between Neixiang and the Nationalist-controlled city of Kaifeng. 
To avoid detection, Q--’s unit practiced “one-way communication,” whereby Q-- would 
receive instructions from his unit leader but had no contact with anyone else in the 
network. This arrangement helped him avoid capture, but made it difficult to verify Q--
’s revolutionary service after the war. Following the liberation of Kaifeng in 1948, Q-- 
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became disillusioned and left the ranks for a second time. In his Autobiography, he 
would explain his departure thus: 
After liberation, my thoughts were gloomy and dejected, and I lost my 
motivation. The main reason was because the Party had turned to 
organization-building, and yet we in the underground Party had yet to be 
officially recognized. My own organizational status was still unclear. At the 
time, I felt that I contributed to the revolution--I had given my whole life to 
revolutionary work. Now I see that I suffered from excessive 
sectarianism…and I was shot through with liberal thinking. Adding to that 
my own illness, and my wife’s illness….I made the mistake of thinking that 
the revolution had succeeded, and therefore I could stop working. If in the 
future, if another occasion arises in which I am asked to give my life for the 
Party, I would gladly do it again. (I told all of this to my friend Ke Guo at 
the time, he can confirm this for me) 
Given the severity of the suspected offense, Q--’s rationalization of his second 
departure was a deft treatment of a thorny issue. His narration is plainspoken and 
assertive, but he directs blame inwardly. Even where Q-- could have placed the issue 
entirely at the feet of the slow-moving bureaucracy, he chose to highlight his own 
ideological problems and express contrition. The context for Q--’s moment of weakness 
is personal and emotional, as Q-- takes special care to describe his anguished state of 
mind at the time. The explanation thereby made an affective appeal upon the reader 
which attached Q--’s own personal struggles to the organizational growing pains of the 
Party. This clever presentation mobilized the Party’s own rhetoric to engage in self-
criticism and navigate a pivotal moment in his political background.  
The foregoing example reinforces the foregrounding of ideological progression 
in the writing of Autobiographies. In this episode and elsewhere, Q-- constantly sought 
to frame his missteps as constructive experiences that deepened his understanding of 
socialism. His Autobiography became a valuable opportunity to account for old deeds 
and sell a story of personal salvation. Q--’s performance demonstrates him to be an able 
raconteur with a sensitivity for political nuance. It is possible that this facility for 
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narrative helped him to coax a more favorable interpretation of his actions from the 
authorities. 
The efficacy of this mode of strategic storytelling is a question for the Public 
Security investigators in the following section. Before turning to the Investigation 
Report however, it is beneficial to resituate Q--’s Autobiography in a broader context. 
To the extent that Q--’s Autobiography reads fluidly, the author benefited from certain 
advantages that other subjects of cadre examination would not have enjoyed. Briefly, Q-
- was highly educated, he had served as an officer in the communist underground, he 
had been exposed to communist ideology and organization over two decades prior. 
Those advantages were evident in both his polished composition, and the lack of 
typographical errors in his writing. The textual and discursive arena of the 
Autobiography represents an area where Q-- was well-positioned to succeed on account 
of his existing cultural capital. 
For most cadres however, writing the Cadre Autobiography was a cause of 
anxiety and trepidation. As revealed by reports from various municipalities throughout 
China, the requirement to the Cadre Autobiography created widespread problems for 
subjects and administrators alike. In neighboring Shanxi for instance, a provincial level 
Organization Department work plan to have all mid-level cadres (ranks 14 to 18) 
complete Autobiographies by the end of 1954 was met with widespread procrastination 
and hand-wringing.291 The lack of cooperation prompted an exasperated follow-up 
memorandum from the Organization Department in which the verbal rebuke of the 
                                               
291 ECNU Aa0357-011-030 “关于彻底完成干部历史自传填写、审查归案工作 Thoroughly 
Complete Cadre Autobiographies, Examinations, and Make Files (1954)“ 
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lower authorities belied its underlying plea for cooperation.292 Other jurisdictions 
attempted to force compliance by threatening holdouts with having to write a self-
criticism (in addition to an Autobiography) for failing to meet the requirement on 
schedule. 
It is not difficult to understand why many cadres regarded the cadre 
Autobiography as such an onerous task. The most obvious reason was that the format 
of the Autobiography, as a type of long-form personal essay writing, was unlike any 
other practice in the day-to-day business of state workers. More intensive, but with less 
guidance than other genres of the dossier, it was unclear to subjects as to how the 
Autobiographies were being utilized, and where criteria for success or failure lay. As a 
consequence, Autobiographies ranged widely from just a page with bullet points, to 
multiple pages with thousands of characters. This lack of explication offered no relief 
when Autobiographies deemed illegible, improperly formatted, or written with the 
wrong type of paper or ink were returned to the subject to be attempted again. 
For a few politically experienced cadres, the vehicle of the Autobiography may 
have offered the possibility of refashioning a historical identity before the state. But to 
most, the Autobiography promised not opportunity, but peril. The vague directive to 
write a historical statement that was ‘complete,’ ‘sincere’ and ‘truthful’ was a high-
stakes endeavor that threatened to go wrong in a number of ways. Where specific 
instructions regarding content did exist, such as this Shanghai notice, they were 
daunting:  
Divide your life history into important periods, and narrate each. For each 
historical period, be sure to ascertain the main points and problems, 
                                               
292 ECNU Aa0357-011-039 “晋南地委组织部 South Shanxi Organization Dept (1955)” 
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connect them to your ideological thought, and analyze everything as a 
whole. For any problem requiring disclosure to the authorities, it is 
important to adopt an attitude of honesty and fidelity—do not hide 
problems, lest it be realized that your disclosure and the truth are at 
odds.293 
The final admonition of the Shanghai notice is perhaps the best expression of the 
hard realities of the Autobiography, and cadre examination more generally. Despite the 
appearance of space for self-fashioning and the negotiation of identity, the bureaucratic 
function of the dossier substantially limited favorable readings. The next portion of Q-- 
Shu’s dossier reveals these limitations in detail. 
Investigation Report
For materials that are sworn to by a witness or verified through records, the 
investigator must immediately organize and substantiate them, noting any 
missing links, and then devising means of continuing the investigation, and 
obtain those materials as well. The investigator may ask the local organs to 
authenticate the materials and their degree of reliability. All investigators 
must keep detailed notes, such that after the investigation they may be 
further consulted as reference materials. The investigator should also 
inventory the files and a brief on their status in a timely fashion. If the 
materials on hand are insufficient or too superficial for the purposes of 
verification, then dispatch another person and reinvestigate—we must 
overcome the unhealthy phenomenon of checking boxes and going through 
the motions when it comes to verifying materials.294 
—Report of the Cadre Examination Committee of Tongzhou 
293 This instruction continued, “For any problem requiring disclosure to the authorities, it is 
important to adopt an attitude of honesty and fidelity, do not hide problems, lest it be 
realized that your disclosure and the truth are at odds.” SMA A23-2-137-10 “关于实行「
市委在半年内全市干部写出自传」的通知 Notice on Implementing the Municipal 
Committee Plan to Complete Cadre Autobiographies within Half a Year” 
294 TZMA 103-2-101 “通州市委审干委员会关于3-11月份审干工作报告及第一、二批审干工作
总结” 
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In the same years that Q-- Shu was undergoing professional evaluation, a 
separate but decisive component of cadre examination was carried out elsewhere 
without his knowledge. The starting point of that parallel process was the 
Autobiography that Q-- submitted to his work unit in 1955. Later that same year, the 
Autobiography was passed on to the Neixiang Public Security Bureau (PSB) which 
processed the document for key information and initiated an investigative follow-up. 
Using places, dates, and witnesses named in Q--’s account, the PSB investigators 
assigned to the case ran Q--’s claims to the ground in a process known as ‘investigation 
and verification’ 调查审核. When this inquiry came to an end in 1956, the investigators 
filed an internal use-only ‘Investigation Report’ 审查材料, along with a set of 
recommendations in Q--’s dossier. 
If the Autobiography grants us access to the voice of the subject, it is in the 
Investigation Report that the bureaucrat gains the last word. In all phases of cadre 
examination, it was explicitly noted that any information provided to the authorities 
was subject to verification. But greater discretion surrounded the precise methods 
investigators were willing to employ in order to settle lingering questions pertaining to 
individuals. PSB investigators were the most meticulous readers of dossier materials. In 
addition to poring over the details of dossier forms for problems and discrepancies, 
they closely tracked individuals named by the subject as associates or alibis. 
Investigators had the option of requesting materials from the PSB files of other localities 
(transmitted through an efficient system of secure post), or going down into the field to 
conduct in-person interviews in the native village of the subject in question. From an 
investigative standpoint, the interviews were regarded as especially crucial, frequently 
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justifying long-distance travel to “run facts to the ground” (lit. ‘摸底’).295 Considering 
what a formidable logistical challenge it must have been to organize face-to-face 
interviews with witnesses scattered about the country by war and revolution, it is 
surprising to learn how often PSB investigators did precisely that.  
In Q-- Shu’s case, the course of the investigation followed leads provided almost 
exclusively by Q-- himself. Throughout his Cadre Background Form and 
Autobiography, Q-- had deliberately interspersed his claims with the names of over 40 
specific individuals who would vouch for his story. Most commonly, Q-- would state a 
personal fact, ending with a name and a parenthetical phase to the effect of “this person 
can verify my account.” The methodical fashion in which Q-- annotated himself 
amounted to a citational practice, and shows his awareness to the instrumentality of his 
disclosure. 
295 TZMA 103-1-63 “通州市委关于镇反肃反及在各系统进行清理摸底工作的计划、报告”; 
Michael Schoenhal’s also has a description of ‘grassroots investigation in Michael 
Schoenhals, Spying for the People : Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949-1967 (New York: Cambridge































































































































































1922 x x x
1937 x x x x
1939-42 x x x x x x x
1943-45 x x x x x x x x
1949 x x x x x x
1952 x x
1953 x x
Fig. 3.5 Corroborating Witnesses Named in Autobiography 
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The two PSB investigators assigned to Q-- Shu’s case, surnamed Tang and Li, 
were primarily concerned with verifying Q--’s revolutionary service and understanding 
the circumstances of his two separate departures from the Party underground. While 
the PSB investigation did not necessitate the direct participation of the subject, it is 
fascinating to observe how the Investigation Report tracked and responded to the 
Autobiography. Along thematic and structural lines, the Investigation Report presented 
a counter-text, undoing the neat narrative arcs fashioned by the Autobiography.  
One notable juxtaposition is the contrast between Q--’s colorful, fervent defense 
for twice leaving the Party underground against the sober analysis of the PSB 
investigators reporting those same incidents. In his Autobiography, Q-- framed his first 
term of service as heroic resistance against hopeless odds: 
In the summer of 1940, the Party underground at Mashankou was 
infiltrated and destroyed. (Two comrades) came to me for refuge. The local 
situation was becoming increasingly suffocating. In 1942, the Party 
underground in Wanxian was infiltrated as well. Counting only the 
revolutionaries and progressives, 500 were arrested. The 
Nationalists…were in control of Funiu Mountain under the command of 
Tang Enbo.296 The situation further deteriorated in the fall. Our 
organization was compromised horizontally, therefore an entire echelon of 
operatives was rounded up. There was no alternative but to dismantle the 
organization and flee…(Huang Tingxiang can corroborate my Party work) 
Researching that same episode in 1955, PSB investigators Tang and Li 
interviewed Huang Tingxiang, a secondary school principal who had previously led Q--
’s underground unit in Henan. As a current Party member with revolutionary 
credentials, Huang’s political reliability made him an ideal witness in the view of the 
296 Tang Enbo (1898-1954) was a well-known and widely respected Nationalist general active 
during the War of Resistance and the Chinese Civil War. 
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PSB. Huang did not deny the outlines of Q--’s account, but the PSB investigators 
gleaned a different perspective on the events of 1942 from the interview: 
According to the testimony provided Huang Tingxiang, it is possible to 
verify that Q-- Shu was an active member of the underground. As to who 
introduced Q-- to the Party, this is not clear. At the time, Q-- was one of 
several underground branch leaders, but as to what his actual 
responsibilities were, no one can say for sure. According to our 
interviews…the counter-intelligence operations of the Nationalists were 
extremely effective in the Funiu Mountain region in 1942. Q-- was 
apparently terrified for his life, and fled to Chongqing. This is how he lost 
contact with the Party the first time. 
Where Q-- Shu’s retelling had been characterized by a firm narrative conviction, 
the PSB report reveals an outlook of empirical skepticism. Tang and Li did not seem 
particularly interested in writing a draft of history—that is, setting down the definitive 
account of the retreat from Funiu Mountain. Tang and Li had set out with specific 
questions to determine if Q--’s facts held true. Beyond what their witnesses could 
verify, the investigators were willing to permit uncertainty. 
Acknowledgment of the limits of the investigation and knowing the past was 
present throughout the PSB report. Commenting on Q--’s second tour of duty and 1949 
break with the Party underground, Tang and Li prefaced their findings by admitting, 
“regarding the facts…we don’t quite understand the full situation.” But casting doubt 
on Q--’s long passage about ideological disenchantment and his ensuing redemption in 
the Autobiography, the investigators presented an alternative account:  
According to Huang, Q-- had a serious ego issue, he was not interested in 
politics and harbored dissatisfaction. Using the excuse of poor health he left 
his post to return home. His superior repeatedly asked him to return to his 
post, but he never did. Therefore he left the revolution in 1949. 
The PSB investigators were clearly not swayed by the rhetorical gestures in Q-- 
Shu’s Autobiography, nor its affective depiction of Q--’s ideological reawakening. They 
pursued their own methods for understanding the past as an empirical field. In the 
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applied epistemology of the PSB, the subject position of information sources was 
heavily weighted. The reliability of a upright Communist such as Huang made him a 
trustworthy witness to events, and his testimony was taken as a corrective to Q--’s 
motivated recollections. In the supplementation investigation notes to Q--’s case, 
additional evidence shows that Tang and Li in fact expended much more time and 
effort on verifying Huang’s account than indicated in their report. They located 
additional witnesses, visited Q--’s former places of residence, and sent for records from 
other bureaus. To better assess Huang’s testimony, the investigators even made several 
side inquiries into Huang himself. 
Fine-grained and meticulously documented investigation was a priority 
promoted by Luo Ruiqing and the highest echelons of the PSB in the 1950s. Michael 
Dutton refers to the organizational orientation toward a a “culture of checking,” which 
conceived of Public Security work in terms of skeptical empiricism—proving ‘facts’ 
through ‘evidence,’ and ‘collecting evidence’ through ‘investigation and research.’ A 
primary tenet of the culture of checking was that people were not to be taken at face 
value. In 1955, Luo Ruiqing’s Public Security work plan included reexamining the 
dossiers and making name lists for all government and Party departments, as well as in 
key industries and work units. Everyone was subject to verification (suspect/verify). 
This approach was reflected in the Jiangxi manual on cadre examination, which called 
attention to “six essentials” when assessing information from an interviewee, whether 
suspect or witness. Investigators were obliged to take note of the interviewees’: 
1. Political views, personality and character, and state of mind in the
interview
2. If an informant—personal relationship to the subject under investigation,
their shared history and potential conflicts of interest, and degree of
sincerity regarding own historical problems
3. Source of information from the informant—was it firsthand experience,
or through hearsay? (firsthand information always has priority)
4. Circumstances under which the information was given—avoid obtaining
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information through coercion! 
5. Consistency between the information provided and the larger questions
of the investigation—pay attention to details and investigate any details
that do not make sense
6. Comparison of information provided with the evidence already
obtained—cross-reference all information to find out what is in agreement
or in conflict297
It was along these lines the facts of Q-- Shu’s case were run to the ground. 
Besides Huang, the PSB took statements from 17 other witnesses, and pulled four 
additional files from other PSB archives. The documentation for the two-year probe—
consisting of 55 pages of affidavits, interview notes, and evidence requests—is retained 
in the ‘supplemental copy’ of Q-- Shu’s dossier 附件 rather than the main file. The 
omission of evidence-bearing appendices in the main file indicates that the investigators 
regarded Q--’s account to be generally accurate. Had the extensive research by the 
investigators unearthed evidence that contradicted the broad strokes of Q--’s story, 
those items would have been placed in the main file as serious findings.  
297 Jiangxi Provincial Committee Office of Cadre Examination, 中共江西省委审干办公室 
Cadre Examination Reference Handbook 审干工作参考手册, (1955), 20.
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Fig. 3.6 Evidence Request, and Witness Affadavit 
To be sure, the PSB investigators were unable to identify any outright falsehoods 
in Q--’s self-testimony. His Autobiography was substantially “sincere” 诚恳老实 in that 
it contained no factual claims that could be easily falsified by the witnesses. But beyond 
what the reliable interviewees were able to confirm, the PSB investigators were willing 
to go no further in reporting. This pointed to an important element of professional 
discipline that was exercised in Q-- Shu’s investigation. Investigative conclusions did 
not denote certainty nor preclude error. For investigators Tang and Li, factual certitude 
was less important than using the investigation report to document the time and care 
invested in the inquiry. The attachment of the investigation notes in an overflowing 
appendix, would attest to the superior levels that the agents had mobilized the cadres 
and the masses, and observed the highest standard of evidential investigation.298 
298 These materials are substantially contained in Q-- Shu’s fujian supplement, which in
comparison to the main file, runs over 80 pages. 
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As a last note, it bears mentioning the willingness of the PSB to accept limits 
knowing the past was not for lack of attention to detail or tenacity. In Q--’s case, Tang 
and Li went to lengths to get to the bottom of specific questions, and showed 
themselves highly sensitive to subtle discrepancies and minor untruths. An example 
illustrates this ethic. In his Autobiography, Q-- mentioned that after moving back to 
Hubei, he found employment with a moneylender, where he became a worker on the 
printing floor. Upon investigation, Tang and Li discovered that Q-- had misstated the 
facts to his advantage. In actuality, Q-- had been a manager, a crucial distinction that
positioned him opposite to the proletariat on the shop floor. While no action was taken 
as a result, the exposed untruth serves to reiterate the granularity of investigation and 
verification, as well as the cat-and-mouse game of facts and interpretation played by 
subjects and the authorities. 
Fig. 3.7 PSB Investigation Report (and detail) 
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Resolution 
When all issues have been studied, investigated and verified, a conclusion 
can be made. Carefully examine the materials in depth, distinguishing facts 
from falsehoods, making comparisons, cross-referencing materials, 
pinpointing dates and location, and individual behavior and action 
(particularly before and after joining the revolution). Distinguish all 
problems by category, duration, and severity—only then draw conclusions 
on each problem. There is usually no need to mention in a conclusion 
general issues about the person, such as their lifestyle. However, for those 
who have severe behavioral issues or deficiencies in character, and who 
have made no improvement despite repeated attempts at reform, these 
facts should be appropriately noted in the conclusion even if there are not 
specific political historical issues. 
—Cadre Examination Reference Handbook 
In 1957, a file bearing the four documents detailed above—Background Form, 
Evaluation, Autobiography, Investigation Report—was bound in an archival jacket with 
a rough thread of twine, and then entered into record in Q--’s native county of 
Neixiang.299 The investigation into Q-- Shu’s background ended with a routine outcome, 
finding no grounds for a negative decision. Despite several factors that may have 
derailed his cadre examination, Q-- was cleared of suspicion and was allowed to 
continue with teaching and civilian life. 
Broadly speaking, cases of cadre examination generated one of three major 
outcomes. An aggravated political offense—which included abetting the former enemy 
and puppet regimes, anti-Party agitation, espionage, and other high crimes—fell under 
the category of ‘serious political historical problems’ 严重政治历史问题. Less serious, 
299 Another copy of Q--’s dossier was kept in Handan with his current work unit. Since the 
Neixiang dossier was not updated, it is reasonable to assume that Q-- transferred 
residency to Handan, and continued to be evaluated on an annual basis there. 
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but amounting to a political misdemeanor—such as an isolated error of judgement, or 
past membership in a ideologically backward association—returned a finding of 
‘ordinary political historical problems’ 一般政治历史问题. Lastly, a background 
investigation absolving the subject of political-historical questions received a decision of 
‘without political historical problems’ 没有政治历史问题. 
Among the several million cadres examined in the 1950s, only a minority were 
found to have political historical problems either of the ‘ordinary’ or the ‘serious’ type. 
However, to locate the outcome of Q-- Shu’s case along a practical spectrum, we may 
briefly consider two contemporaneous investigations that originate from the same 
tranche of personnel records in the Neixiang county archives. Alongside Q-- Shu’s file, 
there are a pair of dossiers pertaining to two primary school teachers of comparable 
circumstances, who nonetheless endured very different experiences of cadre 
examination. 
Li —, 36 years of age when he was examined in 1957, was also a primary school 
teacher before the war. Like Q-- Shu, he hailed from a landlord family in Neixiang, and 
then shuttled between various posts between different military factions during the war 
years. During the Sufan campaign in 1956, Li Yajiu was denounced by his estranged 
brother (also a teacher), who accused Li Yajiu of having concealed significant facts 
about his actions in the revolution.300 The Neixiang Public Security Bureau pursued 
these allegations by canvassing his former associates, in the course of which it was 
determined that Li Yajiu had been an officer in the “collaborationist army” 日为营长, an 
                                               
300 The Sufan campaign, or the “Campaign to Eliminate Hidden Counter-Revolutionaries” 肃
清暗藏反革命分子运动, was a political campaign lasting from 1954-57 that intensified 
cadre examination to focus especially on former officials of the “enemy and puppet 
regimes.” This campaign is dealt with further in Chapter 2.  
  220 
alternate for the local Nationalist Control Commission 候补监察委员会, and a member 
of the Nationalist security forces at various points during the 1940s. While he joined the 
Communist Party late in the Chinese Civil War, he failed to fully disclose his former ties 
until he was exposed by his brother and other witnesses. Li’s 94-page dossier ended 
with a lengthy verdict in which the ‘special five-person committee’ 肃反五人小组 
reasoned that Li “should have been punished severely.” However, due to the “the 
success of re-education” and the “generosity of the Party,” Li had “made fully amends 
and confessed all his crimes.” Therefore, the committee found him guilty of ‘ordinary 
historical problems,’ and “recorded one strike against him” in the dossier.301 
A more severe fate befell a man surnamed Yan, a 32 year-old former school 
teacher at the time of his examination in 1955. Yan hailed from a relatively ‘progressive’ 
middle peasant background in Neixiang, but his career was checkered by political work 
for the Nationalists. Yan later claimed to have joined the Nationalists because of 
material deprivation during the war years.302 However after switching to the 
Communist side in 1949, he made a fateful mistake of holding onto two boxes of files 
and a government seal related to his former work as a Nationalist officer. Sometime in 
the 1950s, he destroyed these items, but not before their existence—and Yan’s efforts at 
concealment—was made known to the authorities. In the process of his discipline, Yan 
never appeared to grasp the severity of the charges against him, and his attempts at 
self-criticism were found wanting. His defense: “I thought because I was poor, and no 
one died because of me, there should be no problems in the future.” In his self-
                                               
301 JTU Y-23-880 四类分子李XX (主件) 
302 “The KMT gave us new clothes, decent meals, and assistants to run errands…I was an 
official with a good salary, therefore I was engaged in what I was doing.”  
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evaluation, Yan revealed that he suffered from “low self-esteem,” contributing to his 
political “cowardice” and “indecision.” Yan was subsequently attacked by examiners 
for his “defeatism.” Owing to the severity of his crimes and his efforts to suppress them 
through the destruction of evidence, Yan received a ruling of ‘severe political historical 
problems.’ A sentencing decision was not included in his dossier, but offenses of this 
severity generally incurred a punishment of “reform through labor” 劳改.303 
Even acknowledging the non-legalistic character of political justice in the PRC, 
the empirical differences between the aforementioned cases are significant. Mao era 
definitions of political crime sometimes navigated a tree of fine distinctions, but the 
divergent outcomes of the Q--, Li and Yan cases were largely predictable given their 
respective shades of Nationalist affiliation, and the ideological climate of the 1950s. Q-- 
entered cadre examination with liabilities—landlord’s son, repeat deserter, workplace 
trouble-maker—but his history of revolutionary service and diligent self-criticism 
helped to balance his record. Crucially, there was no evidence to suggest that Q-- Shu 
had ever held a Nationalist post, despite his deep family ties and time in Chongqing. Q-
-’s non-conviction was by no means inevitable, but the outcome was in line with the 
specific objects of cadre examination and its overriding concern with rooting out 
‘enemy’ elements. Li and Yan, with their Nationalist pasts, presented far more 
straightforward cases for prosecution. 
In Q-- Shu’s case, it is important to acknowledge that political questions were 
raised, the security organs were mobilized, and hundreds of pages of material evidence 
were filled to order, and yet all participants fulfilled their elaborate duties only to arrive 
at the conclusion of a non-offense. The absence of a negative verdict speaks to an 
                                               
303 JTU Y-23-1007 四类分子闫XX 干部档案 (主件) 
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underlying banality at the core of Q--’s case which is useful to appreciating cadre 
examination in a broader historical context. My focus on the mundane may be 
somewhat at odds with the current tone of PRC historiography, where scholarly usage 
of the dossier as a historical source tends to highlight ‘complex’ individual cases that 
involve a form of political persecution and punishment.304 Looking at these complex 
punitive case studies has value, as it allows us to reconstruct the workings of CCP 
personnel organization while acknowledging the underlying potential for violence that 
existed in its practices of dossier surveillance. However, without proper context, a 
narrow focus on political crime and punishment paints an oversimplified picture of 
“dossier dictatorship,” which is highly misleading given that only a fraction of the 
millions of cadre examinations in the 1950s were even referred to the security organs, 
and only a proportion of those ended with disciplinary sanctions. A more textured 
understanding of the dossier system requires situating those limit cases alongside the 
larger body of cadre examinations in which the methods of cadre examination and 
dossier work were exhaustively pursued, only to arrive at benign findings. 
To the extent that Q-- embodies the unremarkable everyman of the revolution, 
there exists a certain incongruity between his pedestrian stature and the elaborate 
routines of cadre examination to which he was subjected. The winding course of Q-- 
Shu’s life was unexceptional for a person of his age and background. In every social 
movement as broad as the Communist revolution, we find individuals swept up by 
contingency and circumstance rather than any firm ideological conviction. Q-- appears 
to have been an accidental revolutionary of this mold, backing into a job of smuggling 
                                               
304 We can see this interest in Yang Kuisong’s insightful case study in Brown and Johnson, 
Maoism At the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism. 
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for the communist underground between stints as a healer and a moneylender. Yet the 
routines of the dossier placed such importance on understanding individuals such as Q-
-, elevating them to the status of temporary protagonists in their own revolutionary plot 
lines. As a primary school teacher, Q-- was deemed worthy of a multiyear background 
probe that spanned multiple provinces and no fewer than 18 interviews. Both Q-- and 
his examiners committed time and effort toward detailed biographical write-ups, 
evaluations, and reports to produce a comprehensive record afforded to few people in 
history. That this course of action was replicated millions of times across the PRC 
reflects the will of the party-state to have knowledge of its personnel. 
To put it straightforwardly, the subroutines required to produce a single dossier 
amounted to a great deal of work. Katherine Verdery, reading through her Securitate 
file, had this precise reaction to the “wasteful duplication of effort” work that Romanian 
investigators had employed in transcribing her activities and contacts. Moreover, as 
Peter Holquist reminds us about the rise of police-style surveillance in the early years of 
the Soviet Union, this type of investigation “required absolutely no technological 
innovations…Surveillance demanded only a bureaucrat, a form, and a file drawer.”305 
Dossier work as practiced by Chinese work units and security organs was indeed a 
manual enterprise, where countless bureaucratic labor-hours were devoted to what 
collectively amounted to the universalization of human resources. Such observations 
only make the scope and ambition of the PRC’s dossier system appear more incredible.  
This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: what 
political project did the practices of the dossier serve? Three cases from Neixiang county 
                                               
305 Peter Holquist, “Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work”: Bolshevik 
Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context,” The Journal of Modern History (1997), 438. 
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are too local and specific to comment on institutional purpose. However, the workflows 
of specific cases sheds light on the objects, values, and social roles that informed the 
personnel archive. Q-- Shu’s case serves to demonstrate that the work of the dossier 
often fell short of revolutionary transformation, and instead focused and reflected 
particular social interests. 
This consideration of the dossier system as a social phenomenon engages the 
important body of literature from Soviet studies. The China field has yet to produce an 
analogue to the work of Sheila Fitzpatrick, Jochen Hellbeck, and Stephen Kotkin on 
identity practices and citizen writing in the Soviet Union. An recurring motif in this 
literature is Kotkin’s notion of “speaking Bolshevik,” the insight that various forms of 
public expression by Soviet citizens involved strategic identification with state power 
through ideological code-switching.306 Fitzpatrick expanded on this idea by focusing 
attention on writings from below—including autobiographies, appeals, denunciations, 
and other genres of the Soviet dossier—as sites of agency where citizens practiced 
certain identities for political gain and indeed manipulated the authorities through 
discursive performance.307 Hellbeck further extended this theme to inner subjectivity, 
arguing that autobiographical texts were also transformative practices through which 
individuals studied, rehearsed, and enacted Bolshevik ideology.308 
These insights from the Soviet literature are highly relevant in the context of the 
PRC, where they unsettle a ‘totalitarian’ thesis that the mechanisms of the dossier made 
                                               
306 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, 221-22. 
307 Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia. 
308 See both Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-
1939)”; Hellbeck, “Working, Struggling, Becoming: Stalin-Era Autobiographical Texts.” 
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Chinese citizens passive targets of the surveillance state.309 Applying a Fitzpatrickian 
analysis to the dossier emphasizes the production of the dossier as a socializing process. 
In this light, discursive performances of evaluation and criticism were significant in that 
they offered participation in a bureaucratic system of assigning identity. We might 
point to certain practices of the dossier as spaces for Chinese subjects to discursively 
align themselves with privileged groups. This process of social self-fashioning through 
the dossier is apparent in our case study; Q-- Shu took care in all of his written 
submissions to repeat slogans, name-check leading cadres, and express appreciation to 
his superiors. The final similarities between Q--’s 1957 self-criticism and his small group 
evaluation supports the notion that identity was a discursive, but also negotiable 
project. 
But Q-- Shu’s case also demarcates the limits of self-fashioning as allowed by the 
texts of the dossier. Among dossier genres, self-evaluations and Autobiographies 
appeared to offer a means for Chinese subjects to appropriate ‘Maospeak’ to constitute 
themselves as revolutionary subjects. However, these texts were highly generic in that 
the modes of self-presentation were circumscribed, if not wholly predefined. This was 
certainly true of criticism/self-criticism in evaluations, where the rite of roundtable 
critique was written into the format of the Evaluation Form itself. Autobiography in a 
similar fashion preserved the appearance of a quasi-literary exercise, but where 
guidance was provided, the scheme of ideological progression was given as a 
requirement rather than a narrative option. Paralleling the standardization of dossier 
forms with printed templates, bureaucratic preferences pertaining the content of the 
                                               
309 Fitzpatrick, “New Perspectives on Stalinism,” 367. 
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dossier inclined toward uniformity. Texts of the dossier were to be functional rather 
than aspirational; predictability and formulism were built into the template.  
The genre constraints of the dossier were a deliberate feature of their means of 
administrative use. In Q-- Shu’s case, it is clear that his materials were read by 
bureaucrats closely according to narrow instrumental needs. Part of the organizational 
ingenuity of the dossier system existed in its ability to collect sensitive information from 
individuals under somewhat false pretenses. Cadre Background Forms presented a 
security disclosure in the guise of a resume, serving as an initial filter for time-pressed 
examiners. Autobiographies appeared to offer the aspirational and cathartic 
possibilities of confessional literature, but were instead mined by the PSB for 
investigative leads. In particular, the bureaucratic utilization of Q-- Shu’s 
Autobiography indicated an approach to handling citizen texts not as genres of writing, 
but rather genres of evidence. If the dossier was generative of social possibility, this 
opportunity extended to the bureaucrats as well. The collection of documents as 
evidence was a material precondition for many of the tasks that comprised the day-to-
day work of management. 
The instrumentality of the dossier system requires a different approach to the 
politics of archival work in the PRC. In the historical examples of rectification in the 
base areas during the 1940s, as well as cadre examination in the 1950s, personnel files 
materialized through concentrated bursts of bureaucratic activity and in conjunction 
with high-level political campaigns. But in these episodes, what we fail to observe is a 
vision or recognition of the personnel archive as a site of transformation, or even 
politics more generally. Instead, bureaucratic users from policy planners to PSB 
investigators tended to refer to the personnel archive as a blunt tool. In the official 
nomenclature, dossiers literally contained ‘材料‘ materials—that is, evidence, references 
and resources—for corresponding bureaucratic actions. The work of the personnel 
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archive was uncritically perceived as empirically and historically grounded, removed 
from other sites of political contestation. 
The fetishization of the personnel archive was to have important consequences 
for subsequent bureaucratic approaches to local administration, justice and social 
management in the Mao era. Nationwide cadre examination served as a prelude to the 
expansion of the dossier system which followed in the second half of the 1950s. The case 
study presented in this chapter represents an instance of personnel investigation which 
managed to hew closely to the empirical, pragmatic, and professional ideals of dossier 
work. Nonetheless, these efforts demanded an inordinate amount of work from both 
subjects and investigators. Emboldened by the success of cadre examination—which 
itself involved millions of cases—party planners extended their program of 
documenting persons to broader circles of proletarians, students, and rural laborers. 
Largely agnostic to the possibilities of the archive as a transformative project, the 
bureaucratic commitment to the archive became the basis for a political economy of 
information. As the personnel archive swelled to the limits of bureaucratic capacity, the 
quality of investigative practices struggled to keep pace, posing challenges for a system 
in which the reliability of paper knowledge was often a naive presupposition. 
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Chapter 4 
Dossiers and their Discontents: 
The Vulgarization of Personnel Investigation 
 
This chapter examines the role of dossier work in routines of personnel discipline in 
local Chinese work units. It seeks to demonstrate that as local work units assumed 
increasing responsibility for the documentation and management of their workforce, 
the dossier sustained a bureaucratic approach to evidence and reporting that 
encouraged the zealous investigation of petty personal misconduct. The chapter 
consists of three main sections. First, I briefly consider the growing authority of the 
work unit over everyday affairs as reflected in public criticism during the Hundred 
Flowers Movement. In the second section, I analyze two cases of alleged adultery from 
the 1960s and 70s to explore how routines of cadre examination were appropriated by 
local work units to prosecute mundane workplace problems. Lastly, I provide a short 
epilogue that attempts to understand the post-archival itinerary of the dossier materials 
utilized in the chapter, and reflect on the implications of reading the dossier as a 
historical source. 
 
“The Whole Lot of Materials Should be Thrown Out” 
In the approximate decade lasting from 1956-66, the dossier system expanded 
from an internal institution of personnel records to a vast, if decentralized registry 
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encompassing most citizens in the PRC. Dossiers in their archival trappings became 
ubiquitous artifacts of socialist organization. The basic format of the dossier lent itself to 
the transcription of any category of persons, leading to different permutations based on 
the original template of the cadre personnel file. 
The production of dossiers often took place in concentrated bursts of activity 
coinciding with political campaigns. The late stages of the Sufan campaign saw the 
creation of dossiers for low-level cadres, students, and workers according to the 1956 
Temporary Regulations. In the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, ‘rightist dossiers’ were 
compiled on persons that had criticized the Party in the short-lived liberalization of the 
Hundred Flowers Movement 百花齐放.310 In the Socialist Education Campaign of 1964-
1965, the party-state made a rural push to set up ‘class dossiers’ 阶级档案 which 
extended the central elements of the file system to rural households.311 
As dossier files expanded to catalog new segments of the population, they 
became the source of widespread consternation. Once instituted at the level of the local 
work unit, the routines of the dossier system consigned its subjects to spending 
significant time and energy each year updating their background forms, writing and 
rewriting Autobiographies, and repeatedly addressing old political suspicions as new 
campaigns prompted reexamination. Equally vexing was how dossiers held by the 
work unit were used as a basis for cases of personnel investigation and discipline. 
Evidence of minor, non-criminal infractions or behaviors came under the scrutiny of the 
                                               
310 The Kunshan files referred to in Chapter 2 are a good example, but such files were 
produced in scale as part of the rectification and have been likened to the black materials 
黑材料 produced on agitators during the Cultural Revolution. JTU 101-9-1 to 101-9-79 
311 马维强 Ma Weiqiang, “Shuangkou Village: Identity, Status, and Countryside in the Era of 
Collectiviation 双口村:集体化时代的身份、地位与乡村 日常生 活,” diss., Shanxi 
University, 2015). 
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personnel section of the work unit; any negative findings were filed into the dossier as a 
permanent ‘black mark’ on the record. For an individual subject to this form of 
personnel surveillance, no aspect of the dossier file provided comfort or pleasure. 
Throughout the period of the ‘golden decade’ of the dossier system (1956-1966), the 
existence of the individual files was a significant source of public controversy, if not 
outright rancor. 
The simmering dissatisfaction with the dossier system punctuated criticism of 
the Party during the abortive Hundred Flowers Movement.312 During that short-lived 
relaxation of ideological controls, numerous voices—including students, professionals, 
and non-party cadres—spoke out against the perceived inequities of the dossier system 
and the power of the personnel sections who managed it. Professionals, students and 
non-party cadres were demographically among the most active critics of the Hundred 
Flowers, but they also held distinct grievances against the dossier itself, since its use in 
personnel decisions played such an immense role in shaping personal and career 
prospects.  
Many critiques initially leveled against the dossier system were ironically 
preserved for the purpose of subsequent refutation by ideologically correct 
viewpoints.313 In late 1957, a party-line meeting of the Marxism-Leninism Workshop in 
                                               
312 During this well-known episode in PRC history, Mao Zedong and senior party leadership 
sponsored an initiative to invite intellectuals and ranking cadres to participate in an 
‘open-door rectification’ of the CCP’s problems in ideology and policy. This invitation to 
critique the Party was greeted with an overwhelming public response, reaching a peak in 
the spring of 1957. Shortly thereafter, the Party reversed itself and launched a sweeping 
crackdown on the intellectuals, professionals, and Party members who had spoken out.  
313 In the rectification, many of the “slanderous attacks” from the Hundred Flowers were 
collated and reprinted for counter-critique by ideologically upright study groups such as 
this one. Ironically, this common practice of circulating ‘poisonous weeds,’ or 毒草 for 
purposes of ideological edification disseminated anti-orthodox opinion far beyond its 
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Dongbei Technical College reprinted a sampling of the ‘rightist slanders’ against the 
dossier system from print forums across the nation. These rightist attacks were 
distributed to the meeting as a discussion handout for counter-criticism, but the 
document doubled as a trenchant summary of the dossier’s discontents, citing among 
other grievances, the secret nature of the files, their long memory of political misdeeds, 
and the arbitrary rules of the form. 
The breadth of opinion collated by the Dongbei Technical College provides a 
glimpse of how the dossier system impacted the lives of its subjects. In the long list of 
critical observations, one statement attributed to a man named Xu said that there was 
no person alive who did not carry a “visceral feeling” toward the dossier system, which 
he described as “all-powerful, sectarian, unequal, and undemocratic,” while “subjecting 
everything to mystification.”314 He claimed that the dossier had a tendency to use 
negative qualities, however minor, to define the individual, adding, “in normal times, it 
acts as a policeman; during campaigns, it becomes an inquisitor.” Others echoed his 
assertions that the political surveillance of the files was simply unnecessary. Sufan had 
theoretically weeded out all those with problematic political backgrounds, and 
“everyone left should be considered to be among the ‘People.’” 
An individual surnamed Zhang attacked the dossier’s penchant for secrecy. 
Dossiers ensured that “issues of personnel are never transparent—what materials, 
comments, or conclusions go in there, the person himself doesn’t even know!” There 
was no possibility for a person to contest a false accusation, because they would not 
                                               
original reach. CCPM “Excerpts of Rightist Views Published in Newspapers and 
Periodicals 报刊摘录：右派对人事制度、干部政策的攻击” (1957) 
314 All of the quotes below are mentioned in CCPM “Excerpts of Rightist Views Published in 
Newspapers and Periodicals (1957)” cited above. 
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even know of its existence in the file. Another man named Jiang echoed that opinion, 
saying, “The whole lot of materials should be thrown out…After all, it is not as though 
we are like the dead serfs of Russia, why are our materials in the control of others such 
that we can’t even see them? The personnel section acts like it is a branch of Public 
Security…but who are they to decide people’s fates?” 
Some complained how the dossier held minor missteps against people in 
perpetuity. One commenter described how as a university student, he had written a 
sincere self-criticism during a campaign that aired out “all of his various crap” (大小便
都要报). Looking back, he felt that he had been naive and the self-criticism should be 
destroyed, but it remained in his file. An academic in Sichuan opined, “In the past I 
have filled out countless forms, they are a dime a dozen, every single one has a field 
that asks the question about ‘previous membership in counter-revolutionary 
organizations.’ In the past, I participated in one, but I have acknowledged that it was a 
mistake. What is the point of harping on this point every time I fill out a form? I would 
suggest that in the future they get rid of this field, let people have a clean slate by 
starting over from liberation.” 
Some of the most specific grievances cited the highhanded practices of the 
personnel office where the dossiers were archived. A medical administrator named 
Zhang said, “The personnel section makes everyone fill forms, fill out forms, and fill 
more forms. At this point, we have filled out forms covering eighteen generations of our 
family, and handed them over so that we can be reevaluated in every single 
campaign...What is personnel examination? It’s the same as what a spy organ does, 
collecting intelligence reports on us!” In a separate forum in Wuhan, an anonymous 
critic described a relatable experience of paying a visit to the personnel section: 
When I arrive at the personnel office, my hair stands up on end with fright. 
As soon as someone from outside comes through the door, the whole staff 
scrambles to stuff the files from desks into drawers. Why so secretive? It’s 
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as though everyone who comes in has a ‘problem,’ no one dares walk in 
there. Life, death, freedom, and imprisonment are all in their hands. Their 
methods are like the police, showing up spontaneously with a small 
notebook recording your information, always secretive, suspecting 
everyone.315 
Critiques along these lines were echoed in public forums throughout China.316 
They evidenced a swift and powerful backlash against a young institution that had yet 
to even reach its full extent. The central organs were alarmed by the breadth of the 
criticism, and in addition to silencing the main critics, they launched their own 
propaganda efforts to boost the dossier system’s battered reputation. However the 
state’s response had the unintended effect of also publicizing the sense of an institution 
under fire and validating its harshest critics.  
During the first wave of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, China Youth ran an article 
trumpeting the heroic actions of a sixteen-year-old Communist Youth League member 
numbed Li Xingchu, who had “risked his life to protect dossier files.”317 Li Xingchu, 
who also happened to be an orphan, was a politically awakened high school student in 
Hanyang, Hubei, when a “counter-revolutionary riot” broke out in June of 1957, Hubei. 
According to this “true story” of real events, “slanderous attacks” upon the dossier 
system had incited a mob of rightist students to storm the offices of the county 
                                               
315 CCPM “Rightist Remarks at Wuhan University Attacking Personnel File System 武汉大学
右派分子攻击攻击人事、档案制度的言论 (1957)” 
316 Many of the complaints were not calls to wholly abolish the dossier system, but rather 
suggested moderate policy changes, such as the separation of professional and political 
evaluation, limits on the range of dossier materials, etc. In the 1980s, the official reform of 
the dossier system adopted many of these very policies pertaining to the separation of 
political and professional screening. 
317 聂铁钢, “真正的勇敢行为：在暴乱中冒险护卫档案的共青团员李行楚” China Youth《中国
青年报》No. 8 (1957) 
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government; Li followed them there to confront them. After saving a telephone from 
destruction at one location (“That is the property of the People, you have no right to 
destroy it!”), Li found the mob in the archives room of the Bureau of Education. The 
young firebrand saw that the counter-revolutionaries had pulled their dossiers from the 
stacks and were intent on destroying them. Before the mob could react, Li sprung over 
to the table where the dossiers were sitting and grabbed them, holding them tightly to 
his chest. The mob turned on Li with physical blows and slurs, but Li only held the 
dossiers tighter, and protected them until the mob gave up. According to the account, 
Li’s heroic actions “saved the precious materials from suffering even a single tear worth 
of damage” (不让这批重要材料受到一丝损失).  
The tale of Li Xingchu has more than a hint of communist fabulism and should 
be read with a grain of salt. But even if this revolutionary yarn was successful in 
illuminating the political virtue of protecting dossiers at all costs, it was only able to do 
so by painting a scene in which mobs of people had attacked government offices in 
order to destroy personnel records. Regardless of the ideological perspective, the 
dossier system appeared to have more critics than defenders. 
 
Discipline in the Work Unit 
Much of the dissatisfaction with the dossier system and the larger scheme of 
personnel administration can be traced to the Chinese institution of the work unit 单位. 
By 1957 industry and commerce had shifted to state control, and the work unit was 
entrenched as the basic unit of urban social administration in the PRC. The work unit 
provided housing, education, healthcare, and an increasing share of the goods and 
services once traded on the private market. At the same time, the work unit also 
assumed increasing responsibility for maintaining public order and monitoring the 
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political attitudes of its personnel. Work units organized political study sessions, 
monitored petty crime, and meted out rewards and punishments.318 
The personnel section of each work unit managed the unit’s dossiers and was 
responsible for spearheading annual evaluations, background examinations, and 
disciplinary matters under the supervision of the work unit leadership. In this sense, the 
personnel section was a localized amalgam of the managerial functions of the 
Organization Department and the surveillance functions of the Public Security Bureau. 
The personnel section was not formally attached to the Party, nor did it have any 
influence outside of its highly specific work unit context. However as attested to by the 
comments of the rightist critics, the managerial and disciplinary powers of the 
personnel section gave it a great deal of control over the day-to-day lives of the people 
under its jurisdiction.  
One common criticism of personnel administration was the brand of discipline 
administered by the personnel section in the name of the work unit. The most serious 
political and criminal acts—such as espionage or violent crime—were obviously the job 
of the Public Security Bureau. But distinguishing acts that fell within the purview of the 
work unit versus that of the PSB was complicated by the ambiguous status of PRC 
criminal law after 1957. Chinese legal scholars Leng Shao-chuan and Chiu Hungdah 
have described the period 1954-57 as the “PRC’s constitutional experiment,” in which 
the CCP made significant strides toward the codification of the legal system based on 
                                               
318 For an discussion of the political activities of work units, see Yung-Fa Chen, “Suspect 
History and the Mass Line: Another “Yan’an Way”,” in Twentieth-Century China : New 
Approaches, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 172. A 
more general overview of work units and their role in the PRC is found in Shaw, Social 
Control in China : A Study of Chinese Work Units. 
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existing Soviet institutions.319 One central piece of that larger initiative was the drafting 
of a complete criminal code governing all criminal behavior in the PRC. However with 
the events of the Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, the draft 
criminal code was shelved; the PRC would not implement a comprehensive code of 
criminal laws until the end of the Cultural Revolution.320 
The absence of a published criminal code compounded the already thorny 
problem of defining punishable crime. The example I use in this chapter is that of 
adultery, an offense that did not appear severe enough to warrant the attention the 
Public Security Bureau, and yet bore discomfiting political and ideological implications. 
Because no work unit wanted to be labeled as overly tolerant of personal misconduct, 
the vast majority of these minor cases were dealt with by personnel sections within the 
work unit.  
Contrary to the Maoist assumption that low-level bureaucrats were lax about 
investigation, the cases that follow show that the work units took their internal 
investigations extremely seriously. As the personnel section assumed the role of 
disciplinarian, they appropriated the same methods used in political and criminal 
investigations for the work of human resources. This approach to discipline fueled the 
perception that the personnel section had arrogated the role of the security services. As 
                                               
319 Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, eds. Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1985), 13. 
320 One of the reasons cited for the decision to suspend the implementation of the criminal 
code was that such a code would purport to treat all citizens according to a single 
standard, which which violate the the socialist principle that law has a ‘class character.’ 
Jerome Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1963: An 
Introduction. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 17. 
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alleged by critics, the personnel section appeared to be playing policeman, inflating 
political and social threats to pursue unnecessary investigations to impress superiors. 
But if local work units were guilty of vulgarizing personnel investigation, the 
appropriation of investigative methods used by the Organization Department and the 
Public Security Bureau resulted in an awkward fit. The conventional approach to 
political and criminal inquiries was directed toward the aim of falsifying testimony and 
‘unmasking’ true identities.321 For instance in cadre examinations, the practice of having 
the subject write multiple versions of an Autobiography was used to illuminate 
inconsistencies in the cadre’s self-presentation. However in the hands of the work unit, 
the application of analogous methods of investigation seemed disproportionate to the 
petty crimes and personal misconduct under scrutiny. The use of these elaborate, 
routines in personnel investigation bogged down in the minutiae of unremarkable 
problems. Such investigations add considerable layers of procedure and checks only to 
arrive back at the most obvious conclusion. 
All of these tendencies in personnel investigation were preserved and enacted 
through practices of the dossier. The low-level Maoist bureaucracy was at times a 
stubbornly empirical organization, not only in its investigative habits, but also in its 
approach to reporting investigative findings to the higher levels. The superior levels 
placed intense pressure on personnel departments and work units to perform 
knowledge of social conditions, measured by physical quantities of paper-based 
                                               
321 Kang Sheng, whose career would be revived by the waves of high-level cadre 
investigations in the Cultural Revolution, commented that cadre examinations had to find 
a the right fine balance between the perfunctory, superficial investigation of ‘rightism’ 
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evidence. These pressures encouraged a style of personnel investigation and dossier 
management in which investigations were rehearsed for superiors through the 
meticulous craft of dossier work. Presenting unimpeachable documentation supplanted 
other ends of investigation, as manifested in the redundancy of evidentiary materials, 
the zealous prosecution of petty crimes, and generic reporting. 
File Affairs I: The T---/W--- Case 
 
A Workplace Affair 
In 1965, officials at the Yangyuan County Supply and Marketing Cooperative 
(Dongcheng, Hebei Province) discovered that two of their retail clerks were engaged in 
an extramarital relationship.322 The affair between T--- Ziqing, a 41 year-old man, and 
W--- Xiuying, a 34 year-old woman, had begun some three years prior and continued 
on and off since then. After being exposed, the affair was reported to the supply 
cooperative’s higher-ups, who launched an investigation into the matter. The case was 
handled as an internal personnel issue, and concluded after one month with T--- and W-
-- each receiving a disciplinary demerit in their personnel files. 
One distinctive feature of the case was that the disciplinary proceedings took 
place entirely within the personnel management structure of the supply cooperative, 
and hence was closely documented in the dossiers of the persons involved. It is rare for 
two personnel files to substantially mirror one another, but because of the disciplinary 
investigation, both dossiers were reorganized around a full record of the findings. Each 
file contains the ‘disciplinary decision’ (处分决定), a series of ‘admissions’ or ‘self-
                                               
322 AC “Dossier: T--- Ziqing”; “Dossier: W--- Xiuying” Yangyuan (1965-68)  
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examinations,’ and ‘eviden materials’ related to the case. All the materials related to the 
disciplinary case were filed in the dossier as a separate appendix (under supplemental 
item No. 7 according to the Temporary Regulations).323 
T--- was made to write five different admissions regarding his offense, the 
earliest of which was dated October 28, 1965. In that “Self-Examination,” T--- narrated 
his account of the circumstances that led to the affair. T--- and W--- had become 
acquainted in 1962 when they were working in the payments department of the supply 
cooperative and assigned to the same desk. T--- claimed that since he was W---’s senior, 
his young colleague frequently sought his help in professional matters, and developed 
an interest in him. Because both parties were married and living with their spouses, the 
affair physically took place in the office, including on occasion when the rest of the staff 
was out in the fields. Leadership would later harp on this point in particular to illustrate 
the depravity of the affair. Sixth months after the relationship began, all area 
cooperatives were merged into the commune and W--- was reassigned to another retail 
location. The affair cooled for a period, but in 1964, T--- claims the pair reconnected 
after meeting on the street—the affair resumed as much as circumstances would allow. 
T--- ultimately blamed his indiscretion on a combination of negative political influences 
(“capitalist and hooligan thought”) and personal weakness (“I have a soft spot toward 
women who like me.”) 
The two ‘decisions’ issued by the supply cooperative against T--- and W--- were 
substantially identical. The serial numbers on the two documents— (65)30 and (65)31 
indicate that they were drafted sequentially, and each decision was carbon copied to 
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allow for duplicates to be forwarded to the higher organs, most importantly, the 
commune-level Party committee. T---, was dealt with first. His decision began: 
Regarding one of our personnel, T--- Ziqing, male, currently 41 years of 
age, family background—middle peasant, class status—businessperson, 
education—elementary school, political status—of the masses… 
The aforementioned T---, ever since he came to Dongcheng as a 
probationary employee at the Supply and Marketing Cooperative, has 
received years of ideological training and reform. However, he still harbors 
deep-seated capitalist thought, and not only has he showed an inability to 
reform, but his consciousness lacks any sense of national laws or political 
discipline. He has wantonly committed sexual relations (乱搞两性关系), 
even during the model Socialist Education Campaign of 1964. He never 
came to consciousness about his ways, and continued to commit one crime 
after another. 
Following this moralized rebuke, the decision launched into a matter-of-fact 
accounting of the specifics of the affair, retold incident by incident with dates, locations, 
and occasions. Those details took up about half a page, at which point the supply 
cooperative’s leadership offered its sentencing recommendation for the commune-level 
committee to consider: “T--- Ziqing’s offense is very serious, his character is depraved (
恶劣). To reform the behavior of these two individuals as well as educate the entire 
staff, his punishment, accounting for leniency for his frank admission of the offense, 
will be one serious demerit.”  
A disciplinary ‘demerit’ 记大过 meant that while T--- was not subjected to 
imprisonment or other censure, his dossier file would henceforth register a “black 
mark,” with an accompanying impact on future evaluations and professional 
advancement. T---’s decision was stamped with the seal of the leadership of the 
Yangyuan Supply and Marketing Cooperative—T--- and W---’s work unit and the 
division responsible for the investigation. The last and most important stamp was the 
approval of the commune’s Party Committee, which was one level higher. This last 
stamp, accompanied by the comment, “Agree with Decision” was the crucial one, as it 
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signaled that the commune leadership approved of the investigation and its findings, 
and the sentence could go into effect.  
The entire process that led to this outcome—the pursuit of the investigation, the 
onerous evidentiary statements and confessions, and the recommendation for 
punishment—was entirely extraneous according to the legal guidelines for handing 
adultery according to PRC law. According to Zeng Yanxiu, an investigation group 
leader during the Sufan and the Socialist Education Campaigns, the specialized 
investigation teams sent by higher organs to examine lower ones were told “not to 
bother” with incidents of adultery or other mature relationships “unfit for civil 
conversation.”324 At the very most, Zeng states that such matters should have been dealt 
with by summoning the involved parties for a polite chat and “dispensing a bit of moral 
education.”  
Zeng’s stance was also backed by the PRC’s legal authorities. The unpublished 
1957 criminal code made no prohibition against adultery or fornication. During the 
PRC’s brief foray into Soviet-style legal codification, Chinese jurists explicitly sought to 
define the boundary of criminality to exclude moral peccadillos.325 Chinese jurists 
highlighted adultery as an example of an offense to be dealt with by means other than 
penal law: 
What are crimes? Crimes are “all acts which endanger the people’s 
democratic system, undermine the legal order or are socially dangerous, 
and, according to law, should be subject to criminal punishment.” That 
bigamy is a crime is already debatable, as for adultery, we believe that it 
should not be treated as a crime…Since the problem of adultery involves 
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325 Leng and Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China, 24. 
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the quality of affection, thinking, and morality, and also involves the 
struggle between new and old ideologies, we should prevent and eliminate 
adultery….As the undertakings of socialist construction gradually grow 
and the people’s political awareness is gradually heightened, the problem 
of adultery can be gradually resolved at the roots. Even if individual 
situations occur, they will only be the abnormalities of individual persons 
who retain remnants of the ideological consciousness of the exploiter class. 
We should still rely for correction of these defects on the pressure of public 
opinion and on education about morality. They cannot be resolved by 
criminal punishment.326 
Like the “moral education” suggested by Zeng, the remedy for adultery 
envisioned by Chinese jurists was advisory, and not necessarily punitive. Moral 
education of this type was not given to be part of any formal process, implying that a 
written record of the offense was unwarranted and would not be put on file in the 
dossier.  
The T---/W--- case represented a different approach altogether. The investigation 
of T--- and W--- for their extramarital affair reflects the blurring of boundaries between 
moral, political, and professional misconduct in the PRC. Despite that the fact that 
adultery did not violate any particular legal statue, it was precisely because the offense 
fell outside the definition of criminality that it defaulted to the purview of work unit. 
This type of formal workplace investigation into acts of personal misconduct was by no 
means exceptional for the time. In fact, the prosecution of adultery was perhaps closer 
to a standard practice in local work units, as evidenced by the prevalence of such 
disciplinary cases in dossiers throughout the 1960s.  
The T---/W--- case is representative of how a host of issues with minor moral-
political valences were investigated as ‘serious problems’ by personnel section. The 
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overall responsibility of the work unit for the moral and political education of its rank-
and-file made policing these minor offenses appear to be a laudable exercise in 
vigilance, even though any associated discipline would have been considered surplus 
over requirements. 
Old Secrets 
The capacious managerial authority of the work unit over the lives of its 
personnel informed a holistic approach to disciplinary matters. In contrast to the notion 
of a legal trial, where there existed a formal distinction between a criminal offense and 
the person who committed it, the disciplinary proceedings that took place through the 
personnel system clearly placed the individual under scrutiny. This emphasis on the 
person encouraged a style of investigation that was tightly intertwined with the work of 
the dossier as a record of personal history and identity. In any given investigation, the 
dossier served as both a key investigative resource, and an end product of investigation 
itself. Because the materials filed into a dossier were not bound by anything resembling 
a statute of limitations, mistakes were accretive in the sense that any negative evidence 
or ruling from the past became new evidence in future cases. 
The investigative habit of recycling old dossier evidence led to the second phase 
of the T---/W--- case. After the discovery of the affair, the investigators as a standard 
procedure pulled up the dossiers of T--- and W--- and re-examined their previous 
materials. Though T--- and W--- stood accused of the same offense—the affair—the 
investigation revealed that W---’s dossier bore evidence of past crimes that then became 
an aggravating factor in the matter at hand. 
In contrast to T---’s portrayal of W--- as a junior colleague lacking experience and 
needing professional help, W---’s dossier revealed a sharp-witted, complex individual 
who had risen quickly in her career.  
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Seemingly by coincidence, both T--- and W--- had participated in the short-lived ‘Red 
Experts campaign’ 红专学校 in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward. An offshoot 
educational initiative of the Great Leap, a major thrust of the red experts campaign was 
accelerated training for adults from red class backgrounds in technical fields of industry 
and agriculture.327 The training component of the program met uneven success, and was 
quietly abandoned along with the Leap. But it was during this time that W--- was 
recognized for having an aptitude for numbers, and took a job as head of the payments 
department at the No. 2 Retail Store of Dongcheng, primarily selling cotton textiles. W--
- would mention in one of her ‘admissions’ that her new job permitted her to move her 
family to her work unit, which may suggest that her job was more desirable than that of 
her spouse at the time. W--- was also made a member of the Communist Youth League, 
and remained part of the organization as a cadre administrator. 
In 1960, when W--- would have been around 30 years old, she was the subject of 
a disciplinary inquiry into her handling of small payments. It is not clear from this 
version of the dossier as to how the initial complaint against her arose, but the two most 
likely possibilities are a managerial audit of the account books, or an accusation by a 
coworker. In the ensuing investigation, W--- admitted to skimming a number of small 
payments from the store and putting them into her pocket (lit. 放我的兜儿). She also 
confessed to having taken home without authorization some small leftover items from 
the store over the years. In both cases, the value of the items was quite negligible, and it 
was clear that she had passed many of the items on to family and friends as small 
favors. But however common, any form of misappropriation was a form of stealing 
from the state, and W--- was forced to account for the entirety of her economic 
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misdeeds in a series of long “Self-Examinations” and “Supplemental Self-
Examinations.” One example was the following: 
(Previously) I brought two boxes of cigarettes to my mother’s house for 
private use, worth 1.8 yuan. I also took leftover cotton packages from work 
weighing 1.5 kilos, worth 70 cents. Last year, I took an used hemp rope 
belonging to the public—I gave it to (a friend) and they made a piece of 
clothing for me, worth 50 cents. I did not behave according to official rules 
when we were harvesting corn, and ate a kilo of peas from the communal 
kitchen… 
 In February 1960, I found a pair of socks, not listed in the inventory. I put 
them into my personal drawer, worth 4 yuan. In May, someone asked me 
to get two pairs of socks for 9 yuan, and another asked for a vest for 5 
yuan—I put both of these into my own pocket. In June, someone came from 
Liu Ma Fang 六马房 wanting to buy khaki fabric. There was no inventory 
left, but he left me the money as well as cotton ration coupons for 11 yards, 
worth 4 yuan. Eventually I gave him the product, but I didn’t put the 
money into the drawer. Together with the fabric ration coupon, I took for 
myself. In July, someone brought in a whole fabric coupon to exchange for 
scrap fabric ration coupons. I gave him the scrap fabric ration coupon, but I 
did not make the exchange. I kept the whole fabric ration coupon, totaling 
11 yards, this I skimmed. 
By time of the inquiry in 1960, W--- had already been promoted to accounts and 
pricing, which somewhat explains her habit of making monetary conversions of all of 
the products and coupons that she had misappropriated. What is equally interesting is 
that her supervisors, who were also presumably proficient in retail accounting, also 
read W---’s self-examination through the lens of their professional specialization. 
Similar to other ‘confessional genres’ often found in dossiers, all of W---’s self-reported 
materials bear the red underlining and margin notes of a higher official charged with 
reviewing the case. In W---’s case, the official from the cooperative ignored the political 
statements of contrition and pledges to reform, and instead underlined only the 
monetary amounts related to the skimmed supplies. At the top and bottom of each 
page, the official kept a running total of the value of goods, separated by different 
commodity categories, such as cash, grain, merchandise, etc. Finally, the official 
transcribed the numbers onto a block-printed “corruption form,” a special-use account 
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table for logging employee theft. The form and its final breakdown of misappropriated 
goods—25.元 of cash; 23.00元 of grain rations; 28.50元 of merchandise, etc—was filed 
into W---’s dossier along with a half-completed “Common Problem Registration Report 
Form.” 
Fig 4.1 Tallying Misdeeds 
For reasons that are not completely apparent from the dossier file itself, W---’s 
career weathered this setback in 1960. Whether because the value of the goods was 
considered minor, or the type of offense was sufficiently commonplace (as indicated by 
the existence of a form template), W--- did not suffer any serious discipline and 
continued to work in the same position at the Cooperative. 
However upon the revelation of the affair in 1965, the records of the skimming 
investigation resurfaced from the reexamination of W---’s dossier. The presence of this 
past disciplinary incident in W---’s dossier not only aggravated the adultery charge, but 
it served to expand the focus of the investigation. What had previously been an 
apparently straightforward case of an extramarital relationship now became the focus 
of a possible financial conspiracy. The leaders of the supply cooperative expressed fear 
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that W--- and T--- might have collaborated to steal from the commune, or that W--- had 
manipulated T--- because of the latter’s access to the cashiers’ drawer. 
The investigation now turned back upon T--- and his handing of the 
cooperative’s funds. Prior to the exposure of the affair, T--- had transferred to another 
job within the cooperative, still working as a cashier but now in a different department 
selling agricultural seed. As with any cashier’s drawer, T--- was liable to be about one 
yuan long or short at the end of every week. This was a common occurrence for an 
enterprise that dealt with so many small payments, and none of T---’s supervisors had 
ever complained about this. But with the resurfacing of W---’s financial improprieties, 
the discrepancies in T---’s drawer now became part of a potentially more serious issue 
though his association with W---. T--- was brought back for further questioning, and 
compelled to write another round of searching ‘self-examinations’ in which he admitted 
to mishandling funds. His own situation was jeopardized by old material in another 
individual’s dossier.  
T--- appears to have realized that avoiding the appearance of a larger problem 
required thoroughly admitting to minor oversights. In his newest round of ‘self-
examinations,’ T--- recounted in detail how he occasionally procrastinated depositing 
the contents of his drawer, or temporarily misplaced sums of money. One of his ‘self-
examinations,’ in which he confessed to an instance of misplacing commune funds, 
reads as an ethnographic account of the routines of the supply cooperative: 
On September 24, leadership decided to reduce the price on the seeds in 
inventory to 0.10 per jin.328 The next day was a market day when we sell 
seed on the streets. Our superior, Gao, took out 975.5 jin of seeds. When the 
day was over he gave over 90 yuan to Zhang Xianglin. Since I had gone 
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home for dinner and was not present at the office, Zhang gave the money 
to Li Shuxing. At the same time our colleagues also sold some seed in the 
courtyard, Zhang was the one who weighed the seed and collected the 
money. After I returned from dinner. Zhang rolled the money, about 11 or 
12 yuan, into the purchase list like the shape of a stick, and handed it to me. 
Without great thought, I put it into my cash drawer in the south position. 
At that time…since I had just been transferred to this department, I lacked 
full knowledge of the procedure, and also it was the harvest season for jute 
hemp, plus the work itself is complicated, therefore there was a delay. 
(A few days later,) I finally asked Li for the package of money which he 
was safekeeping. When I counted the money in the wrap, it was short of a 
few cents, not quite one yuan. At that point, I was ready to put the exact 
amount, plus the money in the south drawer into the deposit account. Since 
the money from selling seed is most often in coins, I was worried that the 
bank wouldn’t accept it, so I exchanged the coins for bills, wrapped it into a 
package, and put it into the south drawer again. It was not until a couple of 
days later…that I discovered that the amount was only equal to street sales, 
not including sales from the yard. I was so lost and confused—I searched 
my memory repeatedly trying to figure out where the money went. 
However, my concerned superiors and sympathetic comrades assisted me 
in recounting the cash, and we found an extra 17.17 yuan, including 3 rolls 
of 5 cent coins, totaling 15 yuan. They had been put in the back of the 
drawer diagonally which I had missed several times. Because I was careless 
and treated the matter lightly, I did not look for it. 
T--- wrote up an additional three ‘self-examinations’ recalling incidents of this 
type. A few of these self-examinations arrive at a political point, such as one in which he 
apologizes for his ‘errors, arrogance, and carelessness,’ or expresses his remorse and 
promises to be more diligent in the future. However most of these accounts amount to a 
form of thick description, in which T--- takes his investigators through his workday, the 
positions of drawers, and his means ways of wrapping coins and bills. All of these ‘self-
examinations’ appear somewhat strenuous. Each of T---’s confessions offer limited 
information of value, leading to overproduction and the reduplication of effort. The 
investigators appear to have cultivated this approach to maximizing the volume of 
material produced. The additional self-examinations from T--- appeared to placate the 
officials from the supply cooperative for the moment. The dozen or so pages of new 
material were filed as with the evidentiary appendix in T---’s dossier. 
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Human Resources Hell 
W---’s ordeal was not yet finished. Her record and position in the CYL made her 
the subject of a two-track disciplinary process. Once the supply cooperative had 
finished its own investigation, W---’s case file was handed over to the Communist 
Youth League branch of the supply cooperative to which W--- belonged. The CYL 
branch deemed the matter of sufficient severity to call a full meeting to publicly discuss 
the affair. W--- was summoned before all of the branch members to give a self-criticism, 
and discuss the matter before her fellow members. 
Following what appears to have been a grueling session of moral edification, the 
CYL branch committee issued its own decision. In form and content, it was almost 
exactly the same document as the supply cooperative’s earlier two decisions. The CYL 
version reutilized the work unit’s choice of language in calling W---’s behavior 
“serious,” “depraved,” and “a danger to the public.” It also took a page from the 
previous sentencing recommendations in citing the depth and honesty of her written 
and oral admissions as a reason for mitigating her punishment to a one-year 
suspension, rather than outright expulsion.  
Considering the other areas of redundancy, it seems clear that the main purpose 
of the branch committee’s report was to inform the upper levels that a meeting had 
been held, and to forward the materials from the investigation along for review. The 
CYL decision—like the others associated with the case—was addressed upwards to the 
higher levels of the CYL, who would then review and approve the punishment. A 
handwritten note on the last line of the decision advised, “these materials have also 
been forwarded to the Party Committee of the commune, ” attesting to the importance 
of ‘showing work’ to all the higher authorities. 
The upward reporting of the verdicts in the T---/W--- case gestures toward the 
institutional logic behind human resources overload. In the T---/W--- case, the 
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disciplinary decision from the supply cooperative and the CYL branch awaited review 
by the commune-level committees of their respective hierarchies. Similar to a cadre 
Evaluation Form, the disciplinary decision was written to a precise length that would 
set aside two blank fields for upper-level officials to review and approve, finalized by a 
red stamp seal. For any disciplinary decision, the upper-level authority was the 
intended audience; red-stamp seals were the effective currency of disciplinary actions. 
Fig. 4.2 For review and approval: work unit and CYL decisions 
Following the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, it became standard practice for 
local party committees to review and approve criminal and disciplinary cases, 
bypassing the formal court system.329 This process of ‘approving cases by the secretary,’ 
329 The formal court system came under severe attack during the Anti-Rightist Campaign for 
its underlying bourgeois principles, including the ‘presumption of innocence’ and 
‘judicial independence.’ The power of the courts was curtailed, and while they continued 
to exist, their role in the administration of justice was generally reduced to a rubber-
stamp approval of the party committee.  
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or shuji pi’an 书记批案, made the party committee the political-legal authority on 
dispensing punishments. According to Leng and Chiu, the addition of case review to 
the already extensive responsibilities of the party committee precluded the detailed 
inspection of every disciplinary case that came up the bureaucratic ladder, particularly 
with regard to minor personnel infractions.330 
Gaining approval from the party committee instead hinged upon the careful 
presentation of the investigation itself. The investigating work unit spent significant 
time and effort preparing the evidentiary appendices, ensuring that the final product 
contained the right combination of documents, formatted according to standard 
conventions, and produced in sufficient volume. The requirements to documentation 
were not dispensed with lightly—it was highly common for a disciplinary case to be 
sent back down to the work unit because of inadequate evidence or formatting 
violations. Technicalities of the latter kind were much more likely to be grounds for 
rejection than issues of content for the simple reason that they were obvious.331 A 
hurried administrator was unlikely to fault inconsistencies in a suspect’s self-
examinations—however, unauthorized practices such as confessions written on red-
lined paper or using ball-point pen would have been immediately noticeable and cause 
for immediate rejection. 
One insight from the bureaucratic approach to the compilation of appendices is 
that that investigation and documentation of the investigation were not precisely the 
same process. Whatever empirical commitments the investigators might have 
                                               
330 Leng and Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China, 24. 
331 The following case study, involving one J-- Shusen, presents an example of this 
phenomenon.  
  252 
possessed, the programmatic end of compiling a case file was to assuage the higher 
levels’ epistemic anxieties and signal that an exhaustive investigation had been fully 
carried out. For the lower-level investigating unit, the presentation of these evidentiary 
appendices had an important performative dimension. The appendices from an 
investigation did not so much validate the facts of the case as the rigor of the 
investigation itself. This administrative approach to producing appendices mirrors Lisa 
Gitelman’s interest in the document as an epistemic object whose material form enables 
its social use as ‘evidence.’332 Dossiers and their contents are classic embodiments of the 
‘know-show’ function of documents, in which the dossier stands in as a token of the 
knowledge that it purportedly contains. 
The surplus of proof in the T---/W--- case provides a glimpse of how the dossier 
sustained a political economy of evidentiary materials within the bureaucratic 
hierarchy. The intra-organizational demand to ‘show work’ produced a bias toward 
volume and excess in the making of paper-based evidence. The over-reporting of non-
essential information, tangential ‘self-examinations,’ and continuous reduplication of 
effort were the means by which officials convinced their superiors that all problems had 
been thoroughly dealt with. The appendices of the T---/W--- case reflects how the 
knowledge practices of personnel investigation were not necessarily the source of 
actionable social intelligence, but were instead productive for performative acts of 
‘knowing and showing’ within the ranks of the bureaucracy itself. 
Bureaucratic requirements to evidence-production brought unintended 
consequences for all participants. For the subjects of investigation, often faced with 
minor disciplinary moral misconduct that were neither purely criminal nor political in 
                                               
332 Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents, 1. 
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nature, these work unit investigations could easily devolve into human resources hell. 
Between the investigation itself, and every major campaign when dossiers were re-
opened for examination, a black mark was cause for additional self-examinations, study 
plans, and more public meetings.  
In the daily work of the low-level bureaucracy, personnel investigations were 
extremely time-consuming. Because the basic methods of personnel investigation were 
the same as those previously employed in political campaigns to unmask hidden 
enemies, disciplinary procedures were liable to overreact to petty offenses. In the 
process, the administrators became bogged down in the ethnography of the most 
mundane problems of everyday life. The occasional heavy-handedness of disciplinary 
decisions belied an overworked bureaucratic workforce that was partially blinded by its 
own tools of self-persuasion. As we shall see in the next case, the general fixation with 
paper-based evidence also complicated and impeded the work of the bureaucracy, 
creating gaps in oversight and vulnerabilities to manipulation. 
 
File Affairs II: The J-- Shusen Case 
 
Letters and Investigators 
The present case addresses a variation on upon the theme of evidence through 
the account of an accused ‘hooligan’ named J-- Shusen.333 The individual in question 
was a party member and an equipment operator at the Hebei Province Installation 
Engineering Company. During J--’s tenure at the company from roughly 1967 to 1978, 
                                               
333 AC “Materials on the J-- Shusen Problem: Supplement” Baoding (1978) 
  254 
his dossier accumulated a long list of minor offenses, including but not limited to 
malingering, petty theft, fraud, and adultery. However, because of a confluence of 
factors, J-- was able to remain on the factory payroll for over a decade while evading 
substantial punishment.334  
What administrators called the “J-- Shusen Problem” was recorded in the 
supplemental file of J--’s personnel dossier, which contains the full stack of evidence 
related to his offenses up until 1978. The first document in the file contains a motion 
from J--’s work unit (Engineering Unit No. 3) to headquarters detailing J--’s crimes, and 
requesting permission to terminate him. This document was of a different variety than 
the verdict in the T---/W--- case above, as it did not refer to a single punishable offense, 
but rather a long record of hooligan behavior justifying the most serious form of 
censure available to a personnel section. The report complained:  
J-- Shusen has been absent from work, has violated the labor regulations 
and commits all kinds of petty crime. In previous times our work unit was 
not in a position to handle his behavior, but is has had a negative impact on 
the general public and his influence is extremely bad. He has hindered our 
progress in many ways. 
The materials appended to the report were compiled by the work unit 
management in order to support the request for expulsion from the factory. The 
evidence in just this case alone spans over 200 pages, containing self-criticism, 
accusations, background verification materials, and a large tranche of love letters from 
                                               
334 The context of J--’s case is germane insofar is it rough coincides with conventional 
periodization of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Baoding was in fact one of the 
epicenters of proletarian agitation in Hebei Province in 1966-67, but it notable that the 
politics of the Cultural Revolution largely figure in J-- Shusen’s case as a discursive 
strategy, employed by both J-- and his investigators to emplot the moral dimensions of 
his actions. 
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J--’s extramarital affair. The letters of the affair numbered in the dozens, and were 
archived in their own separate section. The bulk of the evidence provided in the 
supplement to the dossier related to the alleged affair, which was the basis for the label 
of ‘hooligan' 流氓 crimes. 
According to the work unit’s report, J-- Shusen began working at the factory as 
an apprentice in June 1967. The report alleged that over the next eleven years, J--’s total 
number of work days amounted to less than three years. Most of those working days 
were concentrated between 1967 and 1969. After that period, J-- appeared at the factory 
only sporadically, often coinciding with days when the factory distributed uniforms or 
winter supplies. For most of the 1970s, J-- was absent for long periods and lived off of 
sick pay. When the factory officials attempted to cut him off, J-- resorted to “bringing in 
people from outside the plant to make a scene” and strong-arming the officials into 
signing his documents. (The report named a particular ruffian from the No. 1 Rubber 
and Plastics Company who backed J-- on these occasions.)  
The year 1974 was the year J--’s hooligan activities reached a peak. In the Mao 
era ‘hooligan’ or liumang might refer generally to behaviors on the edges of criminality, 
but also carried a more specific meaning of sexually deviant acts. Therefore, ‘hooligan’ 
crimes in a disciplinary context included suspicions of sexual assault, homosexuality, 
and seduction. Referring generally to sexually deviant men, it had a strongly gendered 
connotation and was often blamed on low political education. In the work unit’s report, 
the factory primarily sought to use evidence of J--’s hooligan activity to expose his 
morally and politically deficient character, rather than strictly punish him for the 
extramarital relationship itself. 
Despite his track record at work, J-- was a party member from an early age and 
evidently benefited from political friendships in the city of Baoding. In May 1974 when 
J-- was 32 years-old, he was introduced to a 23 year-old woman named Y--- Yanfang 
through a mutual acquaintance. Y--- had just graduated from Hebei Normal University 
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with a degree in education and would soon be starting a job as a teacher. She was 
introduced to J-- in the hope that he would be able to use his connections to help her 
secure a job in a more desirable location such as Baoding, a prefectural-level city, as 
opposed to working in the countryside. J-- promised to look into the matter and make 
some inquiries on her behalf. 
Both J-- and Y--- were already married, but over the next four months, the two 
would develop a short-lived, intense relationship. J-- would call on Y--- at her sister’s 
house, and later Y---’s new school in Wan county, 30 miles outside of Baoding. Though 
J-- was unable to help Y--- secure a job in Baoding, he took up a self-appointed role as 
her political mentor and benefactor while pursuing her romantically. As an urban 
resident with an enviable proletarian job, J-- had access to coveted consumer goods, 
such as the new Red Flag Heavyweight bicycle that he promised to Y---.335 Besides the 
bicycle, J-- claimed in his subsequent confessions that he showered Y--- with gifts of 
eggs, pulled noodles, persimmons, mooncakes, a flashlight, and a transistor radio 
belonging to his wife. 
Due to their separate circumstances, J-- and Y---’s affair consisted largely of a 
romantic correspondence. Both were living with their spouses and separated by an 18 
mile bike ride, but they wrote each other regularly. The reason we know this is because 
                                               
335 The bicycle became a major point of contention in the aftermath of the affair. J-- himself 
had a coupon which gave him the right to purchase a Red Flag Heavyweight 紅旗加重自
行車. The bicycle supply company however recommended that J-- hold out in order to 
purchase a Flying Pigeon 飞鸽，or a Forever Bicycle 永久. Ultimately J-- fronted the 
money for the Red Flag on Y---’s behalf, but the cost of the bike was greater than the sum 
of money Y--- advanced him, and the exposure of the affair prevented J-- from receiving 
the full sum of what he paid for the bike. Red Flag and Flying Pigeon were made in 
Tianjin, Forever Bicycle in Shanghai. In the 1970s there was a popular saying about these 
brands: “飞鸽快，永久耐，红旗加重也不赖” Flying Pigeon is fast, Forever Bicycle lasts, 
Red Flag isn’t bad. 
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nearly all of their personal correspondence was seized by the authorities after the affair 
was uncovered. These love letters were read for incriminating information, reorganized, 
and eventually filed into J--’s dossier as proof of the affair. For a number of years as J--’s 
disciplinary case worked it ways through the enterprise’s disciplinary personnel 
structure, his love letters circulated as an object of bureaucratic research.  
The letters themselves are very ordinary and belie the impression of ‘hooligan’ 
activity. To the contrary, J--’s approach to courtship was to present himself as a 
steadfast advocate of revolutionary virtues. He frequently addresses Yanfang as ‘同志’, 
comrade, and signs off with ‘革命敬礼,’ salute to the revolution. His attitude to Yanfang is 
one of paternalistic revolutionary encouragement, writing at one point, “My visit must 
have tired you out. However you did not seem to mind, just like a seasoned fighter for 
the revolution, you are strong and have persevered. You have achieved what a common 
country girl could not, I am proud of you and admire you.” Elsewhere J-- reflected on 
being orphaned at a young age, and his relationships: “I lived for many years without 
my father or mother; it was the Party that raised me. I haven’t contributed much of 
anything, but the state and the masses have always looked after me and I am in debt to 
them. I am in debt to you too—you are always concerned about my health, and health is 
the foundation of the revolution, without good health and thought, we cannot do good 
work for the revolution.” Lastly, J-- speaks at more than point of eventualities: “In the 
not too distant future, we will work together, study together, live and struggle 
alongside one another.” 
For her part, Y--- wrote many letters as well. Y---’s letters are on the whole 
shorter and less overtly patriotic, if equally affectionate. The correspondence seems to 
show that the relationship was one of mutual interest, though Y--- expressed a degree of 
trepidation about being discovered. In response to a reference in one of J--’s letters, she 
questioned him, “Why are you keeping all of my letters? I wish you would not. They 
should be thrown out or burned after reading.” Her concerns fell on deaf ears, as J-- 
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would respond with homilies such as, “Difficulties will not discourage heroes, dawn 
will come soon; all you are doing is embracing the deep emotions of the proletariat.” 
Even by the uneven standards of Mao era personnel investigation, the 
preservation of the letters in J--’s dossier is peculiar. The filing of the letters appears to 
involve an element of archival misrecognition. One the one hand, the letters are 
handwritten texts that corroborate the existence of the affair; visually and generically, 
they appear to seamlessly integrate themselves into the dossier’s corpus of handwritten 
documents and lettered affidavits. But this textuality belies the fact that the letters are a 
rare example of material evidence in a dossier that happens to take a textual form. In 
other words, the letters are not typical ‘evidentiary materials’ 证明材料 in the form of a 
witness affidavit or an archival record testifying to the affair after the fact; rather, the 
letters were the direct objects of the affair itself, and were presented in J--’s dossier as 
material proof of his misdeeds. 
Fig 4.3 Love letters as evidential materials 
The anonymous administrator who handled J--’s correspondence invested a level 
of thought and care into their preservation as a documentary exhibit. All of J-- and Y---’s 
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letters were inventoried and rearranged by date. Many of J--’s letters were written on 
stationary bearing the letterhead of J--’s wife’s unit—but Y---’s letters were often written 
on odd-size bits and pieces of paper. Like all archival materials, these scaps had to be 
trimmed and resized, and then mounted with paste onto regular size pages to fit the 
dossier without obscuring any of the original text. Letters of more than one page were 
numbered by the administrator in the top right corner to note that they were part of a 
set. At some point in the process, this unfortunate reader studied all of the letters, and 
underlined key passages or sections to support the allegations in the report.336 This 
could not have been an enviable task, and yet this tedious presentation captures an 
essential part of what day-to-day dossier work consisted of. 
For J-- and Y---, matters came to a head in November 1974 when J--’s wife wrote 
a complaint with Y---’s work unit. Ma Junqing had apparently discovered some of the 
personal correspondence which confirmed her dark suspicions about the relationship. 
She wrote to the leadership of Qiming Village Middle School, where Y--- was employed 
as a physical education teacher, requesting discipline:  
Branch Party members and Members of the Revolutionary Committee: 
Greetings. There is an issue I wish to raise regarding the relationship 
between Teacher Y--- who is employed by your school and my husband, J--. 
I had heard of multiple rumors floating around that they were in a 
relationship. They both denied it, and I chose not to pursue. Y--- often 
comes to Baoding. Since I often stay with my mother, when Y--- visits, she 
stays at my house alone with J-- sometimes for days. She plays my husband 
against me, therefore my relationship with my husband is terrible. She 
writes to my husband frequently, and in one letter she said: “Our journey 
together is turbulent, yet the future is bright and sweet”—Why is she 
writing such a letter? 
Needless to say, J-- bears responsibility for this situation, but so does Y---. 
Although she is a young person in the New China, I feel she must be of the 
                                               
336 For instance, at one point, the bureaucratic reader underlined J--’s boast, “I do not cling to 
life like some sad bug that fears death” 我不是贪生怕死的可怜虫 
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lowest quality to compose such an embarrassing letter. How can a teacher 
have such corrupt virtues? I request the leadership of the school to educate 
Y--- and assist her in avoiding such serious mistakes in the future. 
Ma Junqing 74-11-25 
It is notable that Ma addressed her letter to the school administrators rather than 
the PSB, perhaps evidencing a sense of the personnel system as the most direct means of 
redress.337 The school’s response was swift. Within three days, they had interviewed Y--- 
and sent a request to J-- to have him visit the school and have a face-to-face with school 
leadership. J-- complied with the request, and travelled out to Qiming village to attempt 
to clear up the situation. But upon arriving in Qiming on the appointed day, J-- was 
confronted by a group of Y---’s local leaders and ‘militia’ who had gathered to defend 
Y---’s reputation. In lieu of the serious sit-down with school leadership, J-- received a 
physical beating for his role in in the affair. The group detained J-- overnight, and the 
next day handed him over to the Public Security branch of Wan County. 
For reasons already acknowledged, the matter of the affair was not an issue for 
Public Security, but J--’s arrival in Qiming had caused a small civil disturbance, so the 
Wan County PSB took him into their custody. In order for the PSB officers to file a full 
report, they required a detailed account from J-- of the complete set of circumstances 
that led to his beating in Qiming village. In Wan county, J-- would write the first of no 
fewer than seven ‘self-examinations’ admitting to the affair. J-- would later claim that he 
wrote this first confession under duress. For reasons that are unexplained, this first 
confession is perhaps the only one that is absent from J--’s dossier—all the others were 
filed in with the dossier as originals. 
                                               
337 It is also entirely possible that Ma did not wish for the issue to become a criminal matter 
and thus deliberately avoided notifying the PSB. In a subsequent letter, J-- claims that his 
wife regretted informing on him, which might deserve a grain of salt. 
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For the next month, J-- bounced around personnel purgatory as one organ after 
another passed off responsibility for dealing with him. Having obtained the required 
confession, the Wan County PSB sent word to the Baoding Municipal PSB that a certain 
J-- Shusen of their jurisdiction was in their custody. J-- was handed off to the 8th 
Precinct of the Baoding Public Security Bureau. However the Baoding PSB also lacked 
any reason to hold J--, so after a round of questioning, they notified J--’s work unit to 
send a representative to pick him up. Back at the No. 3 Engineering Unit, J--’s superiors 
sent J-- off to a detention center 拘留所, a type of temporary prison and reformatory, 
where J-- entered a ‘study course’ 学习班 under the guidance of one Teacher Meng (孟
老师). The purpose of J--’s ‘study course’ was twofold. The greater, stated purpose was 
undoubtedly to reeducate and disabuse J-- of the ‘hooligan’ mindset that had led to the 
affair in the first place. The more immediate and pressing task was to extract from J-- an 
ideologically passable confession statement that addressed both the facts of the case and 
struck convincing notes of contrition. Such a confession was a literal prerequisite to 
close the case and for J-- to be granted release. Meng Laoshi, was only a teacher in the 
honorific sense—it was clear from the dossier that he was a reformatory cadre tasked 
with overseeing J--’s reeducation. Thus began for J-- a month of continuous confession-
writing under the guidance of Meng Laoshi. 
Confession in Multiples 
One constant principle of all penal institutions in the PRC was an administrative 
insistence on obtaining ‘sincere’ confessions from the guilty party for offenses ranging 
from the severe to the trivial. It has been widely noted that the criminal system of the 
PRC, like its Qing and Republican predecessors, promised a measure of leniency to 
wrongdoers who had ‘confessed fully and begged the Party for guidance in self-
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reform.’338 But an equally vital principle in the administration of justice held that 
obtaining a confession from the accused was an all but necessary condition for 
administrative resolution.339 All disciplinary decisions, whether emanating from county 
courts to personnel sections, always travelled upward for higher-level review, and 
confessions were an important means of signaling to the upper levels that investigation 
had been carried out correctly, and justice rendered. Decisions lacking a full and sincere 
confession from the guilty party were often prejudicially viewed as ritually, narratively, 
and programmatically incomplete. 
Taking confessions then involved a degree of cynicism on the part of the 
authorities. For an administrator tasked with discipline, the confessant’s statement had 
to satisfy a subjective standard of sincere performance or it was met with rejection and 
the confessor would have to try again. As confessions were generally written at a point 
in the disciplinary process when guilt had already been determined, the factual content 
of a confession was a lessor criterion. Besides the strategic issue of whether or not the 
crimes confessed to conformed to the charges, the most important attribute of the 
confession was its depth of contrition, which signaled to the higher levels that the 
subject had not only been caught, but also ideologically reformed—that is, cured of the 
retrograde ideology that motivated the crime in the first place. 
For this reason, in any given case of discipline, a large portion of dossier material 
reflected repeated attempts to get the confession ‘right.’ The ‘rejected’ versions of the 
confession, which could be factually at odds with the ‘final’ version, were filed in the 
                                               
338 Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal Justice in China a History (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009). 
339 Michael Schoenhals, “Doing Prc Social History: On Research Methods, Sex, and the 
Decomposition of Paper,” Scottish Centre for Chinese Studies Research Seminar Series (2004). 
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dossier as supplemental material. Sometimes, though not always, the rejected 
confessions bore comments from the administrator specifying the reason for rejection; 
for instance, in the abovementioned T---/W--- case, one of T---’s submissions was sent 
back down because the administrator deemed T---’s ‘self-examination of his doubts of 
the Party to be vague and insufficient‘ 对党的怀疑检查不够仔细.’ 
As previously mentioned, J-- Shusen’s supplemental dossier file contains no less 
than seven ‘confessions,’ most of which were rejected on various grounds. J--’s first 
confession alone runs 42 handwritten pages. It recounted the entirety of the affair with 
an almost implausible level of factual detail, and for its length and qualities, might be 
considered an auto-ethnography: 
The next morning after dawn, Yanfang did a favor for the head teacher and 
went to go bake some bing (饼 flatbread) in the morning, as there was only 
one chef on duty. She helped out for two or so hours, and came back after 
eleven o’clock with a few bing and some groceries. We ate together. 
Afterwards, because Yanfang’s uncle had taken sick, we went to go get 
some other things for him, including two pounds of white sugar from the 
market, and by that time it was already two o’clock. The next day was a 
Sunday, I took her back to her workplace. Qiming is about 18 li from 
Nanlu, Yanfang’s native village—it’s all out in the countryside.340 We 
walked and talked the whole time. Yanfang couldn’t believe that I had 
trekked out this way just to see her and send her off to her work. She felt 
indebted, and said that she was resolved that we should be deep lifelong 
friends. 
J--’s first confession was summarily rejected. It was so extensive and laden with 
information that even if it was a accurate record of events, its ideological content was 
overwhelmed by details of J--’s comings and goings, use of ordinary goods, and 
frequent trips to the market. Indeed, J-- recounted his extramarital affair primarily 
                                               
340 One li 里 is equivalent to about .62 miles, so the entire trip would have been something 
close to 11 miles, which it seems the couple covered by foot.  
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through description of his meals with Y--- Yanfang—when they ate, what they ate, and 
sometimes the cost of various goods. On page 42, the account came to a merciful end 
with J-- promising to ‘deeply examine his problems’ with an attitude of ‘seeking truth 
from facts,’ but this may not have been the most appropriate use of the investigative 
slogan. All 42 pages of this first failed attempt were filed in the dossier. 
From December 1974 to January 1975, J-- would try several more attempts at a 
confession. In another rejected confession, J--, choosing a defiant tone, claimed he had 
been seduced and listed item by item all the gifts that he had given to Y---, such as food 
staples, sweets, and electronics. A few days later, J-- made another attempt in which he 
admitted at least some measure of responsibility: “Due to capitalist thought playing 
tricks on my brain, I took to the path of committing crimes and adultery. Since she 
wrote me many times expressing that we should be together, I replied several times 
with the same. Because I didn’t think of the long-term consequences, things have really 
gotten out of hand.” Later in his detention, J-- addressed one confession to his overseer, 
Meng Laoshi specifically: “Ever since the (beginning of this month), thinking back on 
my mistakes, my mind has been unsettled, and I am filled with regrets…It seems that I 
did not listen to the Party or to the words of Chairman Mao, and I do not deserve Meng 
Laoshi’s just admonishments.” 
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Fig 4.4 Three rejected confessions 
After several more drafts and a month of detention, J-- finally mustered a 
passable confession: 
Ever since I committed the act of adultery, leadership and my comrades 
have found precious time during their busy day to help me to deeply 
acknowledge my problems, which has completely changed my view of the 
world, and eased my personal burden. This deep acknowledgement—my 
heartfelt and honest confession of my problems—will allow me to return to 
the ranks of the working class, and do even greater things in my work and 
study. Though I have confessed my problems, my awareness is but 
superficial. I hope that under the help of leadership, and with my own 
earnest efforts, I will know my problems and deeply examine myself. I will 
hold to the attitude of becoming a new person; in my efforts from today 
forward, I will reform my thought, and from new thought I will recognize 
my mistakes and use my own revolutionary actions to repay the care and 
assistance shown to me by the Party and the People. 
J--’s last confession is such a departure in tone and content that it reads as though 
it was written by another person. Yet this example, like the previous six, is written in 
his own handwriting, with what looks to the same paper and pen. The auto-
ethnography of his first confession was entirely expunged, and the matter of his affair 
abstracted to the category of the offense and no more. Most striking is J--’s newfound 
  266 
sense of political humility, his performative expression of submission to the wisdom 
and mentorship of the Party. 
J--’s slow crawl to political consciousness defies simple characterization. 
Returning to the literature on confessional practices in the Soviet Union, Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has pointed out that scholarly approaches to citizen confessions have a 
general tendency to bifurcate these discursive acts into ‘cynical’ vs. ‘sincere’ 
performances. Viewed through that dichotomy, J--’s confession may reflect a strategic 
use of political discourse to escape detention (Kotkin’s “speaking Bolshevik); or 
conversely, J--’s writing of six successive confessions reflect a disciplinary process 
through which J-- internalizes the role of a revolutionary subject (Hellbeck’s 
‘subjectivizing’ practices).341 But here I second Fitzpatrick’s critique that the sum of 
these interpretations presents a false dichotomy between belief or non-belief, when our 
historical tools give us no purchase on the interiority of the confessant. 
A different approach is to consider the politics of production that the confession 
entailed. A mentioned in the above, a full, sincere confession was all but a prerequisite 
for a disciplinary decision to receive approval from the upper levels. But as a 
consequence, the burden of this requirement fell upon both the person accused of the 
crime as well as the administrator of the investigation. In the context of the Cultural 
Revolution—or any political campaign—no official wanted to be viewed as ’soft’ on 
political crime. If a confession was found lacking, the blame would fall upon the 
accused as well as the administrator, meaning the latter had a significant stake in the 
                                               
341 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization; Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist 
Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939).” 
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quality of the confession. In this act of confession writing, there existed a certain degree 
of mutual interest and co-dependence between criminal and inquisitor. 
In other words, no one had more invested in J--’s political reeducation than the 
official charged with overseeing his case—the aforementioned Meng Laoshi. By default, 
every confession was a joint production, submitted by a suspect individual under the de 
facto sponsorship of a bureaucratic guide.342 Higher-level review entailed the threat of 
administrative sanctions against local administrators for low-quality investigations. 
When the confessant failed to perform to standards, the failure was shared between the 
author and sponsor. In the process, the confession statement, a medium of 
documentation intended to give closure and peace of mind to the bureaucratic process, 
had a way of holding all its participants hostage until the formal standards of the 
process had been fully satisfied. 
The coda to J--’s case showed the hostage metaphor to hold a grain of truth. 
Following J--’s seventh and final confession, Meng Laoshi permitted J-- to leave the 
detention center and briefly return home for the Spring Festival. J-- took advantage of 
the opportunity and never reported back to continue his study course. For the next four 
years, J-- lived largely out of the view of the authorities, living off of the help of his 
sister and a side career in petty theft and swindling. Around the same time that he 
disappeared, J-- was accused by a former coworker of stealing a chicken, an electric 
                                               
342 Literary scholar Jie Li, in her contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Chinese Literature, 
writes a fascinating case study of poet Nie Gannu’s (1903-1986) “literary inquisition.” Li 
casts the written objects of the dossier as a co-authored production, fashioned by the 
subject with the “censor as muse.” Jie Li, ““Are Our Drawers Empty?”: Nie Gannu’s 
Dossier Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Chinese Literatures, ed. Carlos Rojas 
and Andrea Bachner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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kettle, and a valuable toon tree 香椿.343 He also borrowed number of small loans from 
neighbors with promises to help them buy household goods such as charcoal, and 
never paid them back. The mounting accusations found their way into J--’s dossier. 
In 1978, J-- suddenly turned up again at the factory. Perhaps hoping that the end 
of the Cultural Revolution and the wave of rehabilitations might grant him a second 
chance, he asked to have his old job back, in addition to three years back pay. 
Management was outraged by J--’s petition, and attached the hundreds of pages of 
incriminating material in J--’s dossier to a motion to officially expel him from the work 
unit, pending further disciplinary punishment. They forwarded the motion and all the 
relevant materials to headquarters for final approval, writing: 
(In previous times), due to the influence of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, 
our management had no choice but to give in to (J--’s) demands…But 
Chairman Hua has destroyed the Gang of Four, so the conditions for 
resolving the problem of J-- Shusen have come to fruition.344 Now under the 
leadership of Chairman Hua, and guided by the strategic rulings of the 
Party and the policies of the 5th People’s Congress, everyone is working 
together and struggling toward reach a new era. Our unit, to catch up with 
the times, and reflect the changed situation, has reviewed all of our old 
disciplinary cases and request to resolve this problem of J-- Shusen 
immediately. 
Shortly afterwards, the work unit received a reply from the upper levels. Despite 
the several allegations of petty thievery, an extremely well-documented extramarital 
affair, and a poor reputation at work, the higher-ups refuse to grant the motion to 
terminate. The reply stipulated in stern language: 
                                               
343 Also known as Chinese mahogany, the toon tree is both an ornamental and medicinal tree 
commonly found in the northern parts of China. 
344 Hua Guofeng (1921-2008) was Mao’s hand-picked successor, and briefly the Chairman of 
the CCP from 1976-78 after the death of Mao. 
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Decision: This material cannot be approved!  
We require: 1) A ‘self-examination’ for all crimes, with acknowledgement of 
their severity and contrition; 2) Evidentiary for hooligan behavior, cheating 
and stealing; 3) The opinions of the masses… 
Also ‘self-examinations cannot be written using ball-point pen! 
The paper trail comes to an end here. There is no knowing as to whether J-- was 
ever brought to account for his numerous petty crimes, or if he was spared from 
punishment by the inefficiency of circuits of paper. This absurd end was a fitting 
conclusion to a winding bureaucratic journey. 




In May 2015, I went to Baoding to see a man about buying some documents. I 
had been in correspondence with the collector—let’s call him Tian—for several months. 
We made our acquaintance online after he sold me a number of 1950s bureaucratic 
manuals. In our private communications that followed, Tian boasted that he owned 
“the greatest archive in all of Northern China,” and invited me to see for myself. When I 
asked what made this archive so noteworthy, he declined to elaborate, saying its 
contents were not so easily distilled. 
After a delay of several months, I took up Tian’s invitation to visit Baoding and 
see the collection. Commonly referred to in China as a ‘three-tier city,’ Baoding has a 
population of just over two million and sits a brisk 45-minute ride from Beijing along 
the new high-speed rail line. Enmeshed in an industrial conurbation that spreads over 
most of central Hebei, Baoding vies annually with nearby Shijiazhuang for the title of 
most polluted Chinese city by air quality index; but it also retains cultural traditions as 
an old provincial capital and home to Hebei University.  
Tian picked me up from the train station one bright weekday afternoon. He was 
a ruddy, solidly built man in his 50s, and more reserved than our online 
communications would have suggested. He lived alone in a Soviet-style public housing 
compound near the university. When Tian opened the door to his third floor apartment, 
the first thing I saw through the crack of the doorway was papers. Entering the living 
room, stacks of acid-browned, Mao-era documents occupied every surface and cranny. 
As Tian would show me, he kept files in his kitchen cupboards, on top of his 
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refrigerator, and strewn over the bed of what had once been a spare room. Tian did not 
possess a collection so much as he lived among it. 
Fig. 5.1 Files 
Tian carried a mental map of the documents strewn throughout the house. Cadre 
dossiers for instance, were piled high on the bed in the spare room, while the Cultural 
Revolution occupied most of the kitchen. For any documents that Tian had wanted to 
keep together, he loaded them into small semi-transparent plastic bags identical to 
those found at a Chinese wet market. At the top, Tian added a sheet of paper with a 
note to himself about the contents, and then tied a loose knot so that he could 
conveniently carry the documents like a bag of groceries. 
For the next several days, I perused stacks of documents at Tian’s home as 
though it were a library. Tian would bring his collection over to me at the living room 
table two or three plastic bags at a time. When I finished, I put the used files back into 
their overflowing bags and he would swap them out for new ones. Tian was on a 
scaled-back summer work schedule, so most of the time he sat as his desk surfing the 
web or napping while I worked. We developed a comfortable rapport, taking turns 
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making tea and enjoying conversation over lunch. For his trouble, I would take him out 
to a nice dinner each night before his work shift.  
At some point during that week, I came across the “Supplemental Materials on 
the J-- Shusen Problem,” sitting in a bag of cases from the Cultural Revolution. Turning 
to the appendices, I found myself looking at J-- Shusen’s rejected confessions and his 
seized love letters, which—due to the care of an archivist, —had been perfectly 
preserved. One of the reliable cliches of the historical profession is that story of archival 
serendipity, when a frustrated researcher, after a long day of fruitless searching, 
stumbles upon some misfiled note that produces an unexpected breakthrough. I must 
say I have never had the pleasure of such an experience. But as I sat with J-- Shusen’s 
thick case file in Tian’s living room in Baoding, I was struck by thought of its exodus 
from the archive and the winding itinerary that had led to our present encounter. 
It is far more straightforward to retrace my own steps to Tian’s apartment than to 
account for the post-archival journey of J--’s file. The purge of J-- Shusen’s supplemental 
materials was a product of the 1980s reform of the dossier system, which was itself 
keyed to the seismic political changes that followed the death of Mao and close of the 
Cultural Revolution. Reflecting the state-wide initiative to rectify “unjust, false and 
erroneous cases” and rehabilitate the accused 平反冤假错案, the Organization 
Department convened the Second National Cadre Dossier Work Conference in 1980 in 
order to “sort out” 整理 the contents of cadre dossiers.345 According to the planners, 
under the “influence of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four,” a deluge of dubious 
materials—such as confessions, accusations, and questionable reports—had entered 
                                               
345 The first iteration in 1956 had produced the “Temporary Regulations on Cadre Dossier 
Management Work,” which I addressed in Chapter 2.  
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cadre dossiers during the struggles of the Cultural Revolution and rendered the whole 
system inoperable. More precisely: 
For every cadre under ‘investigation,’ there were dozens, hundreds, and 
even thousands of pages of materials…Most of these evidentiary materials 
contained exaggerations, false accusations, and superfluous duplicates. 
Only a small number of the materials are historically accurate and can be 
referenced in cadre examinations or studied for the history of the 
revolution.346 
Based upon the work of the conference, the Organization Department issued a 
notice on “Methods for Sorting Out Cadre Dossiers (1980)” which laid out guidelines 
for all party-state agencies—including the Public Security Bureau—to purge their 
personnel archives of questionable materials. The general principle of ‘sorting out’ the 
cadre dossiers was that for any case that had been overturned, the dossier should still 
retain all records of administrative decisions, such as sentencing decisions, approvals 
from leadership, notices on arrest, detention, etc. However, most of the the evidentiary 
materials making up the supplemental appendix of dossiers were designated to be 
“returned to the individual.” This included the return of all “self-examinations and 
confessions,” “third-party accusations” leveled by others, as well as “any personal 
letters, writings, reference material, photos, or notes.”347 Only duplicates of 
“superfluous or libelous material” were permitted to be destroyed. Officials were 
                                               
346 “Cadre Dossier Work Guidelines (1980)” reprinted in Chinese Law and Government No. 
17(116): p. 125. 
347 CCPM “公安部关于妥善处理文化大革命运动中冤、假、错案材料问题的通知(1980)” 
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instructed to release all of these ‘personal materials’ directly to the subject, or else 
provide an explanation as to why an item was being withheld.348 
The plan to return these controversial materials was a stark reversal for an 
institution traditionally ruled though secrecy, which speaks to the ideological 
imperatives of the post-Mao transition. In theory, all the material in J--’s supplemental 
file, including accusations against made him that he had never seen, were supposed to 
be returned to him. We can imagine what sort of impact the release of these materials 
would have wrought on the lives of Chinese citizens. Persons would receive their files 
to learn for the first time the political charges that had been leveled against them, the 
identities of intimates who had informed, the political reasoning behind their 
punishments.349 The revenge of the archive invokes the testimony of one of Matthew 
Hull’s bureaucratic interviewees, who memorably stated, “Files are always ready to 
talk, if not now, while you are in your seat then later…Files are time bombs.”350 
But in the PRC, the restitution of dossier materials would be complicated by the 
same institutional dynamics that plagued local dossier management throughout the 
Mao era. The Organization Department made the return of materials part of its internal 
                                               
348 Certain personal materials, such as those commented on by party officials, were deemed 
‘unsuitable’ for release. 
349  In the Soviet Union and former republics, the opening of the surveillance archives in the 
1990s shaped the imperatives for individual and collective reckoning. Katherine Verdery 
describes an evocative episode from post-socialist Romania, in which a man requested his 
own file from the Securitate archives. Sitting down with the file in the reading room, he 
proceeded to angrily read through and cross out with a red pen all the information in his 
file that was demonstrably false. No one appeared to stop him. Verdery, Secrets and 
Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of the Romanian Secret Police, 62 
350 Matthew Hull, Government of Paper the Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 135. Verdery singles out this quote as 
well. 
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process of cadre rehabilitation, swiftly addressing most high-level cases by the mid-
1980s. But as directives for sorting out the personnel archive reached down to the local 
work units, the return of dossier materials was far from guaranteed. There were many 
potential issues: the designated recipients for the personal materials had often moved 
away or could not be located; originals and duplicates could not be fully accounted for; 
sorting the materials took more time and manpower than the personnel sections could 
afford. Moreover, despite the Organization Department’s official position that the 
dossier system’s problems stemmed from the Cultural Revolution, it acknowledged 
elsewhere that volume and over-accumulation had clogged dossiers at all levels for 
decades, during which time “the rules where not observed or there were simply no 
rules to go by.”351 The historical self-referentiality built into the structure of the dossier 
made it impossible for an administrator to purge a specific set of materials without 
wading into a deep morass. The problem of these dubious materials was embedded 
within the larger problem of the dossier. 
Under these conditions, many local work units assessed their archive rooms and 
concluded the superfluous dossiers fit the definition of trash. Dealing with them 
according to regulations would require far too much labor, and no one would come to 
claim them regardless. As a result, hundreds of thousands of dossiers from the entire 
span of the Mao era were discarded by local work units in the years after the Cultural 
Revolution. Many of the disposed dossiers were duplicates, including several of the 
items I have used in this study. Others might have pertained to persons who had 
                                               
351 “Cadre Dossier Work Guidelines (1980)” reprinted in Chinese Law and Government No. 
17(116): p. 118. 
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passed away or disappeared. Once a dossier had been discarded, it was difficult to 
ascertain exactly why. 
The preferred means of discarding useless paper was to send it off for recycling, 
which might gain the work unit or an entrepreneurial bureaucrat a few extra cents. 
Somewhere along the process, a large of quantity of materials marked by local work 
units for destruction was instead sold and quietly preserved. Many of the files that 
would later find their way into the hands of collectors are still attached to the original 
order for destruction condemning them to pulp—though both documents survive. In 
the 1980s, when there was not much of a market for paper artifacts of the recent past, 
work unit files were traded by the pound, and carted around on hand-carts. Most 
people went into the files hunting for old photos, which gained a degree of commodity 
value during the 1990s ‘old photo craze.’ Gradually these materials began appearing in 
old book and paper markets, such as the famous Saturday morning market at 
Panjiayuan in Beijing. 
Fig. 5.2 Order for destruction 
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In Baoding, I asked Tian how he came to be a collector of old files. He said that 
he that he started in the 1990s when barely anyone was involved. He had lived through 
the Cultural Revolution and said possessing the files gave him a certain sense of 
“meaning.” He spent thousands of dollars building up his collection.352 His family and 
friends expressed skepticism. He stopped buying for a time, but resumed again in the 
2000s, around the time when academic researchers discovered the markets and started 
driving up prices. It was around that time Tian made his largest-ever purchase, a near-
complete 84-volume set of archives from the Socialist Education Campaign in one Hebei 
commune. The massive series required him to also buy a used wall-length bookcase just 
to store the files in his house. 
Occasionally, Tian would mention eventually selling his collection and retiring 
off of the proceeds, but he seemed to be in no hurry. During our time together, I offered 
to buy several files off of Tian, but each time he was loathe to part with them, so he 
settled on letting me snap photos. Despite the prodigious size of the collection, Tian 
claimed to have read every single document in the apartment. I do not doubt that he 
did at one time, but on the occasions that Tian came to the living room and read over 
my shoulder, it always seemed that he was discovering a new corner of his collection 
for the first time. There was something poignant about the way that Tian had inherited 
a piece of the Maoist archive, and in the process, had himself become the archivist—
living amongst a sea of dimly recalled papers naming other people. 
352  Most discarded work unit files gradually make their way east from market to market 
until they reach a metropolis like Beijing, Tianjin, or Shanghai, where they can sold for a 
higher price. Baoding was one of the last markets before Beijing, and hence gave Tian 
access to files coming from work units in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia before 
they became too expensive.  
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I suspect this is a sign of how all archives end. But with regard to the Maoist 
dossier, a project born in revolution and harboring aspirations to social knowledge, it is 
sobering to wade through the detritus of that archive and find its artifacts so 
abandoned. From the remove of the present, the dossiers tell us a great deal about social 
life under Maoism and the bureaucrats who documented it. The dossier system was 
without doubt, one of the most comprehensive ethnographic archives ever attempted. 
Its legacy and undoing lay in its capacity to thread politics into the fabric of everyday 
social routines, which enlarged the scope of the political at the expense of rendering 
politics mundane and tedious in the process. The same archival operations that made 
the dossier a formidable collector of detailed evidence undermined its coherence 
through the production of a vast body of paper material. Whether the source of this 










Beijing Municipal Archives 
Chongqing Municipal Archives 
Shanghai Municipal Archives 
Tongzhou Municipal Archives 





Chinese University of Hong Kong Universities Services Center for China Studies 
East China Normal University Modern History Research Center 
Fudan University Contemporary China Social Life Data and Research Center 
Jiaotong University 20th Century China County Archives Collection 
Nankai University Social History Center 
Shanxi Social History Research Center 
 
 
Primary Journals and Periodicals 
 
Archives Work 《档案工作》 
Construction 《建设》 
Internal Reference Materials 《内部参考》 
Public Security Construction 《公安建设》 
The People’s Public Security 《人民公安》 
Work Materials Bulletin 《工作通讯》 
 
 
Important Historical Documents of the CCP 中共重要历史文献资料汇编 
 




Vol. 21(7) 公安建设 (1957年: 第1-29期， 总第183-211期)〈内部刊物·绝对秘密〉(中华人民
共和国公安部《公安建设》编委会) 
Vol. 24(7) 组织工作文件汇集 /(中共中央〉西南局组织部办公室编印, 1953年4月30日. 
Vol. 28(2) 人事工作文件选编【内部文件·不得外传】内务部政府机关人事局编·1963年12月 
Vol. 25(40) 肃反运动中清查出的反革命分子和其他坏分子资料汇编【第一编】/中共山西
省太原市委员会五人小组办公室, 1960年5月. 
Vol. 28(4) 民政信访工作资料选编 (国家民政部信访局·1981年10月 
 280 
 
Vol. 28(9) 党的组织工作文件选编〈第一集〉(中共中央组织部办公厅编·1964年 
Vol. 28(10) 干部档案工作文件汇编”【机密】(中共天津市委组织部编印·1982年 
Vol. 28(11) 确定建国前干部参加革命工作时间文件汇编【机密文件】（中共浙江省委组织
部编印·1985年 
Vol. 28(21) 中国居民身份证工作文件资料集【1983～1992】(公安部治安管理局·1993年 
Vol. 28(24) 纠正错划阶级成份文件资料选编〈1947－1986〉”【内部文件·注意保管】(河
北省民政厅·1986年7月 
Vol. 28(35) 民政工作文件选编（一）〈上下〉(民政部政策研究室·1984年9月) 
Vol. 28(48) 档案工作文件汇集【第一集】【机密】(国家档案局办公室编印·1980年2月 
Vol. 28(83) 组织工作文件选编【1978-1984】 （中共中央组织部办公厅·1980年 
Vol. 28(110) 组织工作文件选编【1979年】 （中共中央组织部办公厅·1980年 
Vol. 28(111) 组织工作文件选编【1980年·上册】 （中共中央组织部办公厅·1981年 
Vol. 28(122) 机要, 秘书, 保密工作文件选编（中华人民共和国监察部, 1989年7月） 
Vol. 28(30)  当代中国监狱统计资料【1949～1989】【司法部监狱管理局•1998年11月】 
Vol. 特辑(1) 中华人民共和国最高人民法院特别法庭审判林彪、江青反革命集团案主犯纪
实, 最高人民法院研究室·1982年. 
Vol. 特辑(5) 党的宣传工作会议概况和文献〈1952～1992〉（上下） /中共中央宣传部办
公厅, 1994年. 




Vol. 特辑(51)党史资料征集工作手册 /成都军区党史资料征集办公室, 1985年元月. 
Vol. 特辑(80) 侦破反革命犯罪案例选编 (一)、(二) /中国人民公安大学侦察系, 1986年9月 
Vol. 特辑(92)中共中央组织部史志资料【上下 】/中央组织部相关机构, 2006年3月. 
 
 
Books and Articles 
 
Alford, William. “Of Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew At Criminal Justice in Late 
Imperial China.” California Law Review 72, no. 6 (1984): 1180–256. 
Bachman, David. Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System. Berkeley: Institute of East 
Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1985. 
Barnett, Doak. “Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the 
Chinese Communist Bureaucracy.” The China Quarterly (1966): 8–39. 
Barnett, Doak and Ezra Vogel. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist 
China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 
Baum, Richard. “”Red and Expert:” the Politico-Ideological Foundations of China’s 
Great Leap Forward.” Asian Survey (1964): 1048–57. 
 281 
 
Betts, Paul. Within Walls Private Life in the German Democratic Republic. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Bisson, T.A. Yenan in June 1937: Talks With the Communist Leaders. Berkeley: Center for 
Chinese Studies, University of California, 1973. 
Bray, Francesca. “Science, Technique, Technology: Passages Between Matter and 
Knowledge in Imperial Chinese Agriculture.” The British Journal for the History of 
Science 41, no. 03 (2008): 319-344.  
Brown, Jeremy. “Burning the Grassroots: Chen Boda and the Four Cleanups in 
Suburban Tianjin.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 26 (2008): 50–69. 
Brown, Jeremy. City Versus Countryside in Mao’s China: Negotiating the Divide. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.  
Brown, Jeremy and Matthew D. Johnson, eds. Maoism At the Grassroots: Everyday Life in 
China’s Era of High Socialism Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. 
Burns, John. The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study of 
Party Control of Leadership Selection, 1979-1984. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. 
Burns, John. “Cadre Dossier System: Introduction.” Chinese Law and Government 27, no. 
5 (1994): 5–13. 
Burton, Antoinette. Dwelling in the Archive. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
Carson, John. “Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the Search for Army Intelligence.” Isis 84, 
no. 2 (1993): 278–309. 
Chambers, David. “The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography.” 
Studies in Intelligence (2012): 31–46. 
Cheek, Timothy. “The Names of Rectification: Notes on the Conceptual Domains of 
CCP Ideology in the Yan’an Rectification Movement.” Language and Politics in 
Modern China (1996): 1–42. 
Chen, Yung-Fa. “Suspect History and the Mass Line: Another “Yan’an Way”,” In 
Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches, edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, 
London; New York: Routledge, 2003, 169-89. 
Cohen, Jerome. The Criminal Process in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1963; an 
Introduction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
Cook, Alexander. “Unsettling Accounts: The Trial of the Gang of Four. Narratives of 
Justice and Humanity in the Aftermath of China’s Cultural Revolution,” Ph.D. 
diss., Columbia University, 2007. 
 282 
 
Cook, Alexander. The Cultural Revolution on Trial. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016. 
Dai, Qing, David E. Apter, Timothy Cheek, and Jinshou Song. Wang Shiwei and “Wild 
Lilies”: Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944. Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
Deng, Hongqin, 邓宏琴 and Ma Weiqing 马维强. “革命与日常：集体化时代的中国农村
社会.” Journal of Central China Normal University 华中师范大学学报 11 (2007): n.p.  
Deng, Shaoxing, 邓绍兴. “Pudie as Early Personnel Files 谱牒是最早的人事档案.” 
Dang’an Xue Yanjiu 档案学研究 2 (1991): 14–15. 
Deng, Shaoxing 邓绍兴. Personnel File Studies 人事档案学. Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian 
chubanshe. 中国青年出版社, 1990. 
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996. 
Dimitrov, Martin. “Dictatorship and Information: Autocratic Regime Resilience in 
Communist Europe and China.”  (forthcoming 2018): 1–27. 
Dittmer, Lowell. Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1998. 
Documents Editorial Committee of the Party Center, 中共中央文献编辑委员会, ed. The 
Works of Chen Yun 陈云文献 Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. 人民出版社, 1995. 
Dutton, Michael. Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to “the People”. 
Oakleigh, Melbourne, Australia; New York, N.Y.; Cambridge University Press: 
1992. 
Dutton, Michael. Policing Chinese Politics a History. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2005. 
Epstein, Fritz. “Archives Administration in the Soviet Union.” The American Archivist, 2 
(1957): 131–45. 
Esherick, Joseph, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder. The Chinese Cultural Revolution 
as History. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Fei, Xiaotong, 费孝通, ed. Jiu Renwu de Gaizao. 旧人物的改造 Guangzhou: Chun qiu shu 
dian 春秋书店, 1950. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “New Perspectives on Stalinism.” The Russian Review (1986): 357-373.  
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Everyday Stalinism Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia 
in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 283 
 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Stalinism: New Directions. London; New York: Routledge, 2000. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Tear Off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
Foucault, Michel. Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Fu, Liping, 傅丽萍. “干部人事档案制度的变迁与改革. The Changing and Reform of the 
Chinese Cadre Personnel File,” M.A. diss., Nanjing University, 2012. 
Fu, Hualing. “Formalizing Popular Justice: Police and Community in Post-Mao China,” 
Ph.D. diss., York University 1993. 
Gao, Hua, 高华. How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins and Development of the Yan’an 
Rectification Movement 红太阳是怎样升起的：延安整风运动的来龙去脉. Hong 
Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe 中文大学出版社, 2000. 
Gao, Hua, 高华. “1940: Cadre Screening in Yan’an 1940年延安审干.” Yanhuang Chunqiu 
炎黄春秋 3 (2012): 21–27. 
Getty, J. Arch. Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-
1938. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Ghosh, Arunabh. “Making it Count : Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early 
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1959,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2014. 
Gitelman, Lisa. Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents. Durham; London: 
Duke University Press, 2014. 
Goikhman, Isabella. “Soviet-Chinese Academic Interactions in the 1950s: Questioning 
the “Impact Response” Approach,” In China Learns From the Soviet Union, 1949-
Present, edited by Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li. Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2010, 275-302.  
Goodman, David. Class in Contemporary China. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. 
Greetham, David. “Who’s in, Who’s Out: The Cultural Poetics of Archival Exclusion.” 
Studies in the Literary Imagination 32, no. 1 (1999): 1–28. 
Grimsted, Patricia. “Archives in the Soviet Union: Their Organization and the Problem 
of Access.” The American Archivist (1971): 27–41. 
Gross, Jan. Revolution From Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and 
Western Belorussia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Gupta, Akhil. Red Tape Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012. 
Hacking, Ian. “Making Up People.” London Review of Books 28, no. 16 (2006): 23–26. 
 284 
 
Hacking, Ian. Historical Ontology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Hellbeck, Jochen. “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-
1939).” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (1996): 344–73. 
Hellbeck, Jochen. “Working, Struggling, Becoming: Stalin-Era Autobiographical Texts.” 
Russian Review 60, no. 3 (2001): 340–59. 
Hershatter, Gail. “Notes From the Alleyway: Zhang Jishun’s and the Promise of 
Archival Research.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 10, no. 1 (2016): 106–12. 
Hershatter, Gail. The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. 
Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997. 
Holquist, Peter. “Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work”: Bolshevik 
Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context.” The Journal of Modern History (1997): 
415–50. 
Hong, Jun, 宏钧, ed. Cadre Dossier Work Selected Documents 干部人事档案工作文献选集 
Beijing: Dangjian duwu chuban she 党建读物出版社, 1994. 
Hooper, Cynthia. “Trust in Terror? The Search for a Foolproof Science of Soviet 
Personnel.” The Slavonic and East European Review 91, no. 1 (2013): 26–56. 
Hsiung, James and Hungdah Chiu, eds. The Trial of the “Gang of Four” and Its Implication 
in China. Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1981. 
Huang, Liuhong and Chu Djang. A Complete Book Concerning Happiness and Benevolence: 
A Manual for Local Magistrates in Seventeenth-Century China. Tucson, Ariz.: 
University of Arizona Press, 1984. 
Hull, Matthew. “Documents and Bureaucracy.” Annual Review of Anthropology 41 (2012): 
251–67. 
Hull, Matthew. Government of Paper: the Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. 
Jiangxi Provincial Committee Office of Cadre Examination, 中共江西省委审干办公室
Cadre Examination Reference Handbook 审干工作参考手册. 1955. 
Jin, Bo, 金波. How Grassroots Party Organs Can Initiate Criticism and Self-Criticism當的農
村基層組織怎麼樣開展批評和自我批評. Jilin: Jilin chubanshe 吉林出版社, 1956. 




Karl, Rebecca E. Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism At the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 
Kharkhordin, Oleg. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
Koenker, Diane and Ronald D. Bachman. Revelations From the Russian Archives. 
Washington: Library of Congress, 1997. 
Korzec, Michel and Martin Whyte. “Reading Notes: The Chinese Wage System.” The 
China Quarterly (1981): 248–73. 
Kotkin, Stephen. Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997. 
Kraus, Richard. Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981. 
Krylova, Anna. “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies.” Kritika: explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian history 1 (2000): 119–46. 
Kuhn, Philip. Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990. 
Kuo, Warren. Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party. Taipei: Institute of 
International Relations, 1968. 
Lam, Tong. A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-
State, 1900-1949. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. 
Lamb, Franklin. “An Interview With Chinese Legal Officials.” The China Quarterly 66 
(1976): 323. 
Latour, Bruno. The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil D’Etat. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2009. 
Lee, Hong Yung. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
Lee, R.W. “The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernisation.” The China Quarterly 
(1966): 40–62. 
Leese, Daniel. Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Leng, Shao-chuan and Hungdah Chiu, eds. Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1985. 
 286 
 
Li, Jingrui, 刘晶蕊. “Research on the Sufan Campaign in 1950s Shanghai 20世纪50年代
中期上海肃反运动研究,” M.A. diss., Marxism-Leninism Institute, 2015. 
Li, Xin, 黎辛. “My Experience of Cadre Screening and the “Rectifiation Movement” At 
Yan’an 我在延安经历的审查干部与「抢救运动」.” Dangshi Bolan 党史博览 11 
(2008): 23–25. 
Li, Jie. ““Are Our Drawers Empty?”: Nie Gannu’s Dossier Literature,” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Chinese Literatures, edited by Carlos Rojas and Andrea Bachner, 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 275-95. 
Li, Xiaobing and Qiang Fang. Modern Chinese Legal Reform. University Press of 
Kentucky, 2013. 
Liu, Yajuan, 劉亞娟. “The Zhang Shunyou Affair: A Typical Example of “Setting a 
Typical Example” 張順有事件」: 一個典型的「樹典型」個案.” Zhongyang 
Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 84 (2014): 159–
200. 
Liu, Shao-ch’i and J Mathews. “Self-Cultivation in Organization and Discipline.” 
Chinese Law & Government 5, no. 1 (1972): 24-72.   
Long, Qian, 龍潛. Develop Inner-Party Democracy and Strengthen the Institution of Criticism 
and Self--criticism發展黨內民主和加強批評和自我批評. Huanan chubanshe 華南出
版社, 1952. 
Lubell, Pamela. The Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution: The Case of the 
Sixty-One Renegades. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 
2002. 
Luo, Guoliang, 罗国亮 and 赵铮 Zhao Zheng. “新中国60年来干部考察制度的历史演变.” 
Theory Bimonthly 思想理论双月刊 5 (2009): 7–10. 
Luo, Xiaoli, 罗小利. “A Brief Account of the Origins of Personnel Files in China 简述中
国人事档案的起源.” Dazhong Wenyi 大众文艺 16 (2014): 252. 
Luo, Yanming, 罗燕明. “Chen Yun, Kang Sheng and Yanan Cadre Screening 陈云、康生
与延安干部审查.” Dangshi Bo’lan 党史博览 8 (2010): 7–10. 
Luo, Yanming, 罗燕明. “Further Discussion of Chen Yun and the Cadre Examination 
System in Yan’an 再谈陈云与延安时期干部审查制度罗燕明.” Zhong’guo Yan’an 
Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao 中国延安干部学院学报 4, no. 1 (2011): 111–16. 
Ma, Weiqiang, 马维强. “Shuangkou Village: Identity, Status, and Countryside in the Era 
of Collectivization 双口村:集体化时代的身份、地位与乡村 日常生 活,” Ph.D. diss., 
Shanxi University, 2015. 
 287 
 
MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008.  
Manion, Melanie. “Cadre Recruitment and Management in the People’s Republic of 
China.” Chinese Law and Government 17, no. 3 (1984): 3-15.  
Manoff, Marlene. “Theories of the Archive.” Libraries and the Academy 4, no. 1 (2004): 9–
25.  
Messick, Brinkley. Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society. 
London: University of California Press, 1993.  
Mitchell, Timothy. “Everyday Metaphors of Power.” Theory and Society 19, no. 5 (1990): 
545–77. 
Mitchell, Timothy. “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their 
Critics.” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77–96. 
Mitter, Rana. Forgotten Ally: China’s World War Ii 1937-1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2013. 
Moss, William. “Dang’an: Contemporary Chinese Archives.” The China Quarterly 145 
(1996): 112–29. 
Mouzelis, Nicos. Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories. London: 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1967. 
Mueggler, Erik. The Age of Wild Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
Mühlhahn, Klaus. Criminal Justice in China a History. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009. 
Mullaney, Thomas. The Chinese Typewriter: A History. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018. 
O’Brien, Kevin and Lianjiang Li. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Oksenberg, Michel. “Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy.” The 
China Quarterly 57 (1974): 1-39.  
Oksenberg, Michel. “Political Changes and Their Causes in China, 1949-1972.” The 
Political Quarterly 45, no. 1 (1974): 95–114. 
Pan, Heding, 潘合定, 费运动 Fei Yundong, and 余贵华 Yu Guihua, eds. Collected 




Pantsov, Alexander. “Stalin Watches Mao: Documents From the Top Secret Soviet 
Archives.” 當代中國研究 (Modern China Studies) 22, no. 1 (2015): 13–28. 
Pantsov, Alexander and Daria A Spichak. “New Light From Russian Archives.” 
Twentieth Century China 33, no. 2 (2008): 29–50. 
Perry, Elizabeth. “The Promise of PRC History.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 10, no. 
1 (2016): 113–17. 
Perry, Elizabeth and Li Xun. “Revolutionary Rudeness: The Language of Red Guards 
and Rebel Workers in China’s Cultural Revolution.” Language and Politics in 
Modern China (1993): 1–18. 
Porter, Jonathan. Tseng Kuo-Fan’s Private Bureaucracy. Berkeley: Center for Chinese 
Studies, University of California, 1972. 
Reed, Christopher. Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937. 
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. 
Rinden, Robert and Roxane Witke. The Red Flag Waves; a Guide to the Hung-Chi Collection. 
Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1968. 
Saich, Tony and Bingzhang Yang. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: 
Documents and Analysis. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. 
Sapio, Flora. “Power and Surveillance in Everyday Life,” In Global China: Internal and 
External Reaches, edited by Pak-nung Wong and Yushuo Zheng, Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing Co., 2015, 105–30. 
Schmalzer, Sigrid. Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China. 
Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016. 
Schmalzer, Sigrid. The People’s Peking Man Popular Science and Human Identity in 
Twentieth-Century China. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “Elite Information in China.” Problems of Communism Sept-Oct 
(1985): 65–71. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “Review: Unofficial and Official Histories of the Cultural 
Revolution--a Review Article: Collection of Speeches and Reports on Special 
Topics At the All-China Party School Network Academic Conference on the 
History of the CCP.” The Journal of Asian Studies 48, no. 3 (1989): 563–72. 
Schoenhals, Michael. Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics. Berkeley: Center for 
Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992.  
Schoenhals, Michael. “Talk About a Revolution: Red Guards, Government Cadres, and 




Schoenhals, Michael. “”Non-People” in the People’s Republic of China: A Chronicle of 
Terminological Ambiguity.” Language and Politics in Modern China (1994): 1-48.  
Schoenhals, Michael. “The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79.” The China 
Quarterly 145 (1996): 87–111. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “Ten Years of Madness: Oral Histories of China’s Cultural 
Revolution (Review).” China Review International 6, no. 1 (1999): 106–8. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “Sex in Big-Character Posters From China’s Cultural Revolution: 
Gendering the Class Enemy,” In Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship: Global 
Perspective, edited by Jie-Hyun Lim and Karen Petrone. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, 237-57. 
Schoenhals, Michael. Spying for the People: Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949-1967. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “自传”材料与我的中国当代史研究.” Reading in China 中华读书报 
10 (2013): n.p. 
Schoenhals, Michael. “Protestkultur – Populismus? Gesellschaften Im W Andel Des 20. 
Jahrhunderts.” Gesellschaften im Wandel des 20. Jahrhunderts (2014): 1–10. 
Schoenhals, Michael. China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-69: Not a Dinner Party. Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.  
Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: UC Press, 
1968. 
Scott, James. Seeing Like a State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008. 
Sekula, Allan. “The Body and the Archive.” October 39 (1986): 3–64. 
Selden, Mark. China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
1995. 
Seybolt, Peter. “Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, 
and Mass Movements, 1942-1943.” Modern China 12, no. 1 (1986): 39–73. 
Shaw, Victor. Social Control in China: A Study of Chinese Work Units. Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1996. 
Sheltered, H.B. “Legal Documents and Materials on Administrative Detention in the 
People’s Republic of China.” Chinese Law and Government (1994): 61-92.  
 290 
 
Shen, Zhihua, 沈志华. Soviet Experts in China 苏联专家在中国（1948-1960）Zhongguo 
guoji guangbo chubanshe 中国国际广播出版社, 2003.  
Sheng, Yueh. Sun Yat-Sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution; a Personal 
Account. Lawrence: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1971. 
Smith, Aminda. Thought Reform and China’s Dangerous Classes. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012.  
国家档案局档案工作社, State Archives Bureau, ed. Selected Documents on Documents 
Management and Archives Work 文书处理工作和档案工作文辑 Beijing: Gongren 
chubanshe 工人出版社, 1956. 
Steedman, Carolyn. “Something She Called a Fever: Michelet, Derrida, and Dust.” The 
American Historical Review 106, no. 4 (2001): 1159–80. 
Stoler, Ann. Along the Archival Grain. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Strauss, Julia. “Weiiguan (”lettered Official”), Gongwuyuan (”public Servant”), and 
Ganbu (”cadre”): The Politics of Labelling State Administrators in Republican 
China.” Language and Politics in Modern China (1995): n.p.  
Strauss, Julia. “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries 
and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953.” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 1 (2002): 80–105. 
Strauss, Julia. “Accusing Counterrevolutionaries: Bureaucracy and Theatre in the 
Revolutionary People’s Republic of China (1950–1957),” In Staging Politics Power 
and Performance in Asia and Africa, edited by Donal B. Cruise O’Brien and Julia C. 
Strauss. London: I. B. Tauris, 2007, 49-69.  
Sullivan, Lawrence. “The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 
1977-83.” Asian Survey 24, no. 6 (1984): 597–617. 
Sullivan, Lawrence. “The Biography of an Ziwen and the History of the CCP 
Organization Department.” Chinese Law & Government 21, no. 4 (1988): 15–102. 
Sun, Fuchuan, Michon Morita, and Lawrence W. Strark. “Comparative Patterns of 
Reading Eye Movement in Chinese and English.” Perception & Psychophysics 37 
(1985): 502–6. 
Szonyi, Michael. The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 
Tagg, John. “The Archiving Machine; or, the Camera and the Filing Cabinet.” Grey Room 
47 (2012): 24–37. 
 291 
 
Tang, Jing, 唐晶. “Exploration of Current Development in Chinese Personnel Records 当
前我国人事档案管理发展方向的探索,” M.A. diss., Shandong University, 2007. 
Tang, Xiaobing. “Studies of Shanghai History From the Perspective of New 
Revolutionary History.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 10, no. 1 (2016): 118–22. 
Verdery, Katherine. Secrets and Truths : Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s Secret 
Police. Budapest: Central University Press, 2014. 
Vogel, Ezra. “From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The “Regularisation” of Cadres.” 
The China Quarterly (1967): 36–60. 
Wakeman, Frederic E. History and Will; Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-Tung’s 
Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. 
Wakeman, Frederic E. Spymaster : Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 2003. 
Wakeman, Frederic E. and He. Liang. Telling Chinese History: A Selection of Essays. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. 
Walder, Andrew. Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Walder, Andrew. China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015. 
Walker, Doris. “People’s Court in China: Trial of a Divorce Case.” Guild Prac. 30 (1972): 
45–53. 
Wang, Faxiong, 王法雄. An Outline of Personnel Files Management 人事档案管理概论. 
Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe 湖北人民出版社, 1984. 
Wang, Hui. China From Empire to Nation-State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014. 
Weber, Max, Peter Baehr, and Gordon Wells. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: And Other Writings (Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics). Penguin 
Classics, 2002. 
Weber, Max and Stephen Kalberg. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism With 
Other Writings on the Rise of the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Weld, Kirsten. Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014. 
White, Lynn. Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural 
Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
 292 
 
Whyte, Martin. “Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle.” Center for Research on 
Social Organization Working Paper Series 337 (1986): 1–22. 
Wu, Yiching. The Cultural Revolution At the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
Xia, Yun. “Engendering Contempt for Collaborators: Anti-Hanjian Discourse Following 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945.” Journal of Women’s History 25, no. 1 (2013): 
111–34. 
Xue, Baoqin, 薛保勤, ed. Hongse Dang’an: Yan’an Shiqi Wenxian Dang’an Huibian 红色档
案：延安时期文献档案汇编 Xi’an: Shaanxi Renmin chubanshe 山西人民出版社, 
2014.  
Yang, Kuisong, 杨奎松. A Record of “Marginal People” “边缘人”纪事. 广州: Guangdong 
chubanshe 广东出版社, 2016. 
Yang, Kuisong, 杨奎松. “新中国“三反”运动的来龙去脉(中).” Jiang Huai Wenshi 江淮文
史 6 (2017): 52–69. 
Yang, Kuisong. “Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries.” The 
China Quarterly 193 (2008): 102–21. 
Yang, Kuisong and Wennan Liu. “Studying the Chinese Communist Party in Historical 
Context: An Interview With Yang Kuisong, October 17, 2015.” Journal of Modern 
Chinese History 10, no. 1 (2016): 67–86. 
Yang, Kuisong and S. A. Smith. “Communism in China, 1900-2010,” In The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Communism, edited by S. A. Smith. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 220-235. 
Ye, Wa and Joseph Esherick. Chinese Archives: An Introductory Guide. Berkeley: Institute 
of East Asian Studies, University of California: Center for Chinese Studies, 1996. 
Yurchak, Alexei. Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
Zeng, Yanxiu. Shengan Zatan 审干杂谈. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe 湖南人民
出版社, 1986. 
Zhang, Letian. “Preserving Collective and Individual Memories: The Contemporary 
China Social Life Data and Research Center At Fudan University.” Journal of 
Modern Chinese History 10, no. 1 (2016): 87–97. 
Zhang, Songshan. “Days of Dancing With Wolves: The Confessions of a Special-Case 
Group Leader.” Chinese Law & Government 28, no. 2 (1995): 9–88. 
 293 
 
Zhu, Jie, 朱杰. “The Investigation of Cadres in Jiangsu 1950s 五十年代江苏地区“干部审
查”研究,” M.A. diss., Huadong Normal University, 2012. 
Zou, Jiawei, 邹家炜 and 周雪恒 Zhou Xueheng. Brief History of Chinese Archives 中国
档案事业简史. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin chubanshe 中国人民出版社, 1985. 
294
Appendix I: Maoist Dossiers 
1a. Baoding, 1958 1b. Baoding, 1958 
2a. Beijing, 1960 2b. Beijing, 1960 
295
3a. Gulang, 1958 3b. Gulang, 1958 
4a. Hebei, 1957 4b. Hebei, 1957 
296
5a. PLA, 1954 5b. PLA, 1954 
6a. Railway, 1952 
297
6b. Railway, 1952 
7a. Tucheng, 1970  7b. Tucheng, 1970 
298
8a. Yangyuan, 1973 8b. Yangyuan, 1973 
9a. Yongcheng, 1963 9b. Yongcheng, 1963 
299
10a. Zhaipo, 1959 10b. Zhaipo, 1959 
300
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Campaign to Suppress Hidden Counter-Revolutionaries (1957) 
Illustrations from ‘Study Session’ contained in Supplemental File 
1. 右派分子论点 2. 右派分子宋宝文猖狂的向工人阶级进攻 
3. 请看右派分子宋宝文向群众交待问题的态度吧        4. 右派分子宋宝文向党进攻 
301
5. 右派分子宋宝文 6. 右派分子宋宝文的原形 
7.右派分子宋宝文 8. 右派集团秘密会议 
302
9. 右派向党进攻姿态 10. 这是右派分子宋宝文在大鸣大放中的鬼脸 
303
11. 反革命分子、右派分子殴打妓女罪恶 
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